Jutland, One Hundred Years On

As I write this, almost exactly a century ago the Dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers of the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet and the German Navy's High Seas Fleet were in action off the Western coast of the Danish peninsula; sometimes referred to as Jutland. Over the course of one of the greatest sea battles ever fought the fate of the Entente and Central Powers hung in the balance. If Germany could break the "ring of steel", the Royal Navy's distant blockade, by isolating and destroying portions of the numerically superior Grand Fleet and ultimately wresting control of the North Sea from their enemies the war could have had a dramatically different outcome. However, thanks in no small part to the vast British naval construction programme, and reforms conducted in the years before the war, the German goal was never realised. The "ring of steel" held and the Entente prevailed.

That's the short version of what happened, but the reality was far more complex. The Royal Navy's war from 1914-1918 wasn't just a handful of famous fleet engagements; the names of which are written down in history textbooks. The action at the Heligoland Bight, the battle of the Falkland Islands, the battle of the Dogger Bank, Jutland and the Zebrugge Raid. While these were moments of intense action, they were atypical. A handful of days of fierce combat, where titans clashed on the high seas. While the courage of the men who went to sea in "the fleet that Jack built" (referring to the radical First Sea Lord John "Jackie" Fisher) is unquestionable, we often forget that courage takes many forms. It was never simply a question of a few isolated sorties to confront the German fleet. The First World War at sea was as much a grinding attritional battle as the conflict on land. The drawn out determination of men in all of Britain's warships, great and small, for four long, hard, years helped ensure the defeat of the Central Powers. Today and tomorrow we commemorate 100 years since the action off Jutland, but in a little over a day's time we will go back to our lives, and many will forget. For the men of the Royal Navy in 1916 each day after Jutland was another in the long hard months of training, sorties, scouting and blockade duty in the North Sea. Each day was another spent keeping the sea open to friendly shipping and firmly closed to hostile commerce raiders.

A day from now, when the hundredth anniversary of the battle Jutland passes, I shall still take another moment to remember the sailors who, after having witnessed the titanic clash of fleets, made ready to go to sea once again. While the great battlefleets on both sides often dominate the public view of the First World War at sea, the myriad of smaller ships: cruisers, destroyers and gunboats, on lonely stations, were just as crucial and crewed by men no less courageous. Jutland ensured the Royal Navy kept control of the sea, but it was how they used that control that really mattered.

It is to the efforts of all who served in the Royal Navy throughout the Great War I dedicate this poem, for our world is built upon their backs. I am eternally humbled by their courage, service and sacrifice.

"They bear, in place of classic names,

Letters and numbers on their skin.

They play their grisly blindfold games

In little boxes made of tin.

Sometimes they stalk the Zeppelin,

Sometimes they learn where mines are laid

Or where the Baltic ice is thin.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

Few prize-courts sit upon their claims.

They seldom tow their targets in.

They follow certain secret aims

Down under, far from strife or din.

When they are ready to begin

No flag is flown, no fuss is made

More than the shearing of a pin.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

The Scout’s quadruple funnel flames

A mark from Sweden to the Swin,

The Cruiser’s thundrous screw proclaims

Her comings out and goings in:

But only whiffs of paraffin

Or creamy rings that fizz and fade

Show where the one-eyed Death has been.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

Their feats, their fortunes and their fames

Are hidden from their nearest kin;

No eager public backs or blames,

No journal prints the yarns they spin

(The Censor would not let it in!)

When they return from run or raid.

Unheard they work, unseen they win.

That is the custom of “The Trade."

-Rudyard Kipling, The Trade

After Type 26: The Royal Navy's Next Generation Frigate

"We will also launch a concept study and then design and build a new class of lighter, flexible general purpose frigates so that by the 2030s we can further increase the total number of frigates and destroyers. These general purpose frigates are also likely to offer increased export potential."

-SDSR 2015

The UK's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review brought a few surprises for those with an interest in the Royal Navy's future equipment programme. The review suggested that the Type 26 programme be capped at 8 hulls, rather than the 13 originally planned, and is to be followed by a class of at least five, but possibly more, lighter general purpose frigates. Commentators have already begun speculating about the meaning of the phrase "lighter, flexible general purpose frigates", with some suggesting that it means the RN will be getting a class of corvettes or lightly armed frigates. In the author's opinion this seems unlikely, for many years the RN's leadership has placed a great amount of stress on the credibility of it's surface escorts as platforms for intensive war fighting first and foremost, with other less demanding tasks coming second. It is difficult to believe that the service has made a radical change in this regard, as First Sea Lord Zambellas has continued to underscore the value of capable and credible warships. That said, it does not take the construction of a platform as comprehensively capable as the 8,000 ton cruiser-like Type 26 to produce a useful first class warship. Indeed, the current 5,000 ton Type 23 frigates have done sterling service, in both high and low threat environments, since HMS Norfolk commissioned in 1990; and were successfully built in very significant numbers: 16 in total.

Before we can begin any discussion about what the next generation frigate could look like, it's role and place within the RN's future fleet needs to be defined. The fleet of the 2030s will look quite different from the one the UK is currently used to: it will be centered on a high-readiness carrier battle group and a lower readiness amphibious group, both supported by escorts as well as other specialist shipping. Alongside the escorts required to support both of these groups, UK frigates and destroyers will almost certainly also have to provide a number of detached vessels to provide presence in areas considered important to national interests. These currently include, but are not limited to: the Falkland Islands, Persian Gulf and West Indies. Of these standing patrol tasks only one, the Persian Gulf, is likely to require the continuous presence of one or more of the UK's most capable warships. This almost certainly means the deployment of either Type 26 or Type 45. The Falklands patrol task would be suitable for the new GP frigate, as it requires presence and some capability to demonstrate the UK's enduring commitment to the Islands but the threat level is relatively low. As for the West Indies, in the author's opinion this tasking would ideally be covered by one or more forward based OPVs and one of the RFA's Bay Class LSDs, for disaster relief in the hurricane season. Occasionally an ASW frigate could be rotated into this region, for counter narcotics and to train submarine hunting in tropical conditions, but this would be when ships are not required for other essential tasking. With this in mind, it seems likely that the lighter frigate would spend most of its time in low to medium threat environments when deployed alone and would likely engage in high-intensity war fighting activities as part of, or supported by assets from, one of the RN's task groups.

The future frigate fleet could easily be compared with the RN's pre-2010 force structure. The large and highly capable Type 26 would act as a direct successor to the general purpose Batch 3 Type 22s, able to embark a command staff in order to act as the lead ship for a task group of British and/or allied escorts. 72 missile tubes, Artisan and Sea Ceptor give it a formidable armament for self protection and localised air defence. Type 26 will also act as the principal ASW escort for the Carrier and Amphibious groups, as it will almost certainly be the only class equipped with the 2087 towed array sonar and it's eventual replacement. With the very high end task group escort roles covered by Type 26 and Type 45 the "lighter frigate" need not require complex air defence or ASW equipment beyond that required for credible self-defence. I would suggest that these ships be specialised to some degree in favour of a certain niche capability, rather than simply being a less well equipped version of the Type 26.

While there are several concepts for differently configured ships I wish to explore later, there are a few common systems that the author considers necessary for the new frigate, if it is to be a credible platform able to operate in both high and low threat environments:

CODLAG/CODLOG propulsion: A proven and reliable system, unlike IEP used in the Type 45, with a good balance between sprint speed, reliability, noise, and fuel efficiency when cruising. The system could be a direct copy of the power plant from either the Type 23 or Type 26 if it would reduce costs.

5" Gun: Generally useful for shore bombardment and a range of low intensity constabulary activities. 5" will be the RN standard once Type 26 enters service, mounting a different calibre gun and introducing a whole new logistical support structure for it would be costly and offer few benefits.

Type 997 Artisan Radar: A modern and capable system which is soon to be the standard across the RN; with sets planned for the Type 23 and 26 frigates, Queen Elizabeth Carriers and Albion LPDs. Fleet wide commonality and a long production run should help keep costs down.

Sea Ceptor: In order to be able to operate alone the frigate needs, as a bare minimum, the ability to defend itself against attack by aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Sea Ceptor offers this minimum credible self defence capability and will be a common and proven system throughout the escort fleet once the Type 26 programme is complete.

Seaboats: facilities for operating two of the RN's existing Arctic 28 or Pacific 22/24 RIBs.

Countermeasures: A carbon copy of the RN standard, currently Seagnat, to exploit the benefits and cost savings of fleet wide commonality.

All the concepts below are envisioned to be in the 5,000-7000t range. Although much of what follows is speculative and oversimplified I intend it more as the beginning of a conversation on some of the options the RN has for it's post-Type 26 frigate.

The Type 81 "Tribal Class" General Purpose frigate HMS Eskimo

Type 83:
Drawing upon the legacy of the Tribal and Duke class general purpose frigates "Type 83" would be a frigate in the 4-5000 ton range with a broad, but shallow, general purpose equipment fit. These ships would be well suited to constabulary tasks where long range endurance, or increased threat, is a factor and OPVs would therefore be unsuitable. A modern armament would also allow them to operate in areas where the threat of attack from state actors or modern weapons systems is also present. In areas where the threat of such an attack is high these vessels could be deployed in pairs, to provide similar AAW and ASuW capabilities to a single Type 26, or as escorts for a carrier or amphibious task group.

As for the armament, twenty four Sea Ceptor and eight strike length Mk. 41 Cells would be a good place to start. As previously discussed Sea Ceptor is a highly credible system ideal for self and point defence, that will come with the major benefit of fleet wide commonality. It will also have been proven on the Type 26. The strike length Mk.41 cells would offer flexibility and access to the next generation of anti-surface and cruise missiles, ASROC could be used but the other options would probably be better suited to the ship's intended role. As a truly general purpose vessel the class would need ASW fit beyond the bare minimum torpedo defence system mentioned earlier. Therefore "Type 83" would include a bow-dome mounted 2050 sonar set, five of which could be salvaged from the last Type 23s in order to equip the new frigate class, assuming that the Type 26 will take the first eight sets. If this is not feasible then an alternative system with similar capabilities would need to be procured.

Aviation facilities would be a hangar and landing pad, able to accommodate a single Wildcat helicopter or smaller rotary wing UAVs. For a general purpose frigate a utility helicopter, such as Wildcat, is invaluable for surveillance, constabulary duties, ASW and surface strike.

The Type 23 frigate HMS Northumberland

Type 27:
Inspired by the excellent think defence article that can be found here, as well as the original concept for the Type 23, "Type 27" would be a dedicated task group towed array ship. The proliferation of quiet diesel electric submarines looks set to be a major impediment to the UK's ability to project power into the littoral in the coming years. Protecting the UK carrier and amphibious task groups against this threat will require more than a single Type 26 defending the group's capital ships. "Type 27" is conceived with area anti-submarine operations in mind. Its purpose would be to operate at some distance from the task group, screening it from underwater threats. Such a class, being more expendable than Type 26, would also be better suited to operating up-threat in the littoral against hostile submarines. Such operations may become an increasingly necessary preceding step before other activity can be conducted in the littoral zone. The weaknesses of the concept lie in the specialist nature of such a design, admittedly it would mainly exist to free up Type 26: the ship best suited to general purpose and lone cruiser operations.

Once again twenty four Sea Ceptor cells should be sufficient to provide adequate self defence capability against air attack and anti-ship missiles. These ships, as dedicated ASW platforms, would need to be equipped with both 2050 (or equivalent) bow dome and 2087 towed array sonars. Accepting that Mk.41 and ASROC would be prohibitively expensive, offensive action against underwater threats would have to be performed by the embarked helicopter. While Stingray torpedo launchers would be a useful addition for last ditch self-defence they are not a necessity, and could easily be omitted in order to reduce costs. Aviation facilities would have to be suitable for a single embarked helicopter. The hangar and landing pad would have to accommodate an aircraft up to the size of a Merlin.

A Japanese Shirane class helicopter destroyer

Type 63
The Royal Navy has a wealth of practical experience which demonstrates the immense value of rotary wing assets, for all manner of operations at sea. From counter piracy and disaster relief to surface strike and anti-submarine warfare, helicopters are valuable assets with a great deal of utility. To date almost all dedicated helicopter destroyers have been specialist anti-submarine warfare vessels. The RN's only experience with such ships was with the Tiger Class cruisers in the 1970s, after they were converted to carry Sea King helicopters. More recently both the Italian and Japanese navies have operated destroyers and cruisers in the 5-7000t range, optimised for helicopter operations. With the RN's current helicopter carrier, HMS Ocean, is slated for disposal in 2018 the need for a new class of helicopter carrying ship, capable of supporting amphibious operations, is apparent. While one of the intended uses of HMS Prince of Wales may be to act as a very large LPH, supporting amphibious operations, she will remain a very high value asset. There will inevitably be times where the risks inherent in putting her close to shore become unacceptably high. Nor can the UK's single large LPH be in more than one place at a time. The ability to sustain an ensuring presence for counter piracy, disaster relief or maritime interception operations with a light helicopter destroyer would be highly useful. In a high intensity war these ships could take on the more traditional role of supporting anti-submarine helicopters.

The ship wouldn't require more than 24 Sea Ceptor cells for self defence. Underwater protection would be minimal, a tried and tested commercially available military sonar would suffice. A very large portion of the deck space would need to be devoted to a very large hangar and helicopter deck, suitable for operating up to four Merlin or Wildcat aircraft. If the hangar can be made large enough, there would also be the possibility of accommodating a single Chinook with unfolded rotors. If the aim is to increase the utility of the ship by allowing the RN to tailor the air group to the specific task then the widest range of helicopters, and eventually unmanned rotary wing UAVs, need to be operable from the ship. In this case a simpler but larger ship could be justified, as fewer complex systems would hopefully help to keep costs manageable.

The Damen Sea Axe 1800 OPV, with a large multi-mission bay

Type 84
A major development of the Type 26 design is its mission bay, designed to accommodate a range of equipment from additional sea boats to air, surface and sub-surface unmanned vehicles and ISO containers. Depending on how quickly these systems mature they could soon play an increasingly significant role in maritime operations. Type 26 has, rightly, been equipped with the mission bay and space to operate a range of future systems currently under development. The potential of unmanned  systems is already being tapped with the Hazard boats and their mine countermeasures drones. In future these systems are intended to be operable from a range of surface combatants, including frigates. The US Navy is also exploring the potential of sub-surface drones for anti-submarine warfare. It is entirely plausible that some of these systems will have moved out of the development phase and into service by the time the next generation frigate begins construction in the late 2030s. Similar to the helicopter destroyer the ship itself would be able to stand-off outside the littoral, away from certain threats, and use its unmanned systems to greatly extend the area it can influence.

The focus of these ships would be their mission bay and unmanned systems, which could offer a great deal of flexibility. Ships would have a variety of mission packages, similar to the concept for the Type 26. Ideally the mission bay would be a copy of the Type 26's, with both classes able to embark tailored mission packages from a common pool of equipment. Like the other concepts 24 Sea Ceptor cells would provide a basic self-defence capability. Aviation facilities should be sufficient to embark a single Wildcat, or a number of smaller rotary-wing UAVs, with an aviation deck and hangar sized appropriately.

There you have it, some sketched concepts for the next generation of RN frigate. Hopefully this brief foray into the realm of fantasy fleets helps stimulate some thinking about alternatives to the simple resigned view that these ships must be a less capable Type 26. In order to get the most from this class the Royal Navy could opt to take a different approach, by learning the lessons of successful past designs (British or otherwise) or looking to the future of unmanned systems. The RN consistently stresses the importance of credible surface combatants, hopefully I've demonstrated that while "credibility" necessitates a complex baseline equipment fit there is also a great deal of flexibility in the way that future UK surface ships could be equipped to carry out their duties.

Post-script:
This article has come under scrutiny from some who dismiss it as a "fantasy fleet" piece. I fully accept that this is indeed the case, and that I went into writing this with the intention of stimulating thought and discussion about some possibilities outside the "normal" conception of a UK surface combatant. The ideas here were never intended to be serious proposals for future UK warship designs. I am, however, happy to see that there is a lively discussion on the UK's next generation frigate going on at the UK Defence Forum. As ever I'd like to thank you, dear reader, for taking the time to read what I've written.

21st Century Cruisers, the future of the Royal Navy?

Pictured above is HMS Blake, one of three Tiger class cruisers laid down for the Royal Navy at the end of the Second World War and completed in the early 1950s. She was the last warship in British service to be officially designated a cruiser. Equipped with quick-firing six and three inch guns, Sea Cat anti aircraft missiles and, later in her career, a large hangar for anti submarine helicopters; she remained a well-rounded surface combatant throughout her career, often in spite of her age. Why, you might ask, is a ship that was designed during WWII and decommissioned in 1979 at all relevant to the future of the Royal Navy?

Before the Second World War the RN was predominantly a "cruiser navy ", holding down a range of global deployments with its 15 heavy and 41 light cruisers. These ships had endurance and combat power at the core of their designs, each could operate alone for extended periods, effectively defend itself in most circumstances and demonstrate the interest or resolve of the government in a particular region. The ensuing World War and the Cold War radically changed the type of warships the RN needed. Instead of cruisers built for endurance and complex warfighting the navy built a profusion of smaller frigates and destroyers, mainly to guard convoys and fight submarines close to the UK and in the North Atlantic. To carry out these tasks the navy could make do with smaller, cheaper, ships with relatively shorter legs and far less ability to act independently in high threat environments. Trade-offs like these were made in order to ensure the navy got enough escorts to protect the convoys which would be vital to Britain's survival in the event of a war; and to hunt the Soviet ballistic missile submarines that threatened NATO. These were ships designed to act as part of a military system that would defeat the threat posed by hostile submarines. This system also included land based aircraft, anti submarine helicopters, aircraft and helicopter carriers and the enormous US/NATO SOSUS fixed sonar array. The Leander class is probably the most famous example of these sort of light frigates, operated by the RN into the early 1990s. When the immediate and pressing threat from submarines operating in the North Atlantic, be they German or Soviet, ceased to exist so the naval forces the UK had constructed to defeat them also fell by the wayside.These ships were, broadly speaking, a product of their time and a deviation from the much older structure that had served the RN well for centuries. This structure consisted of a core "battle fleet", made up of capital ships; mainly there to act as a deterrent, supported by powerful forward deployed cruisers that conducted most of the day to day activity.

HMS Euryalus, one of 26 Leander Class frigates built for the RN

By modern standards almost all of the cheap and numerous frigates and destroyers of the past, even the excellent Leanders, would be classed as lightly armed corvettes. The simple fact was that these cheap and numerous ships sacrificed a lot of capability in order to achieve the affordability necessary to build them in numbers. They were still recognisable as frigates built in the convoy escort mold. Similarly the Type 42 anti-aircraft warfare destroyers, in service from the mid-1970s, were also a design that compromised range and armament for numbers. At only 3500 tonnes the Batch 1 Type 42s were clearly a very light and economical design. When compared with their American counterparts, the 8000 tonne Spruance class, it's clear that these ships sacrificed range and armament for economy and numbers. Both the Leanders and the Type 42s are recognisable as frigates and destroyers, light warships designed to act in groups and alongside other warships, auxiliaries and aircraft to be effective in combat. The closest the RN came to "cruiser" designs during the Cold War were the eight County Class missile destroyers commissioned in the early 1960s and HMS Bristol, the sole survivor of the pre-1968 carrier escort programme. While these destroyer classes were cruiser-like in some aspects, they carried a far more comprehensive armament and had a greater range (in terms of fuel) than their contemporaries, they lacked the self-sustainment ability, protection, survivability and range of "true" cruisers. While Bristol was initially labelled a light cruiser by Jane's, the Royal Navy always saw her for what she was: an oversize missile destroyer with the similar limitations to the navy's other destroyers.

HMS Bristol, the closest the RN came to a new cruiser during the Cold War

With the later Type 22 and 23 frigates the RN moved to fewer, more individually capable, platforms. This change was partly necessitated by the introduction of a new generation of bigger towed array sonars which required larger ships to operate effectively. Despite their greatly improved self defence ability, achieved by fitting the Sea Wolf point defence missile system, these ships were still designed to be expendable escorts and lacked the endurance of cruisers. That said, these two classes signalled the start of the navy's shift from a fleet of numerous, small and cheap escorts to fewer, larger ships capable of independent operations in a high threat environment.

This brings us right up to the present day situation, with the RN currently operating nineteen high end surface escorts: six Type 45 destroyers and thirteen Type 23 frigates. It is expected that the first of a new class of escorts, the Type 26 "global combat ship ",  will be ordered in the upcoming SDSR. These ships, and the Type 45s before them, constitute a step-change in the navy's design approach to its surface combatants. Both classes are recognisably cruiser-like ships at around 8000 tonnes, with nearly double the endurance of their predecessors (giving them a similar range to WWII light cruisers). The smaller crews of these ships has improved their ability to act autonomously for extended periods, with far less support needed from auxiliary tankers and stores ships. They have the potential for an extensive armament suitable for power projection and can individually defend themselves and other ships from a variety of threats. This potential will be realised from the start with the Type 26, however, the Type 45s currently lack the Mk.41 strike-length VLS cells they were "fitted for but not with". That said, the RN has been working to integrate ballistic missile defence software with the Type 45s existing air defence radars, this suggests that the long-term intention may very well be to fit the 12 strike-length cells; in order to make use of the american SM-3 anti-ballistic missile and a next-generation anti ship missile (which will eventually replace the RN's aging Harpoon system). With access to the range of weaponry available for the Mk.41 launcher Type 45 has the potential to develop from a dedicated anti-aircraft platform into a more well rounded general purpose surface combatant, or it could be utilised as a more specialised AAW/ballistic missile defence platform.

The Type 26 frigate and Type 45 destroyer, RN cruisers for the 21st century.

Extrapolating current trends leads to a pretty clear vision for the RN's future surface escort fleet: large powerful ships capable of a very broad range of independent action. These ships will require fewer auxiliaries to support, relying instead on their ability to range much further from their bases in the UK and Bahrain. More of the existing auxiliary fleet will be needed to support the UK's new carrier group when it participates in high-intensity operations, this will likely be achieved by reducing the need to support the escort fleet to the extent we currently do. While the navy will almost certainly continue to describe it's major surface combatants as frigates and destroyers, the line between the two will only be the anti-submarine equipment carried by the "frigates" and the area air defence equipment of the "destroyers". Both classes will, in effect, be specialised cruisers; bearing little resemblance to their immediate or historical predecessors. The Royal Navy seems to be returning to it's historical structure, a forward-deployed "cruising navy" supported by a potent UK-based "battle fleet" consisting of Carriers and nuclear powered attack submarines. While HMS Blake may have been the last ship the RN operated that was officially designated a cruiser, the navy currently has six distinctly cruiser-like ships, and plans to build thirteen more. The future of the navy lies in two classes of what are, in effect, 21st century cruisers.

The sun never sets: going back East of Suez

The phrase East of Suez is so inextricably linked with Britain's imperial past that even the mention of it evokes images of cruisers on far flung tropical stations, colonial officials in white linen suits, and all the mystery and adventure of 'the Orient'. Almost inevitably, like all of the other trappings of empire, East of Suez was abandoned and consigned to the history books in 1968. Britain had simply become too small, backwards and poor to continue pretending that it could project force half way around the world. All it took was a government willing to accept Britain's new place in the world, as a diminished regional power, before all the Imperial pretense fell by the wayside. This is how the story usually ends, with a nation in terminal decline, a defining moment in the steady fall of an empire.

Unfortunately for the neat and ordered history of the rise and fall of empires, there is another story of Britain's involvement East of Suez, and it's not nearly as clear cut. While it is true that British troops withdrew from a range of military bases from the Gulf to the Far East, following the 1967 Sterling crisis, the UK never fully disengaged from the region. Before the 1971 date for final withdrawal Britain had already helped establish the five powers defence arrangements, a series of bilateral defence treaties with the leading commonwealth countries in the region, that guarantee the sovereignty of Malaysia and Singapore. By working closely with the new and old commonwealth partners Britain laid the foundations for a 'quiet alliance' that has kept the peace in the region for over 40 years. The security and independence of Malaysia and Singapore remain vital interests for the UK. The strait of Malacca, which borders both countries, handles around one quarter of global traded goods and keeping the waterway open and free ensures that oil, commodities and manufactured goods can flow freely between Europe and the rising Asian economies. The British permanent commitment is small and very cheap: a dock complex in Sembawang, Singapore and 'Naval Party 1022'- the few staff required to man it. Recent developments seem to suggest that post Afghanistan the UK intends to become more, rather than less, involved with the FPDA. Suggestions that for the first time in quite a while British soldiers and airmen will be exercising with their five powers partners is a sign that this 'soft alliance' is stronger and more important than ever.

While the Royal Navy's presence in South East Asia has reduced significantly since the 1968-71 withdrawal from its bases in the region the UK has maintained an impressive ability to surge maritime forces to the region when necessary. The 1983-4 Orient Express deployment saw a UK Task Group conduct a tour of the Indian Ocean and Far East. Led by the light carrier Invincible and including three frigates, a destroyer, a diesel-electric submarine and two RFA support ships the group visited a number of ports in India before heading on to Singapore and exercising with the American and South Korean navies in the South China sea. Similar large group naval deployments to the Far East were conducted in 1992 and 1997. The increased pressure on the surface fleet, due to diminishing escort numbers since the end of the Cold War and the heavy burdens imposed by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have made these large flag-flying exercises a rare occurrence since 2001. The Task Group deployments have been replaced by single-ship tours of the region, such as Daring's 2013 visit to Australia. Despite a smaller surface fleet, the UK has continued to demonstrate an impressive ability to surge substantial naval forces into the region when necessary. This was demonstrated in the same year, when Typhoon Haiyan devastated the Philippines. Daring and the carrier Illustrious was sprinted out to South East Asia to provide disaster relief, stopping to take on supplies at Sembawang dock in Singapore. This just goes to show that the UK's ability to reach around the globe, and into East Asia, with naval forces remains substantial.

The other major military component of Britain's presence in Southeast Asia is the army's garrison in Brunei. Some 2000 troops remain permanently based in the small sultanate near the North coast of Borneo, centered on one of the Gurkha infantry battalions and its supporting forces. The forces are funded by the Sultan and base facilities have been provided to Britain on a five year rolling lease since 1962. Political and military ties between the two countries remain exceptionally strong and look set to remain so for the foreseeable future. The forces stationed in Brunei currently form the UK's Far East acclimatised reserve, in recent years they have taken part in the interventions in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. The British army's jungle warfare courses are also taught there, using the thick rain forests and tropical climate as the ideal location for practical training, particularly for special forces. In support of this mission the army also stations a number of Bell 212 Twin Huey helicopters in the country, as part of 7 flight Army Air Corps. These were deployed following the 2004 Tsunami which struck Indonesia, as part of the disaster relief operation in Northern Sumatra. Brunei became the sole permanent UK military base in the Far East after the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 but, unlike the former colony, its use as a jumping-off point for action in the region has been relatively uncontroversial.

The Armilla Patrol laid the foundations for current UK presence in the Gulf

Ostensibly the British withdrawal from the Middle East and Persian Gulf in 1971 was a clear sign of retreat from imperial responsibilities. The UK was no longer prepared to act as the guarantor of regional stability and consequently pulled out of its military bases in the Gulf States. Under the pressures of the Cold War the United States very rapidly stepped in to fill the vacuum left by Britain's exit, laying the foundations for the current regional order. However, in spite their apparent 'withdrawal' in 1971 Britain has maintained an almost continuous presence ever since. Between 1970 and 1976 the UK deployed some 500 soldiers, Royal Marines and special forces personnel to Oman, to combat communist guerrillas in the Dhofar rebellion. With the support of Iranian troops and forces trained, and in some cases led, by the British the campaign was brought to a successful conclusion and the Adoo insurgents defeated.

The first step towards a post-imperial role for the UK was taken in 1980, the Iran-Iraq war threatened to spill over into the Persian Gulf, an area vital for the movement of crude oil and petroleum products at this time. To safeguard shipping during the conflict the Armilla patrol was established. This has entailed a constant minimum presence of at least one frigate, destroyer and a nuclear powered attack submarine, supported by an RFA tanker, ever since. These forces have been scaled up and down in proportion to the needs of the government, as well as the threat to UK interests at the time. During the 1990-91 Gulf War eleven RN warships and six RFA supporting vessels were assigned to Operation Granby, with the destroyers Gloucester and Cardiff playing a leading role in the destruction of the Iraqi navy. An even larger force was assembled for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Seventeen warships, including the carrier Ark Royal and the assault ship Ocean, supported by thirteen RFAs, deployed to the Gulf. Although the two surge efforts during the wars with Iraq were atypical, constant naval presence with powerful surface and sub surface combatants, has formed the bedrock of the UK's Gulf presence since 1980. In view of this, the recent news that the UK is to establish a naval base in Bahrain shouldn't come as a great surprise. Substantial maritime forces have been deployed in the region for so long that significantly shortening their logistics train through forward basing makes sense. In terms of military value alone the move will free up a number of RFAs currently dedicated to supporting the RN's presence in the region. Forward maintenance facilities will be essential to get the most out of the current small pool of nineteen high-end surface escorts.

Due to the rise in piracy around East Africa between 2005 and 2013 the UK has contributed surface escorts and RFAs intermittently to the multinational combined task force, established in 2009, to safeguard merchant shipping in the area. Since 2010 there has been a marked decline in the seizure of vessels by pirates in the area, in part because of the efforts of international maritime forces.

The Gulf and surrounding region looks set to remain the area where the greatest military threats to Britain's economic prosperity could emerge in the future. The recent nuclear deal with the Iranian regime is a positive start, but there still remains a great divide between the Islamic republic and the West. In concert with partners in the region and around the world the UK presence will continue to act as a deterrent to any state or non-state actors that would threaten the freedom of merchant shipping in these important waterways.

Afghanistan: projecting UK power East of Suez

Finally we come to Afghanistan, the army's largest sustained deployment since Korea. To lay the success of sustaining a force of nearly ten thousand British service personnel in the country solely at the feet of the army would do a disservice to the marines, sailors and airmen, without whom a campaign on this scale would not have been possible. Although the UK did not provide a huge proportion of the total manpower, the US at the height of the war had just under 100,000 troops deployed. Despite this the British troops were likely some of the most militarily capable of the ISAF forces. Unlike some of the other European forces in Afghanistan, UK troops were generally prepared and trained for intensive combat and equipped with robust rules of engagement. They also brought an impressive array of equipment with them, which was steadily tailored and upgraded as the threat from Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents developed. The procurement of a specialised fleet of mine-resistant vehicles is only one example of how the system designed to provide equipment deemed an "urgent operational requirement" was refined throughout the conflict.

Few other countries can boast the ability to sustain such a large and capable force in high intensity combat for as long as the UK did. It must also be remembered that this force was projected into a land-locked country half way around the world, and that until 2008 the army also had significant forces deployed to southern Iraq. This ability alone demonstrates that Britain deserves to be counted amongst the world's serious military players. I'll reserve a finer analysis of the conflict and it's outcome until a later date. However, the essential take away is that the British armed forces have fought some of their hardest battles since the 1950s, in one of the longest wars fought in recent years, with large and capable forces projected East of Suez.

Royal Navy forces contribute to maritime security in the Persian Gulf

In view of the last forty years of history we can clearly see that Britain's 1968-71 withdrawal from its East of Suez commitments occurred in name only. While the way the UK continues to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf, East Africa, South East Asia and the Far East has certainly changed over time it is arguable that they are just as involved in these areas as before. Much of the instability of the 21st century looks set to play out far from the shores of the British Isles and the armed forces remain equipped and able to 'go to the crisis' in ways that few other countries can. As the draw down from Afghanistan is completed, and the defence effort is re-balanced in the wake of that conflict, equipment programmes such as the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, F35 Joint Strike Fighter and Type 26 frigate look set to ensure the armed forces remain able to deploy military force globally. Flexible and deployable forces will be necessary to face new challenges and threats from state and non-state actors.

The huge variety of defence activity that still takes place East of Suez is anything but an anachronism. The imagery of a long lost colonial past may still resonate strongly, but since 1968 Britain has transformed it's role in that area. No longer the declining colonial power but a dynamic and vibrant medium power with security needs and national interests that spread around the world, backed up by an enviable raft of defence agreements and alliances and in possession of highly capable armed forces. Just like the title of this post, Britain's 'withdrawal' from East of Suez is a misnomer. We never really left.