The Lighter Frigate Debate: A Look "Under the Hood"

"Was I to die this moment, 'Want of Frigates' would be found stamped on my heart. No words of mine can express what I have, and am suffering for want of them."

-Horatio Nelson, August 1798

As those who have read my musings on the "lighter frigate" in the past may already know my views on the British government's plan, laid down in the 2015 strategic defence and security review, have been mixed. To some extent I continue to blow hot and cold on the issue. It is now apparent, to me at least, that there is risk inherent in all courses of action when it comes to replacing the Royal Navy's thirteen aging Type 23 frigates. The earlier plan, to build thirteen Type 26 frigates, appears to have fallen afoul of cost and potentially timescale issues. We can criticise the decision to cap the Type 26 build run at the eight anti-submarine configured hulls all we like, but the reality appears to be that BAE's construction yards on the Clyde could not deliver Type 26 at the required tempo without very significant investment (the "frigate factory"). One shipbuild per year was needed to replace the Type 23s as they leave service, without a significant decline in RN escort numbers, whereas the yard currently appears to be scaled for one Type 26 scale shipbuild per 1.5 years.

Presuming that BAE could have delivered at the specified rate of one Type 26 build every 1.5 years it would have resulted in a dramatic decline in the RN's number of escorts, with no realistic chance of recovery until the early 2040s. It would also have likely resulted in a concurrent construction programme, using the same yards, with the Type 45's replacement in the mid-late 2030s. This would have required the Clyde yards to at least double their output of complex warships, a hard ask indeed.

The 13 Type 26 option clearly had some significant problems of its own. It was by no means an "easy" option, requiring a 33% higher build rate than BAE were required to provide under their Terms of Business Agreement with the government, significant investment in new facilities to achieve that higher build rate. Coupled with a higher rate of orders than the MoD was likely capable of funding, without compromising other programmes and we've probably explained the majority of the "witches' brew" that produced the 2015 decision to cap Type 26 at eight hulls and build five or more "lighter frigates".

It's fair to say that this decision has caused more than its fair share of controversy amongst defence commentators. During these early stages hard facts have been very thin on the ground. Most of what we have to go on is based on a few "powerpoint" design concepts put out by BAE, BMT Defence Services and Stellar Systems and Sir John Parker's recommendations for reforming the UK military shipbuilding sector. Bluntly, it isn't a lot and until the government releases its "National Shipbuilding Strategy" at some point soon(ish) we will continue to speculate about the "Lighter Frigate/General Purpose Frigate/Type 31/Type 31e", mostly in the dark. 

It's been suggested that the Lighter Frigate essentially amounts to the "anyone but BAE" option and is a means of undermining their near-monopolistic position in UK military shipbuilding. For some commentators this prospect is deeply worrying, having the potential to fatally undermine the two remaining complex military shipbuilding sites in the country by starving them of orders. For others BAE's monopoly is painted as "the problem" and one of the key reasons why UK-built warships are more expensive than their overseas equivalents. I'm, personally, more inclined to agree with the former position. However, I also see the need for the Lighter Frigate and recognise that it isn't an entirely bad idea from several standpoints.

Firstly, even with a 25% slower build tempo, one Lighter Frigate every two years, escort numbers remain relatively stable; dipping to lows of only 18. 

Secondly, 8 Type 26 at 1.5 year intervals dovetail neatly with the projected start of the Type 45 replacement programme without the need for concurrency. This indicates to me that the "Lighter Frigate undermines BAE" argument may be too harsh. There is a steady stream of the sort of high-end complex warship building work that BAE provides on the Clyde available for those yards well into the future. 

Thirdly, one of the most astute criticisms is that bringing the Lighter Frigate from the concept stage, where we are at present, to a full-fledged design able to be built is going to take time and cost money. This is absolutely the case and where much of the risk lies. However, it is not impossible to design and develop a surface escort to a constrained timescale. Doing so may actually help avoid the problems which emerge when a steady stream of additions and amendemnts are made to a design specification the longer it takes to bring it to fruition. A process that, as Type 26 demonstrates, can add significantly to development costs. It may also limit the scope for bespoke or "revolutionary" components, with designers forced to turn to off the shelf equipment and machinery. A more constrained timescale for designing the Lighter Frigate may actually prove beneficial if it produces a well-executed, but conservative, design.

An earlier and much more modest iteration of Type 26

Fourth, there is justified concern about the viability of the proposed "block build" approach that is intended to spread work to other, smaller, yards around the UK. There are evidently issues with this approach related to the shortage of yards with the necessary skilled workforce, equipment and facilities to efficiently build blocks for a complex surface combatant. While work on blocks for the carriers appears to be a positive indication of their skills and capacity to deliver, it remains to be seen if a similar model can be made to work for the Lighter Frigate. The other issue with this approach is the apparent lack of a suitable "integration yard" (where the blocks are assembled into a functioning warship).

"The vessel should be assembled in a shipyard, backed by a company or alliance with sufficient financial and industrial capacity and capability to construct and commission and enter into the key sub-contracts."

-Parker Report, 2016

There are a very limited set of options on this front. While Sir John Parker's report suggests that BAE should concentrate their efforts on Type 26 their yards on the Clyde would be an obvious option, provided that the risk of concurrently building Type 26 and integrating blocks for the Lighter Frigate could be mitigated. Unfortunately viable alternatives are very thin on the ground. Babcock international's Appledore yard is too small and their Rosyth yard, where the carriers have been constructed, is soon to become the hub for UK nuclear submarine decommissioning. Cammel Laird on Merseyside have the facilities but likely lack the skilled workforce necessary to integrate a complex warship. Their performance constructing the UK polar research ship RRS David Attenborough may give some indication of just how capable they are in this regard. Harland and Wolff's yard in Belfast is large enough, but the company hasn't built ships (let alone anything as complex as a warship) for years, having diversified heavily into the offshore wind sector. Other "options", such as re-opening the Portsmouth construction yard, are little more than fantasy.

The options for the integration yard are extremely limited, realistically boiling down to BAE on the Clyde and Cammel Laird. The latter being a much more risky option that would almost certainly require a consortium that included BAE, to bring their skills and experience to bear, in order to make it work. It would also likely require an expansion and upskilling of Cammel Laird's modestly-sized workforce. Ultimately it might be better to focus efforts on a single complex builder, BAE on the Clyde. However, this could introduce risks to the Type 26 programme. The optimal means of mitigating those risks might be to use BAE as an assembly yard only for the Lighter Frigate, keeping all fabrication activities seperate by farming them out to the smaller yards.

Cammel Laird's yard in Merseyside

If the UK government is serious about building up a second complex military shipbuilder, it needs to consider the implications on continued investment in the Royal Navy and Fleet Auxiliary that will be necessary to sustain two yards. In shipbuilding consistent investment and orders are critical. It will be no different in this case than it is with BAE.

Overall, the Lighter Frigate is simultaneously necessary and difficult to realise. Contrary to some commentators' views, I'm firm in my belief that 13 Type 26 isn't the "magic wand" answer to this problem. A long-term failure to invest in military shipbuilding has led us to a place where there are no easy options. Blaming all of our woes on BAE's monopoly is unhelpful and disguises systematic failures in the government's military industrial strategy. "Competition" isn't a magic wand either, undermining BAE with no real alternative would be the height of irresponsibility. The only way to make a semi-competitive military shipbuilding system work would be to build a significantly larger Royal Navy, able to naturally support more than one major yard. In the author's opinion, the optimum solution would be to use BAE's Clyde yards as the integrator for the Lighter Frigate. Accepting the risk to Type 26 by giving BAE the confidence to invest seriously in their yards and expand the workforce to cope with concurrent builds. The alternative, Cammel Laird, is probably just too much of a leap in the dark at this stage. 

In the end this is about providing the navy with the number of ships it needs to carry out its duties while maintaining a sustainable military shipbuilding sector. 

Oh, and the idea that the UK will export loads of these things is probably bollocks.

After Type 26: The Royal Navy's Next Generation Frigate

"We will also launch a concept study and then design and build a new class of lighter, flexible general purpose frigates so that by the 2030s we can further increase the total number of frigates and destroyers. These general purpose frigates are also likely to offer increased export potential."

-SDSR 2015

The UK's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review brought a few surprises for those with an interest in the Royal Navy's future equipment programme. The review suggested that the Type 26 programme be capped at 8 hulls, rather than the 13 originally planned, and is to be followed by a class of at least five, but possibly more, lighter general purpose frigates. Commentators have already begun speculating about the meaning of the phrase "lighter, flexible general purpose frigates", with some suggesting that it means the RN will be getting a class of corvettes or lightly armed frigates. In the author's opinion this seems unlikely, for many years the RN's leadership has placed a great amount of stress on the credibility of it's surface escorts as platforms for intensive war fighting first and foremost, with other less demanding tasks coming second. It is difficult to believe that the service has made a radical change in this regard, as First Sea Lord Zambellas has continued to underscore the value of capable and credible warships. That said, it does not take the construction of a platform as comprehensively capable as the 8,000 ton cruiser-like Type 26 to produce a useful first class warship. Indeed, the current 5,000 ton Type 23 frigates have done sterling service, in both high and low threat environments, since HMS Norfolk commissioned in 1990; and were successfully built in very significant numbers: 16 in total.

Before we can begin any discussion about what the next generation frigate could look like, it's role and place within the RN's future fleet needs to be defined. The fleet of the 2030s will look quite different from the one the UK is currently used to: it will be centered on a high-readiness carrier battle group and a lower readiness amphibious group, both supported by escorts as well as other specialist shipping. Alongside the escorts required to support both of these groups, UK frigates and destroyers will almost certainly also have to provide a number of detached vessels to provide presence in areas considered important to national interests. These currently include, but are not limited to: the Falkland Islands, Persian Gulf and West Indies. Of these standing patrol tasks only one, the Persian Gulf, is likely to require the continuous presence of one or more of the UK's most capable warships. This almost certainly means the deployment of either Type 26 or Type 45. The Falklands patrol task would be suitable for the new GP frigate, as it requires presence and some capability to demonstrate the UK's enduring commitment to the Islands but the threat level is relatively low. As for the West Indies, in the author's opinion this tasking would ideally be covered by one or more forward based OPVs and one of the RFA's Bay Class LSDs, for disaster relief in the hurricane season. Occasionally an ASW frigate could be rotated into this region, for counter narcotics and to train submarine hunting in tropical conditions, but this would be when ships are not required for other essential tasking. With this in mind, it seems likely that the lighter frigate would spend most of its time in low to medium threat environments when deployed alone and would likely engage in high-intensity war fighting activities as part of, or supported by assets from, one of the RN's task groups.

The future frigate fleet could easily be compared with the RN's pre-2010 force structure. The large and highly capable Type 26 would act as a direct successor to the general purpose Batch 3 Type 22s, able to embark a command staff in order to act as the lead ship for a task group of British and/or allied escorts. 72 missile tubes, Artisan and Sea Ceptor give it a formidable armament for self protection and localised air defence. Type 26 will also act as the principal ASW escort for the Carrier and Amphibious groups, as it will almost certainly be the only class equipped with the 2087 towed array sonar and it's eventual replacement. With the very high end task group escort roles covered by Type 26 and Type 45 the "lighter frigate" need not require complex air defence or ASW equipment beyond that required for credible self-defence. I would suggest that these ships be specialised to some degree in favour of a certain niche capability, rather than simply being a less well equipped version of the Type 26.

While there are several concepts for differently configured ships I wish to explore later, there are a few common systems that the author considers necessary for the new frigate, if it is to be a credible platform able to operate in both high and low threat environments:

CODLAG/CODLOG propulsion: A proven and reliable system, unlike IEP used in the Type 45, with a good balance between sprint speed, reliability, noise, and fuel efficiency when cruising. The system could be a direct copy of the power plant from either the Type 23 or Type 26 if it would reduce costs.

5" Gun: Generally useful for shore bombardment and a range of low intensity constabulary activities. 5" will be the RN standard once Type 26 enters service, mounting a different calibre gun and introducing a whole new logistical support structure for it would be costly and offer few benefits.

Type 997 Artisan Radar: A modern and capable system which is soon to be the standard across the RN; with sets planned for the Type 23 and 26 frigates, Queen Elizabeth Carriers and Albion LPDs. Fleet wide commonality and a long production run should help keep costs down.

Sea Ceptor: In order to be able to operate alone the frigate needs, as a bare minimum, the ability to defend itself against attack by aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Sea Ceptor offers this minimum credible self defence capability and will be a common and proven system throughout the escort fleet once the Type 26 programme is complete.

Seaboats: facilities for operating two of the RN's existing Arctic 28 or Pacific 22/24 RIBs.

Countermeasures: A carbon copy of the RN standard, currently Seagnat, to exploit the benefits and cost savings of fleet wide commonality.

All the concepts below are envisioned to be in the 5,000-7000t range. Although much of what follows is speculative and oversimplified I intend it more as the beginning of a conversation on some of the options the RN has for it's post-Type 26 frigate.

The Type 81 "Tribal Class" General Purpose frigate HMS Eskimo

Type 83:
Drawing upon the legacy of the Tribal and Duke class general purpose frigates "Type 83" would be a frigate in the 4-5000 ton range with a broad, but shallow, general purpose equipment fit. These ships would be well suited to constabulary tasks where long range endurance, or increased threat, is a factor and OPVs would therefore be unsuitable. A modern armament would also allow them to operate in areas where the threat of attack from state actors or modern weapons systems is also present. In areas where the threat of such an attack is high these vessels could be deployed in pairs, to provide similar AAW and ASuW capabilities to a single Type 26, or as escorts for a carrier or amphibious task group.

As for the armament, twenty four Sea Ceptor and eight strike length Mk. 41 Cells would be a good place to start. As previously discussed Sea Ceptor is a highly credible system ideal for self and point defence, that will come with the major benefit of fleet wide commonality. It will also have been proven on the Type 26. The strike length Mk.41 cells would offer flexibility and access to the next generation of anti-surface and cruise missiles, ASROC could be used but the other options would probably be better suited to the ship's intended role. As a truly general purpose vessel the class would need ASW fit beyond the bare minimum torpedo defence system mentioned earlier. Therefore "Type 83" would include a bow-dome mounted 2050 sonar set, five of which could be salvaged from the last Type 23s in order to equip the new frigate class, assuming that the Type 26 will take the first eight sets. If this is not feasible then an alternative system with similar capabilities would need to be procured.

Aviation facilities would be a hangar and landing pad, able to accommodate a single Wildcat helicopter or smaller rotary wing UAVs. For a general purpose frigate a utility helicopter, such as Wildcat, is invaluable for surveillance, constabulary duties, ASW and surface strike.

The Type 23 frigate HMS Northumberland

Type 27:
Inspired by the excellent think defence article that can be found here, as well as the original concept for the Type 23, "Type 27" would be a dedicated task group towed array ship. The proliferation of quiet diesel electric submarines looks set to be a major impediment to the UK's ability to project power into the littoral in the coming years. Protecting the UK carrier and amphibious task groups against this threat will require more than a single Type 26 defending the group's capital ships. "Type 27" is conceived with area anti-submarine operations in mind. Its purpose would be to operate at some distance from the task group, screening it from underwater threats. Such a class, being more expendable than Type 26, would also be better suited to operating up-threat in the littoral against hostile submarines. Such operations may become an increasingly necessary preceding step before other activity can be conducted in the littoral zone. The weaknesses of the concept lie in the specialist nature of such a design, admittedly it would mainly exist to free up Type 26: the ship best suited to general purpose and lone cruiser operations.

Once again twenty four Sea Ceptor cells should be sufficient to provide adequate self defence capability against air attack and anti-ship missiles. These ships, as dedicated ASW platforms, would need to be equipped with both 2050 (or equivalent) bow dome and 2087 towed array sonars. Accepting that Mk.41 and ASROC would be prohibitively expensive, offensive action against underwater threats would have to be performed by the embarked helicopter. While Stingray torpedo launchers would be a useful addition for last ditch self-defence they are not a necessity, and could easily be omitted in order to reduce costs. Aviation facilities would have to be suitable for a single embarked helicopter. The hangar and landing pad would have to accommodate an aircraft up to the size of a Merlin.

A Japanese Shirane class helicopter destroyer

Type 63
The Royal Navy has a wealth of practical experience which demonstrates the immense value of rotary wing assets, for all manner of operations at sea. From counter piracy and disaster relief to surface strike and anti-submarine warfare, helicopters are valuable assets with a great deal of utility. To date almost all dedicated helicopter destroyers have been specialist anti-submarine warfare vessels. The RN's only experience with such ships was with the Tiger Class cruisers in the 1970s, after they were converted to carry Sea King helicopters. More recently both the Italian and Japanese navies have operated destroyers and cruisers in the 5-7000t range, optimised for helicopter operations. With the RN's current helicopter carrier, HMS Ocean, is slated for disposal in 2018 the need for a new class of helicopter carrying ship, capable of supporting amphibious operations, is apparent. While one of the intended uses of HMS Prince of Wales may be to act as a very large LPH, supporting amphibious operations, she will remain a very high value asset. There will inevitably be times where the risks inherent in putting her close to shore become unacceptably high. Nor can the UK's single large LPH be in more than one place at a time. The ability to sustain an ensuring presence for counter piracy, disaster relief or maritime interception operations with a light helicopter destroyer would be highly useful. In a high intensity war these ships could take on the more traditional role of supporting anti-submarine helicopters.

The ship wouldn't require more than 24 Sea Ceptor cells for self defence. Underwater protection would be minimal, a tried and tested commercially available military sonar would suffice. A very large portion of the deck space would need to be devoted to a very large hangar and helicopter deck, suitable for operating up to four Merlin or Wildcat aircraft. If the hangar can be made large enough, there would also be the possibility of accommodating a single Chinook with unfolded rotors. If the aim is to increase the utility of the ship by allowing the RN to tailor the air group to the specific task then the widest range of helicopters, and eventually unmanned rotary wing UAVs, need to be operable from the ship. In this case a simpler but larger ship could be justified, as fewer complex systems would hopefully help to keep costs manageable.

The Damen Sea Axe 1800 OPV, with a large multi-mission bay

Type 84
A major development of the Type 26 design is its mission bay, designed to accommodate a range of equipment from additional sea boats to air, surface and sub-surface unmanned vehicles and ISO containers. Depending on how quickly these systems mature they could soon play an increasingly significant role in maritime operations. Type 26 has, rightly, been equipped with the mission bay and space to operate a range of future systems currently under development. The potential of unmanned  systems is already being tapped with the Hazard boats and their mine countermeasures drones. In future these systems are intended to be operable from a range of surface combatants, including frigates. The US Navy is also exploring the potential of sub-surface drones for anti-submarine warfare. It is entirely plausible that some of these systems will have moved out of the development phase and into service by the time the next generation frigate begins construction in the late 2030s. Similar to the helicopter destroyer the ship itself would be able to stand-off outside the littoral, away from certain threats, and use its unmanned systems to greatly extend the area it can influence.

The focus of these ships would be their mission bay and unmanned systems, which could offer a great deal of flexibility. Ships would have a variety of mission packages, similar to the concept for the Type 26. Ideally the mission bay would be a copy of the Type 26's, with both classes able to embark tailored mission packages from a common pool of equipment. Like the other concepts 24 Sea Ceptor cells would provide a basic self-defence capability. Aviation facilities should be sufficient to embark a single Wildcat, or a number of smaller rotary-wing UAVs, with an aviation deck and hangar sized appropriately.

There you have it, some sketched concepts for the next generation of RN frigate. Hopefully this brief foray into the realm of fantasy fleets helps stimulate some thinking about alternatives to the simple resigned view that these ships must be a less capable Type 26. In order to get the most from this class the Royal Navy could opt to take a different approach, by learning the lessons of successful past designs (British or otherwise) or looking to the future of unmanned systems. The RN consistently stresses the importance of credible surface combatants, hopefully I've demonstrated that while "credibility" necessitates a complex baseline equipment fit there is also a great deal of flexibility in the way that future UK surface ships could be equipped to carry out their duties.

Post-script:
This article has come under scrutiny from some who dismiss it as a "fantasy fleet" piece. I fully accept that this is indeed the case, and that I went into writing this with the intention of stimulating thought and discussion about some possibilities outside the "normal" conception of a UK surface combatant. The ideas here were never intended to be serious proposals for future UK warship designs. I am, however, happy to see that there is a lively discussion on the UK's next generation frigate going on at the UK Defence Forum. As ever I'd like to thank you, dear reader, for taking the time to read what I've written.

21st Century Cruisers, the future of the Royal Navy?

Pictured above is HMS Blake, one of three Tiger class cruisers laid down for the Royal Navy at the end of the Second World War and completed in the early 1950s. She was the last warship in British service to be officially designated a cruiser. Equipped with quick-firing six and three inch guns, Sea Cat anti aircraft missiles and, later in her career, a large hangar for anti submarine helicopters; she remained a well-rounded surface combatant throughout her career, often in spite of her age. Why, you might ask, is a ship that was designed during WWII and decommissioned in 1979 at all relevant to the future of the Royal Navy?

Before the Second World War the RN was predominantly a "cruiser navy ", holding down a range of global deployments with its 15 heavy and 41 light cruisers. These ships had endurance and combat power at the core of their designs, each could operate alone for extended periods, effectively defend itself in most circumstances and demonstrate the interest or resolve of the government in a particular region. The ensuing World War and the Cold War radically changed the type of warships the RN needed. Instead of cruisers built for endurance and complex warfighting the navy built a profusion of smaller frigates and destroyers, mainly to guard convoys and fight submarines close to the UK and in the North Atlantic. To carry out these tasks the navy could make do with smaller, cheaper, ships with relatively shorter legs and far less ability to act independently in high threat environments. Trade-offs like these were made in order to ensure the navy got enough escorts to protect the convoys which would be vital to Britain's survival in the event of a war; and to hunt the Soviet ballistic missile submarines that threatened NATO. These were ships designed to act as part of a military system that would defeat the threat posed by hostile submarines. This system also included land based aircraft, anti submarine helicopters, aircraft and helicopter carriers and the enormous US/NATO SOSUS fixed sonar array. The Leander class is probably the most famous example of these sort of light frigates, operated by the RN into the early 1990s. When the immediate and pressing threat from submarines operating in the North Atlantic, be they German or Soviet, ceased to exist so the naval forces the UK had constructed to defeat them also fell by the wayside.These ships were, broadly speaking, a product of their time and a deviation from the much older structure that had served the RN well for centuries. This structure consisted of a core "battle fleet", made up of capital ships; mainly there to act as a deterrent, supported by powerful forward deployed cruisers that conducted most of the day to day activity.

HMS Euryalus, one of 26 Leander Class frigates built for the RN

By modern standards almost all of the cheap and numerous frigates and destroyers of the past, even the excellent Leanders, would be classed as lightly armed corvettes. The simple fact was that these cheap and numerous ships sacrificed a lot of capability in order to achieve the affordability necessary to build them in numbers. They were still recognisable as frigates built in the convoy escort mold. Similarly the Type 42 anti-aircraft warfare destroyers, in service from the mid-1970s, were also a design that compromised range and armament for numbers. At only 3500 tonnes the Batch 1 Type 42s were clearly a very light and economical design. When compared with their American counterparts, the 8000 tonne Spruance class, it's clear that these ships sacrificed range and armament for economy and numbers. Both the Leanders and the Type 42s are recognisable as frigates and destroyers, light warships designed to act in groups and alongside other warships, auxiliaries and aircraft to be effective in combat. The closest the RN came to "cruiser" designs during the Cold War were the eight County Class missile destroyers commissioned in the early 1960s and HMS Bristol, the sole survivor of the pre-1968 carrier escort programme. While these destroyer classes were cruiser-like in some aspects, they carried a far more comprehensive armament and had a greater range (in terms of fuel) than their contemporaries, they lacked the self-sustainment ability, protection, survivability and range of "true" cruisers. While Bristol was initially labelled a light cruiser by Jane's, the Royal Navy always saw her for what she was: an oversize missile destroyer with the similar limitations to the navy's other destroyers.

HMS Bristol, the closest the RN came to a new cruiser during the Cold War

With the later Type 22 and 23 frigates the RN moved to fewer, more individually capable, platforms. This change was partly necessitated by the introduction of a new generation of bigger towed array sonars which required larger ships to operate effectively. Despite their greatly improved self defence ability, achieved by fitting the Sea Wolf point defence missile system, these ships were still designed to be expendable escorts and lacked the endurance of cruisers. That said, these two classes signalled the start of the navy's shift from a fleet of numerous, small and cheap escorts to fewer, larger ships capable of independent operations in a high threat environment.

This brings us right up to the present day situation, with the RN currently operating nineteen high end surface escorts: six Type 45 destroyers and thirteen Type 23 frigates. It is expected that the first of a new class of escorts, the Type 26 "global combat ship ",  will be ordered in the upcoming SDSR. These ships, and the Type 45s before them, constitute a step-change in the navy's design approach to its surface combatants. Both classes are recognisably cruiser-like ships at around 8000 tonnes, with nearly double the endurance of their predecessors (giving them a similar range to WWII light cruisers). The smaller crews of these ships has improved their ability to act autonomously for extended periods, with far less support needed from auxiliary tankers and stores ships. They have the potential for an extensive armament suitable for power projection and can individually defend themselves and other ships from a variety of threats. This potential will be realised from the start with the Type 26, however, the Type 45s currently lack the Mk.41 strike-length VLS cells they were "fitted for but not with". That said, the RN has been working to integrate ballistic missile defence software with the Type 45s existing air defence radars, this suggests that the long-term intention may very well be to fit the 12 strike-length cells; in order to make use of the american SM-3 anti-ballistic missile and a next-generation anti ship missile (which will eventually replace the RN's aging Harpoon system). With access to the range of weaponry available for the Mk.41 launcher Type 45 has the potential to develop from a dedicated anti-aircraft platform into a more well rounded general purpose surface combatant, or it could be utilised as a more specialised AAW/ballistic missile defence platform.

The Type 26 frigate and Type 45 destroyer, RN cruisers for the 21st century.

Extrapolating current trends leads to a pretty clear vision for the RN's future surface escort fleet: large powerful ships capable of a very broad range of independent action. These ships will require fewer auxiliaries to support, relying instead on their ability to range much further from their bases in the UK and Bahrain. More of the existing auxiliary fleet will be needed to support the UK's new carrier group when it participates in high-intensity operations, this will likely be achieved by reducing the need to support the escort fleet to the extent we currently do. While the navy will almost certainly continue to describe it's major surface combatants as frigates and destroyers, the line between the two will only be the anti-submarine equipment carried by the "frigates" and the area air defence equipment of the "destroyers". Both classes will, in effect, be specialised cruisers; bearing little resemblance to their immediate or historical predecessors. The Royal Navy seems to be returning to it's historical structure, a forward-deployed "cruising navy" supported by a potent UK-based "battle fleet" consisting of Carriers and nuclear powered attack submarines. While HMS Blake may have been the last ship the RN operated that was officially designated a cruiser, the navy currently has six distinctly cruiser-like ships, and plans to build thirteen more. The future of the navy lies in two classes of what are, in effect, 21st century cruisers.

Come Cheer Up My Lads: British Maritime Security

"We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are;
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."

-Alfred Lord Tennyson, Ulysses

While a third of the world's merchant shipping no longer sails under the red ensign as it did in 1939, the UK's maritime sector remains significant and vital to national prosperity and international power. Britain's naval strategy plays an important role, but as part of a wider effort that provides maritime security in home waters and overseas. The business of securing and protecting the UK's maritime interests rests on the shoulders of an astonishing array of actors: the military, government departments, agencies and the private sector. From Royal Navy's enormous new aircraft carriers to the tiny coastal research vessels of the Environment Agency HMG owns, charters and operates a vast profusion of specialist shipping. This is why it's necessary to take a broad view of the UK's security at sea, a narrow examination of the military alone would fail to recognise that the navy is shaped by the maritime world in which it operates.

It would be easy to simply mention the existence of a "maritime world" in passing and never return to, or elaborate on, what it actually means. 71% of the earth's surface is covered by salt water, a vast space that is totally inhospitable to human life; without technological assistance. Despite this, the seas and oceans play host to an astonishing range of economic activity. This can be broken down into two broad categories: logistics and extraction. 90% of global trade goods are moved by sea, transported by an international fleet of over 50,000 merchant vessels crewed by over a million merchant sailors. The UK is even more reliant on the sea than most nations: moving 95% of it's traded goods and importing 40% of it's food by sea. The seas and oceans act as a vast international space, that has acted as the engine of globalisation for centuries. If the Internet is the world's information superhighway then the maritime world is it's economic superhighway.

Earlier I mentioned that the UK merchant shipping sector is no longer the all-encompassing leviathan it once was. Despite the sharp decline in it's size since the Second World War it remains a powerful and healthy entity. The practice of using "flags of convenience", registering ships in countries with few regulations and little ability to enforce them, has fundamentally changed the rules of the game with respect to where merchantmen are registered. Currently 1/3rd of the world's merchant ships are registered in two countries: Panama and Liberia, ~85% of these fleets are foreign owned. In total the UK manages some 53.9 million deadweight tonnes (DWT) of merchant shipping interests, even though only 12.6 million DWT is actually registered in the UK. Since 1998 the gross tonnage of the British flagged merchant fleet has quadrupled, riding a wave of globalisation and technological change. As of 2014 a further 24.2 million DWT were registered in the UK's crown dependencies and overseas territories, the so called "red ensign group". Of these, Gibraltar, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda are prominent red ensign flags of convenience, which contribute to the economies of Britain's overseas territories. Aside from the UK's own merchant fleet, the City of London is a vital financial hub for the international maritime sector. It has a dominant position in marine insurance, holding a 33% market share in 2014, and provides a multitude of other financial services vital to the global maritime industry. In 2013, nearly a quarter of a million UK jobs were sustained by maritime services, mostly in logistics, with 140,000 directly employed in the sector. Of those 140,000 jobs just under half, are in the North of England and Scotland; providing job opportunities to people from communities in some of the most deprived areas of the country. In that year the maritime logistical sector as a whole contributed ~£10 billion to national GDP. The UK is now so deeply integrated into the system of globalised trade, and benefits so much from it, that the continued freedom of the seas to merchant traffic must be considered a paramount priority for any government and any security strategy.

90% of all goods are moved on the world's merchant shipping routes

As for extraction, from fish to fossil fuels and renewable energy the sea contains the resources necessary to sustain hundreds of communities around the UK. The North Sea's of oil and natural gas industry is almost certainly the most famous of these activities. Alone it supports ~450,000 jobs across the whole of Britain, enriches Scottish and Northern communities like Aberdeen, and contributed £32 billion to the national economy in 2014. Although North Sea oil and gas are believed to have now peaked, and the price of oil has dropped dramatically since the US "fracking revolution", UK-based companies like BP and Cairn Energy remain at the cutting edge of fossil fuel extraction techniques. The income from these industries looks set to remain substantial well into the future.

While it's a much smaller industry than fossil fuel extraction it is impossible not to mention the 15,000 fishermen that sail out of ports large and small around the British Isles. From the deep-sea high capacity fleets of Fraserburgh, North Shields and Grimsby to the myriad of small fishermen that sail out of Newlyn, Milford Haven, Plymouth and Poole the industry is alive and well. Although the UK fishing fleet has declined in numbers by 9% since 2004 it remains the second largest in Europe, by tonnage, after Spain. In 2014 the fleet landed 756,000 tonnes of fish and shellfish with a value of £861 million, a 21% increase in volume and a 16% increase in value of the total catch over the 2013 figures. The largest areas for fishing activity remain the North Sea and West of Scotland, with 62% of UK landed fish caught in those areas. While the fishing industry is nowhere near as economically important as North Sea oil and gas it remains the backbone of many communities, often in some of the most deprived areas of Britain.

Maritime logistics and fisheries are industries which have existed for thousands of years the seas around the British Isles also play host to an industry that is just breaking out of it's infancy: renewable power generation. Since the first two experimental offshore wind turbines off the coast of Northumberland were completed in December of 2000 there has been an explosion in the number of turbines and their generating capacity. There are currently 1452 offshore turbines which generated 28.1 TWh of electricity in 2014, accounting for 4% of total UK energy generation capacity. This is a boom industry at the moment, with 4000 MW of capacity already in place with a further 1700 MW under construction and over 5000 MW planned. The wind, wave and tidal energy sectors currently employ and support just under 35,000 jobs, a ~75% increase in five years since 2010. Some predict that the maritime renewable energy industry will create some 70,000 new jobs in the coming decade to 2025. Nearly half of the new jobs are likely to be connected to offshore wind. The renewable energy sector more generally remains an extremely vibrant economic environment, with healthy competition and a profusion of small and medium sized businesses employing 80% of workers. Once again we also find that the offshore arrays are located near areas where quality jobs have been scarce for some time. As North Sea oil and gas helped revitalise a number of towns and cities on the East Coast of Scotland so offshore renewables are slowly having a similar effect on coastal communities all around the UK.

The UK's economy relies upon the maritime sector for logistics and energy 

Amidst all the statistics about what the UK maritime sector does is one clear, simple and incontrovertible fact: the maritime sphere is vital to Britain's continued prosperity. Every single man woman and child that buys food from a supermarket, switches on a light, or works in almost any industry you care to name is, in some small way, reliant on the maritime sphere to continue providing those things continuously and cheaply. Those that describe the United Kingdom as a "maritime nation" are tapping into a fundamental truth about the country's place in the international system, it's greatest strengths and gravest vulnerabilities will always come from it's geography and sea. This is where the maritime security issue enters the picture. Protecting the myriad of seaborne activities, in home waters and abroad, that the British economy is dependent upon is an enormously complex task involving a diverse range of government bodies. Some, like the Royal Navy, are well known. Most, however, would be obscure in the extreme to members of the general public. It is essential to understand that their obscurity doesn't make them any less important. Fisheries protection for example is a complex multi-agency task, involving at least twenty surface ships and several aircraft from six government bodies. Without their contribution to enforcing the UK's laws on safe, legal and sustainable fishing activity the industry would be damaged by illegal and ecologically irresponsible trawling. It goes without saying that this would put many of the 15,000 jobs in that industry at risk, as well as many more further down the supply and processing chain.

Ensuring the security and safe passage of merchant traffic at sea is an even more demanding task, involving the efforts of the private sector, the military, a range of government organisations and international partners. The current system of international merchant shipping is built on navigational safety. Without accurate and constantly updated charts, the Global Maritime Distress and Safety Service, widely available meteorological information and the internationally agreed regulations for the prevention of collisions at sea the system of trade that we know today simply could not work. Britain continues to play an essential role in the maintenance of these systems. The UK Hydrographic Office is world renowned for the quality and accuracy of it's famous Admiralty charts, which 90% of the world's merchant ships use, and the met office's shipping forecast is issued four times daily on BBC Radio 4.  Both institutions have a near-unrivaled pedigree and are at the cutting edge of applying the latest technologies to the cartographic and meteorological fields. The UK, as a world leader in meteorological sciences, maintains two permanent and one summer-only Antarctic research stations run by the British Antarctic Survey (BAS). The Royal Navy's Antarctic patrol ship, currently HMS Protector, is relatively well-known because of her ancestor, HMS Endurance's, role in the 1982 Falklands War. What is less well known is that the BAS also operates two Antarctic research vessels: the RSS James Clerk Ross and the RSS Earnest Shackleton, with the former due to be replaced in 2019 by a new specially constructed polar research vessel. The activities of the BAS are essential for the continued international scientific investigation into, amongst other things, the long-term effects that climate change will have on the natural environment. Long term forecasts about how the Earth's climate will change, and how this will effect sea levels and weather patterns will allow coastal communities, ports and the maritime community to better prepare and hedge against potential environmental threats to their long-term sustainability.

RSS Earnest Shackleton, one of three UK vessels which operate in support
of the British Antarctic Survey.

From a relatively new challenge in the form of climate change to a problem that has existed for millennia, piracy remains a perennial issue which occasionally threatens the free movement of merchant shipping. The modern response has usually been international, because the globalised nature of seaborne trade means that many countries have a stake in ensuring that the flow of trade is not impeded by non-state actors. The response to piracy off the horn of Africa between 2005 and 2013 was the creation of two combined maritime task forces CTF 150 and CTF 151. Both involved, and were occasionally led by, the Royal Navy. Ultimately the international naval presence, combined with an improving security situation ashore and improved security measures by merchant ships, led to the collapse of Somali piracy in 2013.

Closer to home than Somalia and far more immediate than the potential effects of climate change Britain's maritime institutions play an essential role in providing human security. People trafficking, smuggling and illegal migration all pose threats to UK civil society and to many of the unfortunate people exploited by international criminal gangs. Intercepting illicit goods and trafficked people at sea is a far more attractive option than policing them once they reach British shores. Seizures of illegal drugs at sea tend to be measured in tonnes rather than pounds and have the potential to dent the formidable criminal industry in ways that policing alone cannot. Once again we find that tackling these challenges requires a range of government bodies working in tandem: from the intelligence services to HM Revenue and Customs and the Royal Navy. In this role the five customs cutters currently operated by HMRC have proven extremely useful. While unarmed under normal circumstances they have demonstrated their worth by acting as a visible deterrent through presence and monitoring, as well as taking a very active role in boarding, enforcement and constabulary duties around the UK. Interceptions and boarding operations by the customs cutters increased four-fold between 1999 and 2009 to nearly 2,000 operations a year. Some of these operations have resulted in the capture of huge quantities of illicit goods, early in 2015 the cutter HMC Valiant and the frigate HMS Somerset seized three tonnes of Cocaine with a street value of £500 million. Recently the government took the unusual step of deploying two of the cutters to the Aegean to help with the Mediterranean search and rescue effort related to the ongoing migrant crisis. HMC Protector and HMC Seeker were together responsible for rescuing 1650 people and arresting 26 smugglers while they were forward deployed.

HMC Valiant, one of HMRC's 42-metre customs cutters

While a range of civilian organisations contribute to the UK's maritime security in home waters it largely falls to the Royal Navy to protect British maritime interests further from home. As it stands the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Royal Fleet Auxiliary are the principal maritime arms of Britain's military. Between them they operate a force of 77 surface ships, 11 submarines, 33 specialist landing craft and 152 helicopters. The surface ships range in size from small patrol craft and mine hunters to the two new 70,000 ton Queen Elizabeth class supercarriers. While the presence of a sleek grey-hulled warship can often be enough to deter certain threats to the UK's commercial maritime interests, the prolonged presence of surface ships is usually necessary to achieve the desired effect. Since the early 1980s the Royal Navy's warships have patrolled the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf in order to ensure that body of water remains open to safe merchant navigation, especially for the large tankers bound for Europe through the Suez Canal. The deterrent patrol around the Falkland Islands has required a similar long-term commitment of the navy's limited resources. For patrol and presence tasks in global hotspots the navy currently relies on it's fleet of 19 surface escorts. The six Type 45 air defence destroyers and thirteen Type 23 general purpose frigates constitute the UK's front line maritime forces: forward deployed to trouble spots around the world.

To put it bluntly the number of these ships is currently woefully inadequate to support the level of defence activity required to safeguard Britain's maritime interests. The current force of 19 escorts in reality generates a deployable force of some 6-7 ships. The rule that three ships are required to keep one permanently on station, or available at high readiness, still holds true, vessels have always needed maintenance and crews need time ashore. Almost the entire escort fleet is committed to sustaining the UK's few remaining standing patrols in the South Atlantic, Gulf, home waters and the West Indies. There is no strategic reserve, no replacements available for losses to combat, sabotage, technical faults or accidents and few to no escorts are available to protect Britain's capital ships. In 2004 the New Labour government sold three relatively new Type 23 frigates to Chile, in 2010 the Liberal/Conservative coalition scrapped the four remaining Batch 3 Type 22 frigates. The replacement of 12 Type 42 destroyers with half as many Type 45s between 2003 and 2013 amounted to another cut of six hulls. In the decade between 2004 and 2014 the RN lost 13 escorts, almost half of it's major surface combatants.

For a country that is so totally reliant on the sea for it's survival and prosperity the current situation is nothing less than unacceptable. An opportunity currently exists to reduce the pressure on the escort fleet by bringing the new Batch 2 River class OPVs into service in addition to the existing Batch 1 ships, rather than as replacements for them. Forward basing these three new ships in the West Indies, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands would free up three or four high-end warships for operations elsewhere, in areas where their greater combat capability is required. Reintroducing a small but permanent RN presence in the Mediterranean, based out of Gibraltar, would also send a strong message to the Spanish; who have consistently violated the UK territory's sovereign waters in recent years. I would argue strongly that this is the only reasonable coarse of action in the short term, but in the medium to long term the number of escorts must rise. In the author's opinion the best way of achieving this long-term expansion would be to extend the Type 26 production run by at least seven hulls, to give a minimum of 20 frigates plus the six Type 45s. Crucially this increase could be achieved without increasing the total number of crew needed for the frigate fleet. Trained military manpower is a major expense and the smaller compliment of just 118 for each ship (compared with 185 for a Type 23) would allow the RN to man 20 ships with roughly the same number of people needed for 13 Type 23s. Combined with reduced pressure on the escort fleet as a whole, by handing over the Falklands and West Indies patrol tasks to forward based OPVs, this should allow the RN to hold a properly escorted carrier and/or amphibious group at high readiness, available for deployment anywhere in the world at short notice. Importantly, this should be achieved without severely disrupting ships' repair and maintenance cycles, and would also create a small reserve to cover unforeseen contingencies, accidents or combat losses.

The Type 23 frigate HMS Somerset, one of the UK's 19 remaining
surface escorts.

It is quite clear that Britain's maritime sector is both diverse and vital to its economic well being. Although the UK no longer sits at the heart of a global empire knitted together by maritime communications, the country's place as one of a very few centers essential to the management of the modern maritime order is indisputable. While a third of all the ships on the sea may no longer sail under the red ensign of the merchant navy; but 90% of them use British Admiralty charts, one in three is insured by a London-based company, and over a thousand ships are managed in some way by UK companies. Britain alone has more than half of the total offshore wind generation capacity in Europe and is the third largest producer of oil and natural gas on the continent after Russia and Norway. The UK moves 40% of it's food and 95% of it's traded goods by sea. The country is dependent on the maritime sector for hundreds of thousands of jobs, and millions more further down the supply chain.  This broad range of vital interests is supported and protected by an equally broad range of government bodies. From the warships of the Royal Navy, to the research vessels of the British Antarctic Survey, the fisheries protection ships of Marine Scotland to HMRC's customs cutters: Britain's maritime interests are afforded security every day by their work.

It is therefore shameful and shortsighted that Britain's premier means of safeguarding it's maritime interests should be in such poor shape. As I have discussed, the economic health of the UK depends to an extraordinary extent upon the freedom of the seas not only at home but also much further afield. The inner sphere of British maritime security is not in bad shape, with the return of a dedicated maritime patrol aircraft almost an assured part of the upcoming SDSR the future looks good. However, when it comes to the needs of the outer sphere which guards UK interests further afield there is much left to be desired.

It is too rarely expressed that Britain is a maritime nation, for which the sea is the ultimate source of power and the ultimate source of vulnerability. By failing to understand those two words, and the vast, complex and vital systems they so neatly describe, we are failing to understand ourselves. This is something that each generation must learn and relearn, because working out who we are requires us "To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."