Jutland, One Hundred Years On

As I write this, almost exactly a century ago the Dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers of the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet and the German Navy's High Seas Fleet were in action off the Western coast of the Danish peninsula; sometimes referred to as Jutland. Over the course of one of the greatest sea battles ever fought the fate of the Entente and Central Powers hung in the balance. If Germany could break the "ring of steel", the Royal Navy's distant blockade, by isolating and destroying portions of the numerically superior Grand Fleet and ultimately wresting control of the North Sea from their enemies the war could have had a dramatically different outcome. However, thanks in no small part to the vast British naval construction programme, and reforms conducted in the years before the war, the German goal was never realised. The "ring of steel" held and the Entente prevailed.

That's the short version of what happened, but the reality was far more complex. The Royal Navy's war from 1914-1918 wasn't just a handful of famous fleet engagements; the names of which are written down in history textbooks. The action at the Heligoland Bight, the battle of the Falkland Islands, the battle of the Dogger Bank, Jutland and the Zebrugge Raid. While these were moments of intense action, they were atypical. A handful of days of fierce combat, where titans clashed on the high seas. While the courage of the men who went to sea in "the fleet that Jack built" (referring to the radical First Sea Lord John "Jackie" Fisher) is unquestionable, we often forget that courage takes many forms. It was never simply a question of a few isolated sorties to confront the German fleet. The First World War at sea was as much a grinding attritional battle as the conflict on land. The drawn out determination of men in all of Britain's warships, great and small, for four long, hard, years helped ensure the defeat of the Central Powers. Today and tomorrow we commemorate 100 years since the action off Jutland, but in a little over a day's time we will go back to our lives, and many will forget. For the men of the Royal Navy in 1916 each day after Jutland was another in the long hard months of training, sorties, scouting and blockade duty in the North Sea. Each day was another spent keeping the sea open to friendly shipping and firmly closed to hostile commerce raiders.

A day from now, when the hundredth anniversary of the battle Jutland passes, I shall still take another moment to remember the sailors who, after having witnessed the titanic clash of fleets, made ready to go to sea once again. While the great battlefleets on both sides often dominate the public view of the First World War at sea, the myriad of smaller ships: cruisers, destroyers and gunboats, on lonely stations, were just as crucial and crewed by men no less courageous. Jutland ensured the Royal Navy kept control of the sea, but it was how they used that control that really mattered.

It is to the efforts of all who served in the Royal Navy throughout the Great War I dedicate this poem, for our world is built upon their backs. I am eternally humbled by their courage, service and sacrifice.

"They bear, in place of classic names,

Letters and numbers on their skin.

They play their grisly blindfold games

In little boxes made of tin.

Sometimes they stalk the Zeppelin,

Sometimes they learn where mines are laid

Or where the Baltic ice is thin.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

Few prize-courts sit upon their claims.

They seldom tow their targets in.

They follow certain secret aims

Down under, far from strife or din.

When they are ready to begin

No flag is flown, no fuss is made

More than the shearing of a pin.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

The Scout’s quadruple funnel flames

A mark from Sweden to the Swin,

The Cruiser’s thundrous screw proclaims

Her comings out and goings in:

But only whiffs of paraffin

Or creamy rings that fizz and fade

Show where the one-eyed Death has been.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

Their feats, their fortunes and their fames

Are hidden from their nearest kin;

No eager public backs or blames,

No journal prints the yarns they spin

(The Censor would not let it in!)

When they return from run or raid.

Unheard they work, unseen they win.

That is the custom of “The Trade."

-Rudyard Kipling, The Trade

Beyond NATO: Part Two, An EU Army

"With its own army, Europe could react more credibly to the threat to peace in a member state or in a neighboring state"
-Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission

This is the second part in an ongoing series that examines some alternative European defence structures, that could arise in the wake of the US withdrawing its forces and security guarantees from the continent. As we've already seen in the "NATO Minus" scenario the Atlantic alliance would be very hard pressed to generate credible forces to adequately defend its external borders and deter potential Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. However, trying to muddle through by attempting to perpetuate as much of the status-quo as possible is far from the only option that would be open to European states, following American disengagement. One of the most superficially attractive alternatives would be the expansion of the European Union's (EU) defence identity and the creation of a single "EU Army" greater than the sum of its parts. An ongoing process of European defence integration is provided for in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon:

"The Common Security and Defence Policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the member states the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements."

A security guarantee, the "mutual defence clause", similar in practice to NATO's Article 5 is also included in the terms of the treaty:

"If a Member State is a victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States."

These components of the existing treaty could very well become the core of a more Eurocentric alliance in the event that NATO lapsed or dissolved following a US withdrawal from its structures. With the mutual defence clause and a broad statement, committing the members to creating "a common defence", that could be interpreted in many ways the EU has the tools to create a defence union. While the prospect of achieving the unanimous support of the Council of Ministers (i.e. the governments of the EU member states) for such a policy currently seems remote, the US pulling out of NATO could very well provide the impetus for a significant policy shift amongst many of the states currently reluctant to pursue the idea. If the decision was made to develop the EU, rather than NATO, as the core European defence alliance this would undoubtedly have profound consequences for the long-term evolution of the EU's role and the shape of defence on the continent.

However, while the groundwork may have been laid for the EU to assume a much broader and deeper role in European defence, little of substance has actually been built on those foundations. Some progress towards the goal of increased European defence integration was made in the early 2000s: the creation of the EU military committee (2000), EU Institute for Strategic Studies (2002). a European Security Strategy (2003) and the establishment of the European Defence Agency (2004), an EU Military Staff (2004) and EU Battlegroups (2007). While this may seem like an impressive timeline, tracking the progress of an increasingly mature European Union defence identity, a brief look at "the man behind the curtain" reveals just how hollow these structures really are. In reality the whole EU defence project to date amounts to little more than an organisation playing with a handful of feeble military instruments.

Take for example the EU Battlegroups that were heralded by Eurosceptics as the beginning of the end of their national armed forces, and by Federalists as a key step on the road towards a fully-fledged EU armed forces at the core of an increasingly state-like union. To date neither of those predictions have come to pass although, admittedly it is likely still too early to tell where the end point will be. However, what we currently have are a handful of toothless regiment-sized "rapid reaction" forces theoretically capable of deploying within 5-10 days and sustaining themselves for about a month, this can be extended to 120 days "if resupplied appropriately". When you consider that the combat capabilities of these formations are, frankly, pathetic it is unsurprising that deploying them remains politically impossible and that none have ever been used. The only conclusion that can be made about the EU Battlegroups is that their purpose is as a symbolic political project, rather than a serious attempt to create an EU military that is at all credible.

EU Battlegroups: small, toothless and nearly impossible to deploy. 

If the EU Battlegroups are currently the apex of the European Union's defence identity, then it is clear that if the organisation would have a very long way to go if it was to take on the expansive defence and security role currently provided for by NATO. One way of achieving this on a much shorter timescale would be for the EU to "adopt" the, now highly Eurocentric, NATO alliance following American withdrawal. This would have the very significant advantage of not having to build 70 years of military experience almost overnight, along with the continuation of mature NATO structures. Such an arrangement could also provide crucial impetus to progress Turkey's application for entry into the EU. Alternatively, "Europeanisation" of the NATO alliance may lead to political tensions that could see non-EU members such as Turkey and Canada depart altogether. The continued participation and commitment of non-EU states would almost certainly be in doubt, so long as they remained outside the formal political union.

Although the adoption of NATO as a "European" institution is a possibility that could be made to work, the practical difficulties in achieving this aim would seem to be quite significant. Under these circumstances it has to be asked that if NATO should lapse or fall apart, following a US withdrawal, how well placed is the EU to recreate its functions? From the perspective of institutional experience it's fair to say that the EU is extremely poorly equipped to take on NATO's principal roles of collective defence. The EU Military Staff itself remains incapable of conducting operations, instead delegating this responsibility to an "Operational Headquarters" (OHQ) drawn from an existing military alliance (such as the NATO Allied Command Operations centre) or a member state (such as the UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood). While a parallel "EU Operations Centre" has existed since 2007 it is not a formal standing headquarters and would be assembled on an ad-hoc basis. This body's capacity to plan and conduct complex military operations, without extensive support from the member states, remains extremely limited. While a permanent standing EU operational headquarters would certainly enhance the institution's capacity to plan and conduct complex military operations, it is unclear why it would be necessary, when it would simply duplicate a capability that already exists across Europe. Currently there are headquarters in the UK, France, Germany and Italy (as well as the NATO HQ in Belgium) capable of acting in the EU OHQ role. In terms of command and control the EU remains almost wholly reliant on its members to provide the necessary facilities and personnel to coordinate complex operations. Without "adopting" the NATO OHQ, building the existing ad-hoc EU Operations Centre into a fully fledged military command and control facility would undoubtedly be a lengthy and very expensive process.

Another serious issue is the EU's lack of institutional military experience. To date EU operations on land have been characterised by their relatively small scale, low-intensity and multinational nature. Since 2002 five ground operations have been conducted under the EU Force (EUFOR) banner in the following countries: Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic. The largest of these operations (EUFOR Chad/CAR) comprised 4,300 troops drawn from twenty nations, of which 3,700 were actually deployed and 600 held in Europe as a reserve force. More than half the troops assigned to the operation were French, with significant Irish and Polish contingents also present. This relatively modest out of area operation suffered significant logistical problems from the outset, taking six months to achieve its full in-country operating capabilities and only then with significant additional support from the French and Russian armed forces. Only with the deployment of Russian helicopters in late 2008, in support of the EU mission, were these finally overcome.

Russian helicopters proved essential to solving EUFOR's logistical problems
during their deployment to Chad in 2008-2009.

Although the EU has some institutional experience with low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as the ones listed above, its current capacity to do much more is doubtful; considering the significant problems it appears to have had deploying small forces overseas. On the European periphery the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Macedonia are essentially a continuation of the NATO missions to those countries, the only things that have changed in practice are the overall commanders and the addition of the EU brand to the mission. Functionally these deployments have changed very little since their handover from NATO to the EU in 2004. Since 2008 there have been two significant EU naval operations, Atlanta and Sophia/Triton. The former was the EU's response to the spike in piracy off Somalia between 2005 and 2013 and the latter is the ongoing operation to deal with the Mediterranean refugee crisis. Operation Atlanta was part of a wider international effort, involving many other states through the multinational Combined Task Force 151. Its goals were limited and the operating environment permissive, essentially amounting to a complex maritime constabulary task far removed from high intensity war-fighting. As for the EU's Mediterranean operations, Sophia and Triton, both have (to date) failed to match the operational effects achieved during the Italian government's unilateral effort: "Operation Mare Nostrum" conducted between 2013 and 2014 but ended on cost grounds. If these missions were to be summed up with a single word it would be "unambitious". EU missions to date have been defined by their narrow scope, small scale, permissive operating environments and limited duration. This is likely indicative of the institution's structural inability to manage more ambitious or complex military tasks in its current form.

So what of the prospects of deeper integration and a unified EU armed forces? It is unquestionable that mechanisms do exist within the Lisbon Treaty to facilitate increased military integration, the ultimate goal of which is a "common defence". Although the terms used in the treaty are broad and any progress requires unanimous consent from the Council of Ministers (effectively giving every state a veto) it is fair to say that structural provisions do exist to facilitate more defence integration. However, the requirement for unanimity ensures that, in practice, very little real progress can be made towards an EU defence union at present. The final report of the Future of Europe Group identified this issue in 2012, suggesting that in order for progress to be made towards defence union the principal of unanimity would have to be given up in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and replaced by the Qualified Majority Voting system. Such a change would indeed be required if progress were to be made towards a more federated EU defence structure. That said, the prospect of member states unanimously rescinding their veto in this area currently remains a remote one. The key question therefore becomes: would a US withdrawal from NATO be a significant enough strategic shock to convince EU members to abandon the principle of unanimity on the CFSP?

Of course there is some possibility that such an event might trigger a much broader reconsideration of the EU's role as a serious European defence player and there will be some within the EU institutions that would push hard for it but, in the author's opinion, there would simply be too many structural problems to overcome in order to turn the EU into a credible military player. Such a significant change in the status of the union as the movement towards a meaningful defence union would undoubtedly trigger referendums in a number of countries and these would be plebiscites that the federalist position would be unlikely to carry, given the significant unpopularity of moves towards further political integration in a number of key EU states. Not least of which is the union's foremost military power: the United Kingdom. In practice an EU defence union could not work without the wholehearted support of Britain and France, something it is unlikely to receive for domestic political reasons rather than foreign policy concerns. Even if the vast political hurdles to such an enterprise could be surmounted, they would inevitably be followed by even greater practical issues. How would an EU military be funded, raised, trained and equipped? Taking on one of the core functions of a state, defence, would inevitably lead to the growth of other federalising pressures: centralised powers of taxation foremost amongst them. This is simply one of the many reasons upon which the "EU Army" concept falls apart, to build a credible army the EU would need to become far more like a state than it currently is and there simply isn't the appetite amongst the peoples of Europe to see that idea realised.

The closest that Europe has currently got to a unified military organisation, a "European Army" (albeit not an especially credible one) is Eurocorps. Established over three years between 1992 and 1995 Eurocorps is a multinational military organisation centered on a permanently attached combined Franco-German brigade. While Eurocorps is not an EU organisation it does explicitly state that its purpose is as a force that can be made available to the EU, along with other international organisations and NATO, when necessary. To date the Corps only has five permanent members: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain alongside five associate states: Greece, Italy, Romania, Poland and Turkey. While Eurocorps may seem to be a European Army in the making to an outside observer in practice it is in fact similar in execution to NATO's multinational Response Force and Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. The principal difference being that Eurocorps can also be used for or in support of EU missions, hardly a model for a future EU armed forces.

Eurocorps, a very long way from a real "EU Army"

The final assessment of the EU's ability to assume NATO's role of collective defence, in the event that the alliance lapsed or dissolved following American withdrawal, is that in all likelihood it could not. The EU's existing military structures are, in all honesty, pathetically feeble and principally symbolic. They are the follies of an almost exhausted federalist dream rather than a serious attempt at building a set of armed forces for the EU that could perform the roles currently covered by the member states themselves and coordinated through NATO. Although NATO could be "adopted" as an increasingly European institution, following US withdrawal, this would have the likely effect of driving a wedge between EU NATO members and non-EU members. A wedge that could potentially lead to the withdrawal of allies, such as Turkey and Canada, from European defence structures entirely. Furthermore, the political difficulties inherent in setting in motion the processes which would enable the creation of a European Army remain so great as to be almost insurmountable. They are tied far too closely to an unpopular federalist direction for the EU to gain the support needed to carry the creation of a single military force for the union through to its conclusion. The, almost certain, outcome would be a series of unwinnable national referendums on the issue, which would undoubtedly kill it.

The reality of the EU's military structures is that they are a "Potemkin Village", a symbolic facade with no real substance behind them. They cannot be relied upon to provide for Europe's defence because they are incapable of managing all but the simplest and lowest intensity conventional operations. In effect the institution would remain wholly dependent on its members and unified EU armed forces will remain an unattainable federalist dream.

Thoughts on a Grand Strategy for Britain

"I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."

-Viscount Palmerston, 1848

Of the 194 independent states currently in existence you would be hard pressed to find many that have more potential than the United Kingdom. As I explained here and here the British state has a raft of in-built advantages, from its globally engaged and powerful economy to the range of useful overseas territories, modern armed forces and an impressive diplomatic footprint. And yet, since the end of the Second World War, Britain has lurched from crisis to crisis with events and political short termism dictating national strategy. Since the 1956 Suez Crisis the relationship with the United States, never one of equals, has steadily come to replace British strategy abroad. At home the relationship with the European Union and it's predecessors has also curtailed national strategic decision making. For the best part of a century an uneasy hodgepodge of US and European grand strategy has effectively been British grand strategy. This has led to the steady atrophying of a unique political and military culture, that was decidedly un-American and un-European, with no real replacement. While much world-class strategic thought still goes on in the UK it is largely confined to Academic spheres, lacking integration with mainstream politics and public consciousness. What must be recognised to move forwards is that our current approach has been broadly unsuccessful and that what's needed is a distinct and British grand strategy, designed to use the UK's strengths to secure and advance its national interests in the long term.

To begin to formulate a grand strategy first a question must be asked and answered: "what will Britain's vital national interests in the coming century, and beyond, be?". I would argue some are obvious and eternal; the enduring territorial integrity of the British isles, the continued existence of the United Kingdom as a single political entity, economic prosperity, stability, the protection of British citizens wherever they may be and the sustainment of the Western liberal order. Simple, direct and broad in scope these are what I conceive Britain's long-term interests to be. To define UK interests too narrowly and specifically would ensure that the resulting analysis would eventually become dated and increasingly irrelevant. It also avoids falling into the trap of confusing values with interests. Although the sustainment of the Western liberal order is a vital national interest, it's expansion is not. Events in the last decade and a half have shown that trying to forcefully expand the borders of the Western order is usually futile and has unintended consequences. That said, states willingly wishing to join that club should be admitted with open arms; as Eastern Europe was after the collapse of Soviet Communism. For these reasons the interests that drive grand strategy must be broadly defined and enduring. If the ends sought are to be broadly defined and eternal, then the ways used to achieve them; the grand strategy, must take an equally broad approach to the UK's geo-strategic challenges.

In contrast with simple political or military strategy, which draw upon distinct resources to achieve specific goals in the short to medium term, grand strategy aims to combine all aspects of national power and influence in pursuit of its aims. When applying narrow forms of power, be they military, diplomatic, economic or otherwise, Britain often fails to live up to its potential. The United Kingdom does not have the most powerful global economy, the military might of a vast continental state, or the raw influence to be the essential diplomatic power broker. However, when taken together it's easy to see that Britain has nearly unrivaled national power across the whole spectrum. The British armed forces may not be the most powerful, but they have a range of impressive capabilities and can still "go to the crisis" with decisive force if needed. The UK wields impressive influence through it's global diplomatic presence, with seats in countless international organisations; not least of which is permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Although it's true that Britain can't compete with the vast resources of China and the United States for economic power, only a fool would call the UK economically weak. While the 2008 financial crisis hit key sectors of the economy hard Britain is currently amongst the fastest growing economies in Europe, a dynamic medium-sized economy with a strong tradition of the rule of law and the ability to efficiently mobilise its resources. If there is one aspect of national power in which Britain excels, yet continues to underutilise, it is cultural. While feelings on Britain's imperial period are decidedly mixed, the overriding legacies of Empire: the Anglosphere, the Commonwealth, English as the global language of commerce, the export of British common law and institutions as well as the "Westminster system" of government tend to be positive ones that (if used correctly) will continue to enhance UK power. If Britain wishes to protect and advance its national interests it must be done by wielding comprehensive, rather than narrow and specific, national power.

At it's most successful Britain applied economic, military, diplomatic
and cultural power effectively in pursuit of its interests.

Before beginning to look at an overarching national strategy it's necessary to examine what has prevented the UK from doing so over the last half century or so. The outcome of the 1956 Suez war, the "last gasp of the imperial lion", effectively shackled much of British foreign policy to that of the United States. Whether the Americans intended for that to be the outcome is up for debate, but the practical long-term consequence was an ever closer foreign policy union between the two great Anglosphere nations; a union that has increasingly become dominated by the senior partner. While the "Special Relationship" has not been one of true equals for a very long time, on it's own it doesn't explain the British dependence on America's foreign policy leadership.

For that we must look at to the period of decolonisation after the Second World War and the growth of an unhelpful Eurocentric view of the world. Although the decision for Britain to withdraw from its vast Empire after 1945 was certainly, in hindsight, the correct one; the imperial possessions that were being abandoned were too often confused with structures established to protect the UK's overseas interests. It is easy to forget that when Britain first acquired an Empire, its territories existed to provide a string of naval bases that supported maritime forces capable of defending and advancing British interests. The vast land empire, which emerged later as a product of the Industrial Revolution, overlaid the original structure and obscured its purpose. Bases, and the commitments they underpinned, in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and South China Sea were abandoned in the decolonisation drive. During this process the expectation was often that the United States would become Britain's proxy in the abandoned regions, who would defend British national interests at little to no cost to the UK. While the Americans certainly did enter these regions as the guarantor of stability, they came with their own economic and diplomatic agendas that often didn't match Britain's. It is too easy to forget that while the US is a diplomatic, military and cultural ally of the first order; it remains an economic competitor and undeniably self-interested in that regard.

The second factor that has contributed to the atrophy of British grand strategic thought is the increasingly Eurocentric approach to foreign policy, instigated by the Cold War and exacerbated by the period of relative decline in the late 1960s and through the 1970s. At that time there was a belief, strongly held by some, that in the future the United Kingdom could redefine itself as a mid-sized European power; rather than as a great power situated in Europe but with interests and concerns that spread far beyond the continent. This view contributed to the UK's steady collapse down to a continental defence posture, designed for the Cold War confrontation in Europe, that was ill-suited to the defence and advancement of it's interests elsewhere. A concerted effort was also made  to abandon much of Britain's presence outside Europe throughout that period, although the retreat from 'East of Suez' was the most prominent, Mediterranean and South Atlantic commitments were also drawn down. All of this, combined with a degree of fatalism amongst decision makers, often meant that the draw down from what were perceived as imperial commitments was pushed further and faster than it should have been. To some extent Britain's improved economic condition (and the boost given to national confidence by victory in the Falklands and the Gulf) curbed the worst of the declinist tendency amongst policymakers for a time. 

Now, however, after a grueling decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan we are seeing a return to timid passivity in the face of some of the gravest crises since the end of the Cold War a quarter century ago. Such behavior is placing greater burdens on an already overburdened United States, still a vital and potent ally, as well as failing to support British national interests. There is also the uncomfortable fact that the United Kingdom is often led, handled and judged as if it were a smaller and less potent copy of the United States. An apparent ignorance of what must be done to maximise Britain's international power is particularly concerning. Too often have leaders missed the basic truth that a country with the will to be engaged and active on the international stage will always "punch above its weight", whereas those too timid to do so will usually remain on the sidelines. In the event of a crisis there is often much to lose and little to be gained by not being involved, or at least possessing the ability to become involved at short-notice. 

The willingness and ability to "go to the crisis" with decisive force has set the
UK apart from other countries over the centuries.

The lesson of the last sixty years is clear: while allies are often essential to the success of British engagement abroad they are a very poor substitute for sovereign capabilities and action. Therefore, before a grand strategy tailored to Britain's situation can be developed, there must be some degree of separation from the foreign policy goals of the United States and from the European continent. While policymakers will likely still find that UK and US interests often align closely, making co-operation highly desirable, a more independent and mercenary approach should be taken when interests conflict. As for the affairs of the European continent, they stand as more of an impediment to a global strategy for Britain than anything else. While stability in Europe is an important, likely essential, component for a successful global Britain, protracted continental commitments have almost always proved an expensive distraction. Only when it's vital national interests are at stake should the UK consider entering into binding continental commitments. "Business as usual" on the continent would be the exercise of influence through diplomatic and economic means, backed up by UK-based armed forces that could be deployed in the event of a serious crisis.

On the subject of Europe, the gravest threat is likely to remain an embittered, revanchist Russia. While Putin's conservative clique remain in power it seems likely that tensions will be high, as liberal Western values collide with Russia's deeply conservative world view on the fringes of Eastern Europe. The challenge for Britain is that Eastern Europe is fundamentally a theater where it's military influence will always be rather limited. "Blue water" maritime forces are not well suited to the enclosed waters of the Baltic, threatened as they are by Russian air power and missiles based in their enclave at Kaliningrad. It is fundamentally a continental theatre, where a maritime power such as Britain would find it impossible to contribute significant forces; certainly without compromising it's global limited-war power projection capabilities. As it stands, a power vacuum exists in Eastern Europe. Following the recent withdrawal of the last substantial American ground forces, the two heavy brigade combat teams, from Germany almost all of NATO's first class military capability is now situated to the West of Germany. Although the US has issued an abrupt volte face, returning some of the heavy equipment it withdrew in 2013, Europe is approaching a tipping point. The continuous presence of large American conventional forces can no longer be considered to be a certain prospect.Without enough high-readiness conventional forces positioned nearby, to balance Russia's ability to rapidly mobilise very large numbers of troops (demonstrated time and again by "snap" military drills and maneuvers), the situation will remain unstable and potentially quite dangerous.

The return of large-scale US forces to Germany in the long term is something that cannot be counted upon, as a growing confrontation with China in the Pacific continues to exert a powerful draw on overstretched American military resources. Instead, in order to secure the integrity of the NATO alliance (and by extension the Western liberal order in Eastern Europe) Germany must be rehabilitated as a continental great power, integrated into the defence of Eastern Europe. Although the burden of history weighs heavy the most effective means of balancing Russian power in the long-term is to have the other great power in the region, Germany, fully and actively committed to regional security through NATO. The logical question that follows this conclusion is "what does this have to do with the United Kingdom?", presuming Britain wouldn't be able to exert the influence to instigate such a significant policy change. While it's true that the decision would ultimately rest with the Germans, there is still much the UK could do to help move them in that direction. As one of the most influential members of NATO, with strong transatlantic links to the most influential member, much could be done within the alliance to set the direction and agenda of it's future commitments to Eastern Europe. In recent years Germany has also proved more willing to deploy its armed forces outside its borders, in an alliance context, than in the past. With the right incentives and multilateral direction, their participation in combat and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan could prove to be a watershed moment, the first step along a road leading to a more normal position in the international system. It's not impossible to conceive that this precedent could be used to begin the shift to a regionally deployable Bundeswehr, capable of balancing Russia along with predominantly Eastern European NATO allies.

Europe will not be able to count on the United States continuing to commit large,
expensive, military forces to it's defence, while its interests elsewhere are pressured.

Any attempt to use Germany to balance Russian power must also address the thorny issue of the former's energy dependence on the latter. While it is true that Germany imports some ~40% of its natural gas from the Russian Federation, there are several factors that make the use of the "energy weapon" against Germany a much more unattractive prospect than its use against other Eastern European states. First and foremost is the sheer quantity of Russian natural gas imported by Germany, about a quarter of what Gazprom exports to Europe. Shutting off supply to Germany for a long period of time would likely do serious damage to the Russian state owned energy sector, already struggling in the wake of the collapse in the price of oil. Nor could the energy weapon be used briefly to any great effect either, unlike the Eastern European countries subjected to a punitive gas shutoff in 2009 Germany has substantial storage capacity (equal to ~50% of their annual needs). As Germany is an especially unattractive target, hardened against the Russian "energy weapon", it should not stand as the overwhelming impediment to a more engaged German defence posture in Eastern Europe that it might be considered to be.

The reader might, rightly, ask why building a new structure to guarantee the security and stability of Central and Eastern Europe was the first issue addressed when discussing a British grand strategy. In order for the UK to focus it's efforts where it is best equipped to do so, outside the European continent, it needs a measure of freedom from continental commitments. While Britain will always have an important part to play in European defence, through NATO, it needs to be recognised that the UK is best able to contribute on the alliance's "maritime flanks" rather than a distant Eastern "central front". Failing to create new structures within NATO to guarantee the security of Eastern Europe, with Germany playing a key role, will continue to leave that region dangerously exposed to an illiberal Russia. In the long-term the United States will not continue to be the ultimate guarantor of European security forever. They will inevitably continue to be an invaluable ally, and a vital pillar of NATO, but we need to be prepared to take up much of the slack they will leave as their forces are drawn down to a size that allows them to balance their other global commitments.

While Britain will always be tied much more closely to the security of Europe by dint of its geographical proximity than the United States, it too must look to balance its commitment to the continent against a much broader demi-global role stretching from the Atlantic to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean. In order for the UK to secure its interests beyond Europe it first needs a measure of stability in Europe. As history shows us, this will require working alongside and supporting continental allies, rather than attempting to replace them. As it stands Britain is a powerful country, with a broad range of advantages and tools at its disposal, constrained by a lack of independent strategic thought, over-reliance on others in the sphere of foreign policy and a volatile European situation. Before a coherent grand strategy can emerge these problems need to be tackled, not by abandoning old alliances and roles but by reinventing and reinvigorating them so that they better suit our current needs and those of our allies. It also needs to recognise that Britain's strengths lie in the maritime sphere, and that this is where we must focus our efforts if we are to successfully defend and advance our interests.

Geographic Fatalism: Maps and Why the West isn't Doomed

Maps are amongst the most ingeniously deceptive objects in existence today, for they can make the strong appear weak and the weak appear strong. Maps give you just enough information to come to the wrong conclusions about the way the world is ordered, and the meaning of national power. People tend to fall into the trap of presuming that, when it comes to countries, bigger is better. Strength is assumed to stem from the number of square kilometres of land a state governs, the size of its population, how many soldiers it commands, and its economic produce: measured in tonnes of coal, steel and grain.

There's just one problem with this neat, ordered, view of the world. It's almost completely wrong. It can't explain how the tiny merchant republic of Venice was able to march into the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire in 1204, and burn it to the ground. It can't explain how Portugal and Holland carved out trading empires, that brought them fabulous wealth, from countries many times their size. Nor can it explain how Britain repeatedly and consistently humiliated China, the largest country in the world, throughout the nineteenth century. Maps paint a profoundly misleading picture of the world. They ignore the fact that the larger a country is, the more difficult it becomes to administer and defend. As a state gains "mass" it commonly loses agility and efficiency. The largest countries, with one notable exception, are usually fatally undermined by corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency.

Map of perceived corruption, with the most
corrupt countries in red and the least in blue.

While there are a few enormous countries which dominate vast swathes of the earth's surface they have often proved to be "titans with feet of clay", backwards and underdeveloped because their territory is far too large to centrally manage with any real hope of success. So often shrewd diplomacy, limited aims, good organisation and technical prowess have allowed smaller nations to humble larger ones. It is so often the case that the most successful states, able to project power and influence far beyond their borders, are rarely the largest. Instead they are those that best balance "mass" and resources with efficiency, agility and crucially the will to act.

Britain's experience of Empire is an almost perfect example of how territory alone does not bring power. Having slowly won a vast land empire, over the course of two hundred years, by the middle of the twentieth century the cost of administering that territory had begun to exceed the income it generated. Nor was the Empire an endless source of useful military power, for it consumed the bulk of the British and colonial armies in static garrisons, and most of the Royal Navy policing and protecting its communications. This was a far cry from the early days of Britain's rise to great power status, where the nation's resources were ruthlessly directed into the effort to control maritime trade. A handful of possessions in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Caribbean and Indian Ocean provided staging grounds for the projection of maritime power and the control of commerce.

The obvious exception to the rule would appear to be the United States, a very large country with the ability to mobilise its resources with sufficient efficiency to produce a degree of international power not before seen in human history. However, let us not forget that it was not until very recently that it attained the hegemonic position it now occupies. It also mustn't be forgotten that the USA's current position was built upon its status as the sole great power to survive the Second World War relatively unscathed. Its rivals were so damaged by the war that in 1945 the US alone accounted for half of global economic output. The war mobilised enough of their economy to generate power that was unrivalled by all but the Soviet Union. Without a sound economic base underpinning their power the Communist bloc, led by the USSR, ended up bankrupting themselves trying to keep pace with the US. By the 1980s the US was spending 7% of it's GDP on defence, while the Soviets were spending 27%. The period of unusual US economic strength from 1945 to the early 1970s laid the foundations for the hegemon we know today. What made it a reality, however, was the US' geostrategic position. The modern continental United States is effectively an island, bounded by the sea to the East and West and incredibly weak neighbours to the North and South. This allows the US government to look beyond the American continent when it comes to securing their interests, instead of having a myopic fixation on their land borders. Despite this, there are clear signs that US power is slowly waning. Now that its economy only accounts for a fifth of global GDP it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to remain the comprehensive superpower we have known. In short, while the United States certainly bucks the trend it remains an atypical example: briefly blessed with overwhelming economic dominance and benefiting from a highly advantageous geographical position. As for corruption and inefficiency, the federal system alleviates some of the worst effects of trying to run such a vast country with a centralised government. That said, there is still enormous waste in the US system. Routine complaints of pork barrel politics, bloated federal government and waste just go to show that the US isn't immune to the problems inherent in managing such a vast country.

The US is a strategic island, able to deploy it's resources to further its
Interests rather than to defend it's borders.

Time and again it's been demonstrated that well organised, efficient and willing small and medium sized countries can out maneuver and defeat their much larger counterparts. In the case of the latter so much effort is invested in simply running vast countries that they rarely have the spare resources or the will to routinely reach far beyond their own borders. This explains why countries like Britain, France, Germany and Japan continue to exert as much or greater influence as countries many times their size, with vastly larger populations and far greater resources to call upon. When large states are able to mobilise their "mass", turning it towards a specific goal, they are nigh - unstoppable: as the Soviet Union and United States demonstrated during the Second World War. However, such mobilisation is extremely difficult to sustain over the long term. With the country usually falling back into a more natural, inward-looking, state of existence.

For the forseeable future it would seem that medium-sized European states, along with the USA, will remain powerful and competitive. Western states, networked and efficient, have advantages that will ensure their continued relevance. Whatever happens, the economic rise of the BRIC countries will be singularly difficult to translate into other forms of power and influence. Their sheer size and vast populations bring as many burdens with them as they do benefits. Drawing simple conclusions about power from maps will lead you to make deterministic assumptions about the power dynamics that govern the international system. Those that believe China will supplant the United States as a global superpower have bought into the lie that territory, resources and population equate to power. A more nuanced examination would show that for all its mass China remains politically fragile, inward looking and largely isolated.

The "rise of the rest" is a defining reality of the twenty first century, but that doesn't mean that large states with big populations are destined to inherit the earth. Historically this has not been the case, it is doubtful that it will be in the future. Unfortunately maps have convinced some that scale correlates closely with power and influence. Thankfully for the West this isn't the case.

Queens and Princes: The Road Ahead for UK Carrier Aviation

 "The navy of any great power has the dream to have one or more aircraft carriers. The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier."

- Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Chinese Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Office.

As it stands the UK is currently in the middle of a long process, which will culminate in the regeneration of key national capability: the ability to fly fixed wing aircraft from the decks of its carriers. Once this process is complete, some time in the early 2020s, the Royal Navy will return to operating full size carriers for the first time since Ark Royal, the last of the Audacious class, decommissioned in 1979. The new Queen Elizabeth class are true supercarriers, though not cast from the same mold as the US Navy's current Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford classes, they can still employ an impressive array of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Although the class will be fitted with deck equipment for short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft like the F-35B, including the famous "ski-jump", they are of a similar size to the US Navy's former Forrestal and Kitty Hawk class carriers. It is easy to see that there is vast scope for modification and upgrade throughout their service lives, a process which every previous class of British carriers since the Second World War has undergone. The only certain thing is that these ships will end their service lives looking very different from the way they began them. Thankfully, unlike their predecessors, significant margins for growth have been built into the two ~70,000 ton ships from the start.

The short term shape of the carriers and their air groups is now mostly known, with the 2015 SDSR clearing up some of the speculation; especially with regards to the number of F-35B to be routinely embarked. The purchase of 42 airframes, with the specified purpose of arming the carriers with a "full air group", indicates that we could see the Tailored Air Group (TAG) routinely including an F-35B squadron; with a total of around 24 fixed-wing aircraft. This leaves a further 16 "slots" in the TAG available for a range of rotary wing assets, including the Army's Apache and the RAF operated Chinook. This is one of the most pioneering parts of the UK carrier concept: operating them as RN-led tri service assets. In theory these ships could simultaneously host RAF, Fleet Air Arm and Army Air Corps aircraft and maintainance crews. Making all this work in practice, in a challenging maritime environment, is likely to be a major test of the viability of the concept. It is encouraging that the tri service concept builds upon years of hard won experience, gained from the RAF/FAA Joint Force Harrier and the RAF/FAA/AAC Joint Helicopter Command. Small numbers of RAF Harriers have, in the past, operated from the decks of RN light carriers. As recently as 2011 the AAC flew some of its Apache gunships from HMS Ocean during the intervention in Libya. However, the scale of the Queen Elizabeth carriers and the sheer number of aircraft operating from her will inevitably complicate matters. Nevertheless, the concept is certainly exciting and will give the UK a truly flexible asset and a first class capability, if they can pull it off.

So, what might the future hold for these ships, the aircraft that fly from them and the people that will make the whole thing work?

"Jointness" and the Joint Strike Fighter:
As it stands the medium-term plan for the UK's fleet of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters has been spelled out. With the initial aircraft divided between the RAF's 617 "Dambusters" Sqdn. and the FAA's 809 "Immortals" Sqdn. Both of which will be based at RAF Marham in Norfolk, the UK hub for F-35. The pilots and maintainers in both squadrons will be a mix of RAF and FAA personnel, with the bulk likely being drawn from the RAF. The entirety of the UK F-35 fleet will also be officially "owned" by the RAF, this means that the RN will have a more limited degree of control over the FAA badged squadrons than in the past. Looking to history for a precedent for this sort of arrangement seems to throw up an eventual outcome that doesn't bode well for the current structure. Between 1924 and 1937 UK naval aviation was given over to a branch of the RAF, over the ensuing thirteen years a clear divide emerged between the naval aviators and their land based counterparts. While "FAA squadrons" will exist in the future structure they will, in effect, function as a naval branch of the RAF in all but name. Squadrons routinely deployed to the carriers, likely the FAA badged ones, will develop a more "naval mentality" and slowly diverge in skills and attitudes from those that do so far less frequently or not at all. While the planned common pool of pilots may seem like a way around this, it may in fact end up militating against the development of the skilled naval aviators necessary to get the most from the carriers.

Allowing some pilots, wearing light or dark blue uniforms, to spend much of their career conducting carrier operations at sea will eventually result in the slow re-emergence of a group of professional naval aviators that will not fit especially comfortably into the planned joint structure. The same could be said of the ground crews and maintainers, with certain people gravitating towards the naval environment and drafts on the carriers while others remain ashore. Whether this will eventually lead to a natural split in the joint force, with the navy taking control of some of the aircraft once the FAA rebuilds the necessary skills and personnel base to do so, remains to be seen. Although the cost of doing so for the RN will likely remain prohibitive. What is very much more likely is that de-facto divisions will emerge within the joint force, with the FAA badged squadrons containing the preponderance of experienced carrier pilots and "navalised" maintainers. The land-based squadrons' pilots will continue to qualify for carrier operations, but will likely spend less time at sea building up to the same levels of practical experience as their counterparts in the naval squadrons.

A USMC F-35B lands aboard the USS Wasp

Future of the air group:
The range of aircraft due to be flown from the decks of the Queen Elizabeth carriers in the medium-term is already clear at this point. The core of any TAG is always likely to be a number of F-35B to cover carrier air defence, strike and combat ISTAR. The number will vary depending on the task at hand, but I would think the ship would routinely deploy with a minimum of 12 on board-maintaining core naval aviation skills, providing CAP for the carrier group and allowing the ship to rapidly re-role for basic strike operations at very short notice. In the "maximum effort" scenario where both decks are in action simultaneously, with one acting as an enlarged LPH and the other a full strike carrier, I would still expect to see F-35B operating from both ships.
Merlin will form the second part of the core TAG, whether carrying the "Crowsnest" Airborne Early Warning (AEW) equipment, Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) gear or in the HC3/4 cargo and troop transport configuration. What is reasonably certain is that Merlin, especially in the "Crowsnest" configuration, will nearly always be present aboard these ships.
The RN's Wildcats will also likely be a regular feature covering the surveillance, utility and surface strike (with the new Sea Venom lightweight anti-ship missile) roles. However, the limited number of airframes in RN service and high demand for the aircraft from other parts of the fleet, especially the forward-deployed escorts, may stand in the way of a regular presence on the carriers. The same case could be made for the ASW variant of the Merlin, the HM.2, with only 18 front-line airframes available to cover the needs of the escort fleet and the carriers. With regards to Wildcat best use of the tri service operations concept should be made by looking at close co-operation with the AAC, exploiting the possibility of routinely hosting of a number of Army Wildcats to ease the strain on the RN's fleet. This would also have the benefit of building and then sustaining the skills base necessary to rapidly and effectively embark and integrate Army helicopters and AAC crews at short notice if necessary.

Outside the core component aircraft of the TAG the carriers are also likely to see Army Apaches and RAF Chinooks embarked occasionally, on a less frequent basis. In order to operate these aircraft effectively from the carriers, pilots and aircraft will need to be exposed to the demands of operating in the maritime environment on a semi-regular basis. Similarly the ship-side aircraft handlers will need to build and maintain their experience dealing with very large helicopters such as Chinook. While it is helpful that both Apache and Chinook have already been deployed at sea, aboard HMS Ocean, the scale and tempo of deck operations aboard a carrier that will be simultaneously operating large numbers of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will be very different. The RN is lucky that the basic needs of carrier operations, folding rotor blades and protection from salt corrosion, have already been built into the British Apaches. However, while Chinook does have the necessary corrosion resistance it lacks folding main rotors. Although the carriers' aircraft lifts have been designed to handle Chinook without folding blades these aircraft will take up a great deal of space in the hangar without them. This is acceptable if Chinook is only intermittently embarked for specific tasks. However, if it becomes a regular part of the air group then upgrading some or all of the Chinook fleet with powered folding rotors, or exploiting the unpowered folding mechanism already present, should be a high priority.

AAC WAH.64 Apache gunships operating from the deck of HMS Ocean

Looking slightly ahead into the next decade a single V-22 Osprey squadron should, if the money becomes available, be given serious consideration. The range of F-35B is already the shortest of all three variants, with forced loiter times an inherent part of carrier operations, air to air refueling (AAR) would be a very valuable support capability. The V-22 Aerial Refueling System (VARS) is a palletised probe and drogue tanking kit already in development for the US Marine Corps, for use with their F-35Bs. VARS initial operating capability is expected to be reached in 2017, so the system would be substantially de-risked in the event of a UK buy in the 2020s. While introducing a whole new aircraft and its supply chain into UK service would be costly, V-22 and VARS is the only realistic option open that is compatible with a STOVL carrier. With 16 airframes, for a squadron of 12 and a reserve of four, and eight VARS kits the UK could provide a continuous AAR capability for both carriers in the "maximum effort" scenario. The spare aircraft could also be flown from bases ashore to provide additional refueling capacity alongside the Voyager fleet during routine carrier operations, where only a single ship will be at sea. Of course, because VARS is a palletised kit, some of the aircraft could also be used in the heavy lift and troop transport roles for which they were originally designed; freeing up RAF Chinooks for operations ashore. The Osprey would also be able to cover most of what the US Navy calls the "Carrier Onboard Delivery" (COD) role, moving personnel and stores long distances from ship to shore and vice versa. Although the V-22 lacks the cargo space to carry the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine for the F-35, it's range and carrying capacity are still impressive. It seems to be the case anyway that in RN service the spare engines will be carried by the accompanying MARS solid support ship: able to transfer them to the carrier via their heavy RAS gear when needed. So the Osprey's lack of capability in that area wouldn't be a severe drawback. Overall the V-22 would be a very useful option to add to the Queen Elizabeth carriers' TAG if, in future, the money becomes available.

A USMC V-22 Osprey refueling an F-18 with the VARS drogue

Another interesting area for future development will be the operation of short takeoff and landing drones. A number of the current generation of propeller-driven long endurance UAVs operate at low enough speeds to consider carrier operations without catapults a serious proposition. A naval version of the Watchkeeper surveillance drone, or simply using some of the Army's could be one possibility for an initial round of trials to prove the concept. If successful, it could pave the way for trials with larger UAVs such as Predator, possibly using a simple pneumatic catapult for launch. All this is, however, a long way off. Although proving the concept and clearing the carriers to operate larger surveillance drones than the RN's ScanEagle would certainly be something to investigate and develop in the medium term.

Overall, by the time the Queen Elizabeth carriers reach their full operating capability in the mid-2020s the RN will have a pair of very capable ships with robust air groups, able to be tailored to suit specific missions. While the phrase "second only to the United States" is so often repeated by MoD and government officials that it's become a bit of a cliché, the capability offered by the Queen Elizabeths will almost certainly live up to those ambitious words. There are ways that this impressive capability could be further enhanced, with V-22 for AAR, heavy lift and COD, and grown over time by trialing UAVs; with a view to eventually including them in the array of aircraft that can be operated from the carriers' decks. If the TAG concept is properly implemented and a variety of aircraft from the RAF, FAA and AAC are routinely embarked for training in the maritime environment then these ships will deliver on the impressive flexibility they were designed to offer.

Operating both carriers:
SDSR 2015 delivered the pledge that the UK would operate both ships simultaneously to ensure one carrier will always be available for deployment 24/7/365. What this will mean in practice is that most of the time one ship will be alongside in the UK, usually undergoing repairs or a refit, while the other acts as the duty carrier: available to respond to events and deploy at short notice. However, as the RN discovered with its previous carriers, leaving ships alongside with minimal manning for prolonged periods of time leads to steady material deterioration and shortens the lives of the ships. Both Invincible and Ark Royal fell afoul of this, spending significant time unmanned and alongside in 3 Basin badly effected the material state of both ships. With only two Queen Elizabeth carriers available the RN cannot afford to make the same mistake, effectively mothballing one ship at a time for lack of crew will shorten the life of a class that could, given adequate care, serve for half a century. Failure to properly man and service both ships at all times would inevitably impose avoidable maintenance costs further down the line and steadily erode the RN's ability to surge two carriers as a "maximum effort" as a serious war fighting contingency against a near-peer opponent.

An Invincible Class carrier, tied up alongside in HMNB Portsmouth's 3 Basin

It has been said elsewhere but the 2020 SDSR needs to include a substantial increase in RN manpower, to enable the service to adequately crew both ships at all times and surge two carrier decks in an emergency: provided the spare ship isn't in deep refit. Providing adequate crew for both ships would also introduce additional opportunities for training in or near UK waters. The need to provide the RAF and AAC pilots and maintainers with experience of operating in the maritime environment has already been mentioned. With only one carrier deck operating at any time, which may be away on operations, the limited availability of a ship for the component elements of the TAG to train on is concerning. The flexible TAG concept only works if its constituent elements can be called upon at short-notice to form a mission-specific package. While the mock carrier at RNAS Culdrose will be a useful facility for training pilots in deck operations, it is no substitute for realistic training at sea. With a sufficiently manned second ship the RN could, when the ship is available, use the reserve carrier for training around the UK. Employing the Queen Elizabeths in this way ensures that the RN would always have more than enough ship-side crew to keep the duty carrier at full strength, and enough to make the two carrier "maximum effort" a realistic prospect. In order to achieve this though, the RN's total manpower must rise.

CATOBAR:
Finally, the thorny issue of whether these ships will ever be reconfigured and refitted with catapults and arrestor wires needs addressing. In 2012 the Coalition government looked at the costs of converting both ships, briefly committing to the cat & trap configuration, before reverting to the original STOVL configuration once it became clear that the costs of conversion would be prohibitive. The cost of converting the partially built Prince of Wales was stated to be an additional £2bn, while the class was supposed to be relatively easy to change from STOVL to CATOBAR in reality this does not seem to be the case. Some sources stated at the time the decision was reversed that conversion would have required modifications to over 200 compartments. A mid-life conversion may become necessary if there is no available STOVL replacement for F-35B after its 2045 out of service date. With so many unknowns inherent in predicting what could happen thirty years into the future, all that can be done is to restate much of what we already know.

The QE Carrier flight deck in both the STOVL and CATOBAR configurations

A CATOBAR conversion would be extremely expensive, it would involve very extensive rebuilds of the ships and the generation of a whole new set of training pipelines for pilots, flight controllers and deck crew. It would also mean learning a whole new way of doing things, and it could not be done cheaply or quickly. When all is said and done developing a bespoke UK STOVL aircraft to replace the F-35B might actually end up being the cheaper option, when compared with the cost of the substantial organisational changes that would be necessary. While many long time supporters of the Royal Navy's cause would, no doubt, love to see the UK return to catapult carrier operations the reality is that STOVL currently offers an effective capability at a tolerable cost. In the author's opinion the decision to convert to CATOBAR would only be taken if there was no other alternative, including the development of a bespoke UK STOVL aircraft. The hope at this point should be that the USMC continues to make a convincing case for STOVL aviation within the US armed forces and ultimately gets a like for like F-35B replacement. This would enable the UK to participate in a joint or multilateral programme, with orders large enough to drive down the unit cost. It must be stated again though that predicting the shape of UK naval aviation that far into the future is almost impossible. For all the sentimental and symbolic importance attached to CATOBAR, it is clear at this point that while a mid-life conversion would be possible, it is far from preferable.

Almost from their very inception the Queen Elizabeth class carriers have proved be a subject of controversy. Fierce and sometimes public debates have been held on their relevance in the modern world, usefulness for the UK and the difficulties involved in realising their potential capabilities in practice. The last point was expressed with a clarity that only tabloid journalism could manage in the oft-repeated phrase "carriers with no aircraft". Thankfully, it is now clear that the tabloids were wrong and the public's concern was partly misplaced, the carriers will have a robust TAG with a great deal of potential flexibility and, if necessary, striking power. While there is still a little room for improvement with regards to the air group such as the inclusion of an AAR tanker, Osprey VARS or otherwise, the concept is sound and the aircraft will be available to start realising it by the early-mid 2020s. While the author still has concerns over the long-term durability of the Joint RAF/FAA F-35B arrangement it is certainly a workable plan and may yet prove to be a success. The key to successfully realising the high-minded goal of turning the carriers into tri service aviation ships will be regular joint training for all component parts of the TAG, on the mock carrier deck at RNAS Culdrose but, more importantly: at sea. Without experience and training on a real carrier deck the individual TAG components will likely struggle to adapt to a very different working environment whilst also trying to conduct operations. The old adage train how you fight comes to mind, if we intend to embark RAF Chinooks and F-35s or AAC Apaches and Wildcats then they must spend regular time training aboard one of the carriers. In order to achieve this the RN needs to be given the manpower to operate both carriers simultaneously as often as repair and refit schedules will permit, with the off-duty carrier operating near the UK as a training platform. This would have the added benefit of keeping both ships out of what would effectively be time spent in mothballs: alongside in Portsmouth with a caretaker crew aboard, which shortened the lives of the preceding Invincible class. If the UK intends to make good on it's substantial investment in the Queen Elizabeth carriers they need to be manned sufficiently to maintain them over their 40-50 year lifespan, failure to do so would be yet another example of the MoD being "penny wise and pound foolish".
Finally, while a post-F-35B conversion to the catapult and arrestor wire configuration is theoretically possible, the costs of doing so, and the institutional upheaval it would cause, would be enormous. In the end, despite the emotional pull exerted by the idea of "proper" carriers and the drama of catapult operations, a CATOBAR conversion should only be embarked upon if the only other alternative is scrapping the ships prematurely and wasting the money already sunk into them.

While some commentators have been very dismissive of the UK carrier programme in the author's opinion they could, in time, give the UK a truly first-class capability "second only to the United States". However, in order to achieve that ambitious and, let's not forget, thoroughly attainable goal the UK needs to make good on its current investment in the carriers. This can be achieved by manning and operating both, potentially investing in AAR capability and most importantly ensuring all component parts of the TAG regularly embark and train on the carriers. At the close I will return to the words of Major General Lihua:

 "The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier."

Superpower on a Shoestring: Britain's Place in the World

Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role.

-Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 1962

Those simple words spoken by the chief diplomat of a confident and rising power, about an economically moribund country in apparently inexorable retreat, continue to grind at a raw nerve in the British psyche. Since then more words have been written and spoken on the subject of "Britain's place in the world" than most people could ever reasonably be expected to digest. It should be noted that most other great powers are not constantly trapped in the same cycle of questioning and self-doubt that the UK is. This country has at times been described as a "hub", a "bridge" and a link between Europe and the United States. In short, a distinct entity deeply connected with both regions and yet still separate from them. It is likely the distinctive and unique nature of Britain's power that makes it so difficult for so many people to understand; and which generates this constant national discussion.

Of the seven current great powers: the United States, France, Russia, Germany, China, the United Kingdom and Japan, only two are maritime powers. And while the UK and Japan share many common strategic challenges, only the UK has the freedom of action to employ the full range of it's national power. For all the talk of its re-militarisation Japan is still severely limited in what it can do with regards to foreign policy. The remaining five are continental powers, whose global influence is limited, to greater or lesser degrees, by their need to police and defend extensive land borders. The ability to generate and maintain military power has therefore, historically, been an essential determinant of a continental power's ability to defend it's territory, position and international influence. Applying the same standards by which we measure the strength of continental powers to a maritime power such as Britain leads inexorably to the "small irrelevant island" view. In the global rankings Britain's population and military are remarkably small, while it remains a significant economic power. As it stands the UK has the fifth largest economy in the world, with some long term projections indicating that it may overtake Germany into fourth place by the middle of this century.

Clearly Britain has substantial economic power, but some will still argue that this power isn't useful unless it is converted into military means. This is patently not the case, the UK's place at the centre of the European finance and banking sector gives it leverage, influence and power whenever the economic weapon is wielded. Comprehensive sanctions and targeted asset freezes are often the modern equivalent of a blockade, with the ability to deal severe damage to a country's economic activity and national life. This has been shown to be true time and again, sanctions had the power to badly hurt regional powers like Iraq and Iran as well as a major power Russia in the wake of it's invasion of Crimea. Financial means are especially useful because, unlike the armed forces, they cost next to nothing when they are not being used; and are an effective way of inflicting damage to states without the risks inherent in military action.

The City of London, Europe's banking capital,
 and a formidable source of UK economic power

Despite what a number of newspaper columnists and commentators would have the general public believe, the UK clearly sits amongst the top tier of great powers. While Russia and China may both have far more men and women under arms; and an impressive array of military equipment, their reach and ability to sustain forces far from home is limited. Neither possess the network of strategically located bases and territories that the UK does; in this regard we are only really surpassed by the United States. The construction of a major new naval base in Bahrain is only the latest development in this regard. It's location would, in theory, allow the Royal Navy to project and sustain it's carrier and/or amphibious battle group almost anywhere in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Air bases in Cyprus, the Falkland Islands, Ascension, Qatar and Gibraltar mean that the RAF could rapidly establish a strong presence in the Atlantic or Mediterranean If deemed necessary. Neither Russia nor China possess the strategically placed sovreign territory necessary to effectively forward base their forces like the UK can. While the port of Tartus in Syria gives the Russian Navy a toehold in the Mediterranean, it has come at the cost of being dragged into that country's civil war. This is potentially a very high price for the use of what amounts to a small naval station, unable to service any of Russia's major warships.

An RAF Tornado flies out of the UK's military airbase on Cyprus. 

While the UK's range of military bases and overseas territories give it substantial military reach, the nation's ability to effectively employ force rests on a comprehensive network of bilateral and multilateral military alliances and partnerships. Of the six other great powers the UK is part of a defensive alliance with three, including the pre-eminent conventional military power: the United States, and is currently less close but still friendly with Japan; especially with regards to military training. It can't be stated enough that Britain's international security strategy, especially in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, relies upon building the capabilities of regional and local actors to a point where they can effectively provide their own security. While a network of alliances with the great powers helps secure the UK's international position at the highest levels, many of the partnerships with smaller powers are aimed at empowering them in order to address problems at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Small military missions, training and consistent engagement can achieve what ten thousand British troops, fighting for over a decade at a great cost in blood and treasure, struggled to do in Afghanistan. As a maritime trading power stability, especially in areas near important waterways, is nearly always in Britain's national interest. It is undeniable that the UK's network of military alliances, friends and partners is an important means of maintaining and supporting stability in vital areas of the world.

Another area where Britain's great power status is clearly evident is it's diplomatic presence. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has either a high commission, embassy or diplomatic mission in almost every internationally recognised state. With the exception of a handful of West African and Central American countries and Syria. The UK has maintained it's embassies in North Korea and Iran, acting as an important intermediary in the latter case.

The UK maintains a comprehensive global diplomatic footprint.

It also goes almost without saying that Britain was a founding member of the United Nations and remains one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. With this position comes a constant UK voice at the highest levels of international decision making and a veto on issues of peace and war. Excepting the UN Britain is a member of a further eighty international organisations. A comprehensive list of which reads like a bizarre alphanumeric soup, but demonstrates the country has an impressive voice on the world stage in a vast array of areas.

These are just a few of the ways in which Britain makes its presence felt on the international stage. It has become a national cliché to state that the UK "punches above it's weight", this oft repeated statement suggests that the country's natural position is that of a much lesser power. This is patently not the case, for the ~300 years that the United Kingdom has existed as a state it has always been a great power. While it has always been cast in a different mould to its continental competitors, a maritime power able to use a raft of advantages and alliances to achieve it's goals, its great power status is indisputable. So what, to return to Dean Acheson's question, is Britain's place in the world? In the author's view it is to be a "superpower on a shoestring", leveraging its advantages in order to achieve national objectives without the massive resources that can be brought to bear by the largest continental powers.