The Lighter Frigate Debate: A Look "Under the Hood"

"Was I to die this moment, 'Want of Frigates' would be found stamped on my heart. No words of mine can express what I have, and am suffering for want of them."

-Horatio Nelson, August 1798

As those who have read my musings on the "lighter frigate" in the past may already know my views on the British government's plan, laid down in the 2015 strategic defence and security review, have been mixed. To some extent I continue to blow hot and cold on the issue. It is now apparent, to me at least, that there is risk inherent in all courses of action when it comes to replacing the Royal Navy's thirteen aging Type 23 frigates. The earlier plan, to build thirteen Type 26 frigates, appears to have fallen afoul of cost and potentially timescale issues. We can criticise the decision to cap the Type 26 build run at the eight anti-submarine configured hulls all we like, but the reality appears to be that BAE's construction yards on the Clyde could not deliver Type 26 at the required tempo without very significant investment (the "frigate factory"). One shipbuild per year was needed to replace the Type 23s as they leave service, without a significant decline in RN escort numbers, whereas the yard currently appears to be scaled for one Type 26 scale shipbuild per 1.5 years.

Presuming that BAE could have delivered at the specified rate of one Type 26 build every 1.5 years it would have resulted in a dramatic decline in the RN's number of escorts, with no realistic chance of recovery until the early 2040s. It would also have likely resulted in a concurrent construction programme, using the same yards, with the Type 45's replacement in the mid-late 2030s. This would have required the Clyde yards to at least double their output of complex warships, a hard ask indeed.

The 13 Type 26 option clearly had some significant problems of its own. It was by no means an "easy" option, requiring a 33% higher build rate than BAE were required to provide under their Terms of Business Agreement with the government, significant investment in new facilities to achieve that higher build rate. Coupled with a higher rate of orders than the MoD was likely capable of funding, without compromising other programmes and we've probably explained the majority of the "witches' brew" that produced the 2015 decision to cap Type 26 at eight hulls and build five or more "lighter frigates".

It's fair to say that this decision has caused more than its fair share of controversy amongst defence commentators. During these early stages hard facts have been very thin on the ground. Most of what we have to go on is based on a few "powerpoint" design concepts put out by BAE, BMT Defence Services and Stellar Systems and Sir John Parker's recommendations for reforming the UK military shipbuilding sector. Bluntly, it isn't a lot and until the government releases its "National Shipbuilding Strategy" at some point soon(ish) we will continue to speculate about the "Lighter Frigate/General Purpose Frigate/Type 31/Type 31e", mostly in the dark. 

It's been suggested that the Lighter Frigate essentially amounts to the "anyone but BAE" option and is a means of undermining their near-monopolistic position in UK military shipbuilding. For some commentators this prospect is deeply worrying, having the potential to fatally undermine the two remaining complex military shipbuilding sites in the country by starving them of orders. For others BAE's monopoly is painted as "the problem" and one of the key reasons why UK-built warships are more expensive than their overseas equivalents. I'm, personally, more inclined to agree with the former position. However, I also see the need for the Lighter Frigate and recognise that it isn't an entirely bad idea from several standpoints.

Firstly, even with a 25% slower build tempo, one Lighter Frigate every two years, escort numbers remain relatively stable; dipping to lows of only 18. 

Secondly, 8 Type 26 at 1.5 year intervals dovetail neatly with the projected start of the Type 45 replacement programme without the need for concurrency. This indicates to me that the "Lighter Frigate undermines BAE" argument may be too harsh. There is a steady stream of the sort of high-end complex warship building work that BAE provides on the Clyde available for those yards well into the future. 

Thirdly, one of the most astute criticisms is that bringing the Lighter Frigate from the concept stage, where we are at present, to a full-fledged design able to be built is going to take time and cost money. This is absolutely the case and where much of the risk lies. However, it is not impossible to design and develop a surface escort to a constrained timescale. Doing so may actually help avoid the problems which emerge when a steady stream of additions and amendemnts are made to a design specification the longer it takes to bring it to fruition. A process that, as Type 26 demonstrates, can add significantly to development costs. It may also limit the scope for bespoke or "revolutionary" components, with designers forced to turn to off the shelf equipment and machinery. A more constrained timescale for designing the Lighter Frigate may actually prove beneficial if it produces a well-executed, but conservative, design.

An earlier and much more modest iteration of Type 26

Fourth, there is justified concern about the viability of the proposed "block build" approach that is intended to spread work to other, smaller, yards around the UK. There are evidently issues with this approach related to the shortage of yards with the necessary skilled workforce, equipment and facilities to efficiently build blocks for a complex surface combatant. While work on blocks for the carriers appears to be a positive indication of their skills and capacity to deliver, it remains to be seen if a similar model can be made to work for the Lighter Frigate. The other issue with this approach is the apparent lack of a suitable "integration yard" (where the blocks are assembled into a functioning warship).

"The vessel should be assembled in a shipyard, backed by a company or alliance with sufficient financial and industrial capacity and capability to construct and commission and enter into the key sub-contracts."

-Parker Report, 2016

There are a very limited set of options on this front. While Sir John Parker's report suggests that BAE should concentrate their efforts on Type 26 their yards on the Clyde would be an obvious option, provided that the risk of concurrently building Type 26 and integrating blocks for the Lighter Frigate could be mitigated. Unfortunately viable alternatives are very thin on the ground. Babcock international's Appledore yard is too small and their Rosyth yard, where the carriers have been constructed, is soon to become the hub for UK nuclear submarine decommissioning. Cammel Laird on Merseyside have the facilities but likely lack the skilled workforce necessary to integrate a complex warship. Their performance constructing the UK polar research ship RRS David Attenborough may give some indication of just how capable they are in this regard. Harland and Wolff's yard in Belfast is large enough, but the company hasn't built ships (let alone anything as complex as a warship) for years, having diversified heavily into the offshore wind sector. Other "options", such as re-opening the Portsmouth construction yard, are little more than fantasy.

The options for the integration yard are extremely limited, realistically boiling down to BAE on the Clyde and Cammel Laird. The latter being a much more risky option that would almost certainly require a consortium that included BAE, to bring their skills and experience to bear, in order to make it work. It would also likely require an expansion and upskilling of Cammel Laird's modestly-sized workforce. Ultimately it might be better to focus efforts on a single complex builder, BAE on the Clyde. However, this could introduce risks to the Type 26 programme. The optimal means of mitigating those risks might be to use BAE as an assembly yard only for the Lighter Frigate, keeping all fabrication activities seperate by farming them out to the smaller yards.

Cammel Laird's yard in Merseyside

If the UK government is serious about building up a second complex military shipbuilder, it needs to consider the implications on continued investment in the Royal Navy and Fleet Auxiliary that will be necessary to sustain two yards. In shipbuilding consistent investment and orders are critical. It will be no different in this case than it is with BAE.

Overall, the Lighter Frigate is simultaneously necessary and difficult to realise. Contrary to some commentators' views, I'm firm in my belief that 13 Type 26 isn't the "magic wand" answer to this problem. A long-term failure to invest in military shipbuilding has led us to a place where there are no easy options. Blaming all of our woes on BAE's monopoly is unhelpful and disguises systematic failures in the government's military industrial strategy. "Competition" isn't a magic wand either, undermining BAE with no real alternative would be the height of irresponsibility. The only way to make a semi-competitive military shipbuilding system work would be to build a significantly larger Royal Navy, able to naturally support more than one major yard. In the author's opinion, the optimum solution would be to use BAE's Clyde yards as the integrator for the Lighter Frigate. Accepting the risk to Type 26 by giving BAE the confidence to invest seriously in their yards and expand the workforce to cope with concurrent builds. The alternative, Cammel Laird, is probably just too much of a leap in the dark at this stage. 

In the end this is about providing the navy with the number of ships it needs to carry out its duties while maintaining a sustainable military shipbuilding sector. 

Oh, and the idea that the UK will export loads of these things is probably bollocks.

Size Matters: Britain's Aircraft Carriers

"The aircraft carrier is truly amazing. I am amazed at the concept of the carrier, and the fact that it works. And it doesn't just work, it kicks butt.

-Lt. Barry W. Hull, VFA-81 Squadron, USS Saratoga, 1991

Why build big? It's a simple question asked frequently about the UK's two new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. Weighing in at just over 70,000 tonnes they are, by quite a long way, "the largest ships ever built for the Royal Navy". Many have leveled criticisms against them because of their size, claiming they are little more than a vast vanity project, that their size makes them unsuitable for a "medium power" such as Britain and that they reflect a yearning for a status on the world stage that is undeserved. What these criticisms ignore is that there are serious practical reasons why larger carriers are, in most circumstances, a significantly better investment when compared with smaller "pocket carriers" such as the Invincible class ships the UK operated from the late 70s through to 2014; when HMS Illustrious was decommissioned.

Efficiency:
Probably the key reason why larger carriers are significantly better than their smaller cousins is that they are a more efficient way of sustaining air operations from the sea. Generating the same effect with numerous smaller carriers, as some have suggested as a better course for the UK to follow, simply costs much more. The obvious consequence of this is that you get a force of smaller carriers that cannot deliver the same effect as fewer, larger, ships. The reason why this is the case can be neatly summed up with a single word: duplication. This is especially true of the manpower required to run two equivalent carrier forces, equal in "striking power", where the only difference is the size of the ships.  While the individual light carrier will undoubtedly have a smaller crew than an individual large carrier, you might need two or three smaller carriers to achieve the same number of sorties as a single, larger, ship and each still requires a range of highly trained crew members. To draw upon a real-world example: HMS Queen Elizabeth has a core crew of ~679, will carry and operate a tailored air group of 40 aircraft and can surge 110+ sorties a day. In comparison the 25,000t ITS Cavour has a core crew of ~451, an air group of around 20 aircraft and can surge approximately ~40 sorties a day. This means that, broadly speaking, in order to achieve the same effect as a single Queen Elizabeth you need approximately three Cavour-style light carriers on station, with manpower equivalent to double that of the larger ship. When considering the force structure necessary to ensure there are three small carriers available at all times for operations, taking the Royal Navy's current ratio of around 2 ships in maintenance for every 3 ships operationally available, you're looking at a fleet of five light carriers to achieve the same notional operational effect as a pair of Queen Elizabeths. Overall the model of smaller, more numerous, ships would require between 20 and 35% more manpower across the entire carrier force. At a time when the Royal Navy is hard-pressed to man its existing fleet a solution that involves adding up to a third more ship-side manpower to the carrier force is simply impractical and would add substantially to the force's through-life running cost.

As the ships get smaller their efficiency decreases markedly. Concepts for extremely small VTOL carriers, such as the one illustrated below, essentially amount to a reductio ad absurdum but nevertheless prove the point that greater numbers of smaller carriers become exponentially more expensive to produce the same effect in terms of available aircraft and sortie generation. Furthermore, there is also needless duplication in terms of aircraft maintainers with small carriers. It takes a similar number of trained engineers to maintain a small number of aircraft operated from a small carrier as it does to maintain a larger number on a larger carrier, once again duplication of functions across multiple platforms leads to greater manpower needs, reduced efficiency and increased costs across the entire fleet. The cost of the ship per aircraft carried also increases significantly as the platform becomes smaller. Taking into account that the RN, when presented with the opportunity to replace their old carriers, was instructed by the government that no more than two new ships would be procured it then becomes clear that two larger ships were the clear and preferable choice.

Concepts were produced for very small carriers, this modification of the "Type 43" destroyer examined the possibility of operating a pair of STOVL Sea Harriers from escorts. Image courtesy of D.K Brown & Moore's "Rebuilding the Royal Navy"

Sustained Operations:
The next major limitation on many smaller carrier designs is their capacity to conduct sustained air operations. This is due to a number of factors, but principally comes down to aircrew endurance, aircraft maintenance and supply limitations. As you can well imagine it is easier for a carrier with a larger air wing to conduct more sorties in a short-term high-intensity surge effort, however, their advantage becomes even more obvious when looking at sustaining a more modest number of sorties over a longer period of time. Facilities for planning and briefing multiple air operations are also more limited aboard smaller ships. Light carriers with smaller air groups place greater demands on a smaller pool of pilots and other air crew when sustaining operations over time, or compromise by reducing the number of sorties flown. Similarly, working a smaller number of aircraft harder to sustain operations leads to greater wear on individual aircraft, increasing the risk that they end up out of action without an available replacement. For example, during NATO bombing operations in 1995 Britain's "pocket carrier" HMS Invincible was struggling to sustain eight sorties a day with her eight embarked Sea Harrier FA.2s (and both Sea Harrier models had a reputation for being robust and reliable aircraft). A larger carrier with more aircraft embarked can better afford technical problems which prevent some aircraft from operating, because each individual aircraft's availability is less important when a large pool is available to draw from.

Logistics are also another crucial advantage of larger carriers, as greater space for fuel and stores makes them less reliant on frequent resupply operations which take time and prevent flying operations. The Invincible class were (despite some mid-life improvements to the quantity of ammunition they could store in their magazines) always tied very closely to their attendant fuel and stores ships. By comparison the Queen Elizabeth design can hold fuel and stores for around ~400 "strike" sorties, sufficient for five days of very high-intensity operations (defined as a first-day Surge of 110 sorties, followed by 72 sorties a day for four days) before needing to come "off station" in order to resupply fuel and ammunition. Alternatively, a more relaxed tempo could obviously be sustained over a longer period of time. Considering that the Libya air policing mission only required 36 sorties per day to enforce, after the first 11 days spent degrading Libya's air defences, QE could sustain a similar lower tempo operation without resupply for 11 days.

The Invincible class light carriers struggled to sustain air operations for an extended duration without reduced sortie rates and heavy dependence on attendant logistics ships.

Eggs and Baskets:

There is a superficially appealing argument that reliance on a smaller number of larger ships amounts to "placing all of one's eggs into a few very expensive baskets". While this may sound like an enlightened nugget of wisdom on the surface, dig a little deeper and you find that it's a flawed argument. Firstly, "hardening" a carrier force by using a greater number of smaller platforms only works if you have the escort warships to form multiple carrier groups. Without a sufficient number of these ships, which form a vital part of the carrier's layered defences, the available escorts will either be too thinly spread to be effective, or the carriers will have to be concentrated within the protected zone afforded by the available escorts. The first approach risks spreading available forces too thinly, dispersing them into vulnerable "penny packets", while the second only provides marginal benefits over having a single larger ship at the centre of the carrier group. Effective dispersal of the carrier force would multiply the number of effective escort groups required, something that is beyond the current capabilities of the Royal Navy. Secondly, a more dispersed carrier force would also require the dispersal of logistics support ships. As presently planned the UK carrier group will be supported by a large fleet tanker and solid stores ship, in comparison multiple smaller carriers would each require a roughly equivalent number of support ships (and would be more dependent on them, as their own fuel and magazine space would be more limited). If, broadly speaking, three smaller carriers are necessary to replicate the capability of a single larger carrier then the overall force will require something like triple the number of logistics ships and escorts; if the carriers are operated separately in order to take advantage of the dispersed approach. Even then, each group centered on a light carrier will have fewer aircraft available to contribute to the outer ring of its layered defense. This means that Combat Air Patrol (CAP) operations, designed to keep hostile aircraft away from the carrier group, would require a greater portion of the air group's effort and leave fewer aircraft available for offensive operations. What this means in practice is that the smaller carrier would be expending so much effort protecting itself and its escort group that its "punch" would end up being anemic.

The alternative approach to effective dispersal is concentrating multiple smaller carriers within the same group. This does have the clear benefits of not requiring nearly as many additional escorts and also limits the need to duplicate replenishment ships. The group's "punch" is also greater, due to the larger number of available aircraft for all duties, albeit spread between a number of ships rather than concentrated on one. Indeed, the concentrated approach was taken by the commander of the British naval task force that fought the 1982 Falklands War; with HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible operating together throughout most of the conflict. However, it is important to note that this means of employing smaller carriers sacrifices the key benefits of effective dispersal: the increased difficulty of locating the entire carrier force for the enemy, the ability to deploy the dispersed groups to different areas and the increased "coverage" this can provide (especially for anti-submarine operations). It is a fundamental principle of military operations that force be concentrated in order to achieve decisive effects, while a dispersed force may allow individual platforms to survive it is far less useful for striking hard blows against an adversary.

Operating a dispersed force of smaller carriers requires significantly more escorts and logistics ships and must still be concentrated in order to achieve decisive military effects in most circumstances.

Conclusions:
I began this piece with a simple question: "why build big?" and the answer is now clear. When discussing aircraft carriers, from a purely functional perspective, size matters. Setting aside the soft power and symbolic implications of operating large carriers entirely, they're simply better from a pragmatic position. Smaller numbers of larger carriers are more efficient in terms of manpower, cost per aircraft carried and supporting ships than larger numbers of smaller carriers. For the Royal Navy, told that they would only get two ships to replace the remaining Invincible class carriers, the decision was clear and they chose to build two large, efficient and effective ships. This was, for all of the reasons discussed, absolutely the right decision for the UK. The new Queen Elizabeth class, once fully worked up, will be capable of conducting extremely intensive "short and sharp" air operations before exhausting her own supplies of fuel and ammunition or sustaining a lower tempo of operation for a significant time. They will be able to bring a decisive level of force to most engagements, instead of the small "penny packets" of aircraft aboard light carriers. Along with a properly constituted escort group the larger carrier is also capable of simultaneously defending itself and conducting meaningful strike operations when necessary. For those who claim that the UK's large carriers are simple a vanity project I would respond by stating that deliberately pursuing a more expensive and less effective solution, in the form of smaller carriers, because of a perception that they "better suit Britain's position in the world" is not only vain but unnecessarily introspective and downright foolish. When it comes to carriers, the UK has absolutely made the right choice. Bigger is better.

Jutland, One Hundred Years On

As I write this, almost exactly a century ago the Dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers of the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet and the German Navy's High Seas Fleet were in action off the Western coast of the Danish peninsula; sometimes referred to as Jutland. Over the course of one of the greatest sea battles ever fought the fate of the Entente and Central Powers hung in the balance. If Germany could break the "ring of steel", the Royal Navy's distant blockade, by isolating and destroying portions of the numerically superior Grand Fleet and ultimately wresting control of the North Sea from their enemies the war could have had a dramatically different outcome. However, thanks in no small part to the vast British naval construction programme, and reforms conducted in the years before the war, the German goal was never realised. The "ring of steel" held and the Entente prevailed.

That's the short version of what happened, but the reality was far more complex. The Royal Navy's war from 1914-1918 wasn't just a handful of famous fleet engagements; the names of which are written down in history textbooks. The action at the Heligoland Bight, the battle of the Falkland Islands, the battle of the Dogger Bank, Jutland and the Zebrugge Raid. While these were moments of intense action, they were atypical. A handful of days of fierce combat, where titans clashed on the high seas. While the courage of the men who went to sea in "the fleet that Jack built" (referring to the radical First Sea Lord John "Jackie" Fisher) is unquestionable, we often forget that courage takes many forms. It was never simply a question of a few isolated sorties to confront the German fleet. The First World War at sea was as much a grinding attritional battle as the conflict on land. The drawn out determination of men in all of Britain's warships, great and small, for four long, hard, years helped ensure the defeat of the Central Powers. Today and tomorrow we commemorate 100 years since the action off Jutland, but in a little over a day's time we will go back to our lives, and many will forget. For the men of the Royal Navy in 1916 each day after Jutland was another in the long hard months of training, sorties, scouting and blockade duty in the North Sea. Each day was another spent keeping the sea open to friendly shipping and firmly closed to hostile commerce raiders.

A day from now, when the hundredth anniversary of the battle Jutland passes, I shall still take another moment to remember the sailors who, after having witnessed the titanic clash of fleets, made ready to go to sea once again. While the great battlefleets on both sides often dominate the public view of the First World War at sea, the myriad of smaller ships: cruisers, destroyers and gunboats, on lonely stations, were just as crucial and crewed by men no less courageous. Jutland ensured the Royal Navy kept control of the sea, but it was how they used that control that really mattered.

It is to the efforts of all who served in the Royal Navy throughout the Great War I dedicate this poem, for our world is built upon their backs. I am eternally humbled by their courage, service and sacrifice.

"They bear, in place of classic names,

Letters and numbers on their skin.

They play their grisly blindfold games

In little boxes made of tin.

Sometimes they stalk the Zeppelin,

Sometimes they learn where mines are laid

Or where the Baltic ice is thin.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

Few prize-courts sit upon their claims.

They seldom tow their targets in.

They follow certain secret aims

Down under, far from strife or din.

When they are ready to begin

No flag is flown, no fuss is made

More than the shearing of a pin.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

The Scout’s quadruple funnel flames

A mark from Sweden to the Swin,

The Cruiser’s thundrous screw proclaims

Her comings out and goings in:

But only whiffs of paraffin

Or creamy rings that fizz and fade

Show where the one-eyed Death has been.

That is the custom of “The Trade.”

Their feats, their fortunes and their fames

Are hidden from their nearest kin;

No eager public backs or blames,

No journal prints the yarns they spin

(The Censor would not let it in!)

When they return from run or raid.

Unheard they work, unseen they win.

That is the custom of “The Trade."

-Rudyard Kipling, The Trade

MACs and Jeep Carriers: A Useful Lesson From History

"We must assume that the battle of the Atlantic has begun... Extreme priority must be given to fitting out ships to catapult or otherwise launch fighter aircraft against bombers attacking our shipping. Proposals should be made within a week."

-Winston Churchill, March 6th 1941

At the height of the Second World War Britain, under immense pressure from Germany's U-Boat campaign, converted sixty one merchant vessels into auxiliary aircraft carrying ships. While thirty five were "CAM" ships (Catapult Aircraft Merchantman) equipped with a single last-ditch catapult launched Hurricane fighter, nineteen were fully-fledged flat topped "MAC" ships (Merchant Aircraft Carrier) capable of launching and recovering aircraft. Over the course of the War the Royal Navy also operated a total of forty four light "escort carriers". These ships were made necessary because of a number of factors but, fundamentally, they were built because the RN needed to close the "black gap" (the area in the mid-Atlantic beyond the range of land based anti-submarine aircraft where U-Boats concentrated their efforts). The presence of MACs and escort carriers helped to finally turn the tide in 1943 and ensured that Germany's 1944/45 commerce raiding campaigns would fail.

It's certainly worth asking why these ships were successful in their de-facto service with the Royal Navy, to the extent that it is claimed not a single merchant ship was lost from a convoy defended by a MAC. They certainly weren't very good aircraft carriers, even the largest couldn't operate more than four Fairey Swordfish biplanes and the aviation facilities were quite rudimentary. While escort carriers were certainly better than MACs as aviation ships, some were able to carry up to 24 aircraft and all had superior purpose-built aviation facilities, they achieved substantial tactical and operational effect for the same reason as the smaller civilian conversions. The reason for their success can be summed up in a single word: presence. While the air groups were small, especially when compared with the RN's fleet carriers, the MACs and escort carriers were comparatively cheap and available in large numbers. This meant that they could be used for convoy protection, as well as many other duties that the handful of hard-pressed large fleet carriers were too busy to perform. While around three quarters of the Royal Navy's escort carriers were built in the United States and loaned to Britain under the terms of the Lend Lease act, most were extensively modified by the RN, with all having their provisions for damage control improved and brought up to the RN's higher standards before entry into service.

So, what is the modern relevance of Britain's Second World War experience with MACs and escort carriers? Now we are, of course, no longer facing the threat of hordes of rudimentary diesel-electric submarines attempting to strangle our maritime communications. However, the fundamental lesson learned from that wartime experience was that inexpensive merchant-conversions, and aviation ships that exist below the capability of a fleet carrier, can enhance their larger cousins' availability by covering a wide range of low-end activities. In the Pacific the US Navy used its "Jeep" carriers (escort carriers) for a wide range of support and front-line activities, from transporting aircraft to launching strikes against Japanese forces in support of amphibious operations. While the ships themselves were generally unimpressive this was largely irrelevant, as their fighting power came from the aircraft they carried rather than the ships themselves. What we might now refer to as providing combat capability through "off-board systems".

Skip forward to the twenty first century and we find that aviation ships, below the level of a fleet carrier, continue to be valuable additions to many navies around the world. They come in a vast variety of shapes and sizes and, with modern helicopters, almost any large merchant ship can be converted into a somewhat capable aviation platform "on the cheap". RFA Argus, the UK's floating military hospital, was originally taken up from trade by the MoD in 1982 as the Contender Brezant before being purchased outright in 1984 and into an aviation training ship. She entered service in 1988. In this role she could carry and operate around six RN, Army Air Corps or RAF helicopters up to and including the largest rotary wing aircraft in UK service, the CH47 Chinook. Alternatively she could transport, although not operate, up to twelve Harrier-type VTOL aircraft. In a very real sense Argus, in her "aviation training" configuration, was the modern embodiment of the MAC ships of the Second World War. Her initial conversion proved extremely cost effective, costing only £45mn (~£120mn in 2016 prices). She also had the added benefit of only requiring a fifth the manpower of an Invincible class light carrier, just over half of which were actually Royal Navy personnel; with the rest being made up of RFA merchant sailors.

RFA Argus, the "modern MAC", has proved to be an incredibly valuable asset 
over nearly three decades of hard service.

Since her formal entry into service with the RFA in 1988 Argus has consistently been a busy ship. During the 1990-91 Gulf War she received her second major conversion, adding extensive medical facilities to enable her to act as the UK "Primary Casualty Receiving Ship" (or PCRS). She sailed or the Gulf with four Sea-King helicopters embarked, which aided in mine-clearance operations once she arrived in theater. In 1992 she deployed to the Adriatic, again with Sea Kings embarked, in support of the UK's contribution to the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia. In 1997 she deployed to the West coast of Africa to evacuate UK nationals from the Congo. She was part of the UK's national amphibious task group that deployed to both Sierra Leone in 2000 and Iraq in 2003. She underwent a major life extension in 2009 before being deployed to the Mediterranean, ready to evacuate UK nationals from Libya in 2011. Later that year she was assigned to the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. Her most recent activities have included support for UK overseas territories in the Caribbean and aiding in the fight against Ebola in Sierra Leone.

It is notable that Argus, like the Second World War MAC, has filled the gap that exists below the space occupied by high-end aviation platforms designed for intensive war fighting. Indeed, the only time that Argus was trialed in such a role (she was used as a makeshift helicopter carrier during the international intervention in Yugoslavia) she did not perform well. However, as an auxiliary aviation support platform, used initially for training and later for a range of defence and security activities below the level of war, she has proved herself invaluable. Indeed, it's possible that the lessons learned from RFA Argus contributed to the development of the Bay class auxiliary landing ships, with their distinctive flat aviation decks aft of the main superstructure.

When her procurement, conversion and operational costs are tallied and compared to her service record it becomes quite clear that Argus has been, and continues to be, excellent value for money. She is the ultimate vindication of the relevance of the MAC concept for the 21st century. Considering this, it is concerning that the UK government has refused to specifically state whether she will be replaced with a similar platform after she leaves service in 2024. The loss of Argus without replacement in order to save money would, in the author's view, be a profoundly short-sighted decision. Considering how relatively cheap such a platform would be to purchase, convert and run, as well as the enduring utility of aviation platforms that can fill the sub-war fighting niche, the prudent choice would be to opt for a replacement with similar capabilities.

If RFA Argus has epitomised the enduring viability of the MAC concept for the RN in the twenty first century, then HMS Ocean has demonstrated that the fundamental guiding design principles of the WWII escort carrier still also hold relevance. Built for only £154mn in 1993 (£280mn in 2016) her construction costs were about the same as a Type 23 frigate, or less than a tenth the cost of a Queen Elizabeth class strike carrier. In order to achieve the low-cost she was built to reduced part-commercial standards and sacrificed other in other areas compared to a "full fat" fleet unit. She is limited by her inability to achieve high sprint and cruise speeds, has a relatively minimal self-defence armament and a noticeably shorter lifespan than ships built to full military standards. In exchange for these trade-offs the UK received a capital-size ship at a very low cost that was rapidly built and commissioned in four years.

While originally conceived of and built as a Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) to support Royal Marine amphibious operations she, like Argus, has proved useful for a wide variety of rotary-wing aviation tasks. From her support of the UK intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the RM invasion of the Al Faw peninsula during the 2003 Iraq War in her intended LPH role to acting as a makeshift "strike carrier" with Army Apache helicopters embarked during the 2011 Libya intervention. Since 2010 she has repeatedly led the UK high-readiness Response Force Task Group on its annual "COUGAR" deployment and acted as an auxiliary heliport, moored at Greenwich, during the 2012 London Olympics. As of June 2015 she is currently serving as the RN's flagship. It is expected that she will decommission in 2018, nominally replaced in the LPH role by HMS Prince of Wales.

HMS Ocean in the light strike role, with Army WAH-64 Apache attack helicopters
embarked.

Ocean, like Argus, the Second World War MAC and the escort carrier continues to demonstrate that "second rate" aviation ships are not only a viable concept, but continue to fill essential niches that large strike carriers do not sit comfortably in. Ultimately the use of a 70,000 ton supercarrier to conduct HADR operations with its aviation assets will, in most circumstances, be a waste of one of the RN's most potent war-fighting assets. Similarly, placing a Queen Elizabeth class close enough to shore to act in the LPH role places an extremely high value asset at heightened risk of attack. In both circumstances a simple and cheap aviation platform is a far more appealing prospect, leaving the "proper" carriers available to deploy at short notice to do what they're best at: deterring and defeating serious threats to national interests.

Over the last two decades Ocean and Argus have acted as an effective adjunct to the UK's front line carrier fleet, made up of two Invincible class light ASW/strike carriers for most of these ships lives, they have performed essential auxiliary and supporting roles that freed up the fixed-wing carriers for other, more important, duties. It is a great shame that Ocean will not be replaced with another cheap LPH, she has added great value to the Royal Navy over her relatively short life. However, there remains hope Argus may yet be replaced with a similar auxiliary aviation platform. Failure to do so would almost certainly heap additional burdens onto the strike carriers and waste some of their awesome capability. Just like our predecessors concluded during the Second World War, if we are to make the most of our fleet carriers we need to invest in the auxiliary aviation platforms necessary to support them, allowing them to go where they need to be; rather than tied up with duties for which they are poorly suited.

Come Cheer Up My Lads: British Maritime Security

"We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are;
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."

-Alfred Lord Tennyson, Ulysses

While a third of the world's merchant shipping no longer sails under the red ensign as it did in 1939, the UK's maritime sector remains significant and vital to national prosperity and international power. Britain's naval strategy plays an important role, but as part of a wider effort that provides maritime security in home waters and overseas. The business of securing and protecting the UK's maritime interests rests on the shoulders of an astonishing array of actors: the military, government departments, agencies and the private sector. From Royal Navy's enormous new aircraft carriers to the tiny coastal research vessels of the Environment Agency HMG owns, charters and operates a vast profusion of specialist shipping. This is why it's necessary to take a broad view of the UK's security at sea, a narrow examination of the military alone would fail to recognise that the navy is shaped by the maritime world in which it operates.

It would be easy to simply mention the existence of a "maritime world" in passing and never return to, or elaborate on, what it actually means. 71% of the earth's surface is covered by salt water, a vast space that is totally inhospitable to human life; without technological assistance. Despite this, the seas and oceans play host to an astonishing range of economic activity. This can be broken down into two broad categories: logistics and extraction. 90% of global trade goods are moved by sea, transported by an international fleet of over 50,000 merchant vessels crewed by over a million merchant sailors. The UK is even more reliant on the sea than most nations: moving 95% of it's traded goods and importing 40% of it's food by sea. The seas and oceans act as a vast international space, that has acted as the engine of globalisation for centuries. If the Internet is the world's information superhighway then the maritime world is it's economic superhighway.

Earlier I mentioned that the UK merchant shipping sector is no longer the all-encompassing leviathan it once was. Despite the sharp decline in it's size since the Second World War it remains a powerful and healthy entity. The practice of using "flags of convenience", registering ships in countries with few regulations and little ability to enforce them, has fundamentally changed the rules of the game with respect to where merchantmen are registered. Currently 1/3rd of the world's merchant ships are registered in two countries: Panama and Liberia, ~85% of these fleets are foreign owned. In total the UK manages some 53.9 million deadweight tonnes (DWT) of merchant shipping interests, even though only 12.6 million DWT is actually registered in the UK. Since 1998 the gross tonnage of the British flagged merchant fleet has quadrupled, riding a wave of globalisation and technological change. As of 2014 a further 24.2 million DWT were registered in the UK's crown dependencies and overseas territories, the so called "red ensign group". Of these, Gibraltar, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda are prominent red ensign flags of convenience, which contribute to the economies of Britain's overseas territories. Aside from the UK's own merchant fleet, the City of London is a vital financial hub for the international maritime sector. It has a dominant position in marine insurance, holding a 33% market share in 2014, and provides a multitude of other financial services vital to the global maritime industry. In 2013, nearly a quarter of a million UK jobs were sustained by maritime services, mostly in logistics, with 140,000 directly employed in the sector. Of those 140,000 jobs just under half, are in the North of England and Scotland; providing job opportunities to people from communities in some of the most deprived areas of the country. In that year the maritime logistical sector as a whole contributed ~£10 billion to national GDP. The UK is now so deeply integrated into the system of globalised trade, and benefits so much from it, that the continued freedom of the seas to merchant traffic must be considered a paramount priority for any government and any security strategy.

90% of all goods are moved on the world's merchant shipping routes

As for extraction, from fish to fossil fuels and renewable energy the sea contains the resources necessary to sustain hundreds of communities around the UK. The North Sea's of oil and natural gas industry is almost certainly the most famous of these activities. Alone it supports ~450,000 jobs across the whole of Britain, enriches Scottish and Northern communities like Aberdeen, and contributed £32 billion to the national economy in 2014. Although North Sea oil and gas are believed to have now peaked, and the price of oil has dropped dramatically since the US "fracking revolution", UK-based companies like BP and Cairn Energy remain at the cutting edge of fossil fuel extraction techniques. The income from these industries looks set to remain substantial well into the future.

While it's a much smaller industry than fossil fuel extraction it is impossible not to mention the 15,000 fishermen that sail out of ports large and small around the British Isles. From the deep-sea high capacity fleets of Fraserburgh, North Shields and Grimsby to the myriad of small fishermen that sail out of Newlyn, Milford Haven, Plymouth and Poole the industry is alive and well. Although the UK fishing fleet has declined in numbers by 9% since 2004 it remains the second largest in Europe, by tonnage, after Spain. In 2014 the fleet landed 756,000 tonnes of fish and shellfish with a value of £861 million, a 21% increase in volume and a 16% increase in value of the total catch over the 2013 figures. The largest areas for fishing activity remain the North Sea and West of Scotland, with 62% of UK landed fish caught in those areas. While the fishing industry is nowhere near as economically important as North Sea oil and gas it remains the backbone of many communities, often in some of the most deprived areas of Britain.

Maritime logistics and fisheries are industries which have existed for thousands of years the seas around the British Isles also play host to an industry that is just breaking out of it's infancy: renewable power generation. Since the first two experimental offshore wind turbines off the coast of Northumberland were completed in December of 2000 there has been an explosion in the number of turbines and their generating capacity. There are currently 1452 offshore turbines which generated 28.1 TWh of electricity in 2014, accounting for 4% of total UK energy generation capacity. This is a boom industry at the moment, with 4000 MW of capacity already in place with a further 1700 MW under construction and over 5000 MW planned. The wind, wave and tidal energy sectors currently employ and support just under 35,000 jobs, a ~75% increase in five years since 2010. Some predict that the maritime renewable energy industry will create some 70,000 new jobs in the coming decade to 2025. Nearly half of the new jobs are likely to be connected to offshore wind. The renewable energy sector more generally remains an extremely vibrant economic environment, with healthy competition and a profusion of small and medium sized businesses employing 80% of workers. Once again we also find that the offshore arrays are located near areas where quality jobs have been scarce for some time. As North Sea oil and gas helped revitalise a number of towns and cities on the East Coast of Scotland so offshore renewables are slowly having a similar effect on coastal communities all around the UK.

The UK's economy relies upon the maritime sector for logistics and energy 

Amidst all the statistics about what the UK maritime sector does is one clear, simple and incontrovertible fact: the maritime sphere is vital to Britain's continued prosperity. Every single man woman and child that buys food from a supermarket, switches on a light, or works in almost any industry you care to name is, in some small way, reliant on the maritime sphere to continue providing those things continuously and cheaply. Those that describe the United Kingdom as a "maritime nation" are tapping into a fundamental truth about the country's place in the international system, it's greatest strengths and gravest vulnerabilities will always come from it's geography and sea. This is where the maritime security issue enters the picture. Protecting the myriad of seaborne activities, in home waters and abroad, that the British economy is dependent upon is an enormously complex task involving a diverse range of government bodies. Some, like the Royal Navy, are well known. Most, however, would be obscure in the extreme to members of the general public. It is essential to understand that their obscurity doesn't make them any less important. Fisheries protection for example is a complex multi-agency task, involving at least twenty surface ships and several aircraft from six government bodies. Without their contribution to enforcing the UK's laws on safe, legal and sustainable fishing activity the industry would be damaged by illegal and ecologically irresponsible trawling. It goes without saying that this would put many of the 15,000 jobs in that industry at risk, as well as many more further down the supply and processing chain.

Ensuring the security and safe passage of merchant traffic at sea is an even more demanding task, involving the efforts of the private sector, the military, a range of government organisations and international partners. The current system of international merchant shipping is built on navigational safety. Without accurate and constantly updated charts, the Global Maritime Distress and Safety Service, widely available meteorological information and the internationally agreed regulations for the prevention of collisions at sea the system of trade that we know today simply could not work. Britain continues to play an essential role in the maintenance of these systems. The UK Hydrographic Office is world renowned for the quality and accuracy of it's famous Admiralty charts, which 90% of the world's merchant ships use, and the met office's shipping forecast is issued four times daily on BBC Radio 4.  Both institutions have a near-unrivaled pedigree and are at the cutting edge of applying the latest technologies to the cartographic and meteorological fields. The UK, as a world leader in meteorological sciences, maintains two permanent and one summer-only Antarctic research stations run by the British Antarctic Survey (BAS). The Royal Navy's Antarctic patrol ship, currently HMS Protector, is relatively well-known because of her ancestor, HMS Endurance's, role in the 1982 Falklands War. What is less well known is that the BAS also operates two Antarctic research vessels: the RSS James Clerk Ross and the RSS Earnest Shackleton, with the former due to be replaced in 2019 by a new specially constructed polar research vessel. The activities of the BAS are essential for the continued international scientific investigation into, amongst other things, the long-term effects that climate change will have on the natural environment. Long term forecasts about how the Earth's climate will change, and how this will effect sea levels and weather patterns will allow coastal communities, ports and the maritime community to better prepare and hedge against potential environmental threats to their long-term sustainability.

RSS Earnest Shackleton, one of three UK vessels which operate in support
of the British Antarctic Survey.

From a relatively new challenge in the form of climate change to a problem that has existed for millennia, piracy remains a perennial issue which occasionally threatens the free movement of merchant shipping. The modern response has usually been international, because the globalised nature of seaborne trade means that many countries have a stake in ensuring that the flow of trade is not impeded by non-state actors. The response to piracy off the horn of Africa between 2005 and 2013 was the creation of two combined maritime task forces CTF 150 and CTF 151. Both involved, and were occasionally led by, the Royal Navy. Ultimately the international naval presence, combined with an improving security situation ashore and improved security measures by merchant ships, led to the collapse of Somali piracy in 2013.

Closer to home than Somalia and far more immediate than the potential effects of climate change Britain's maritime institutions play an essential role in providing human security. People trafficking, smuggling and illegal migration all pose threats to UK civil society and to many of the unfortunate people exploited by international criminal gangs. Intercepting illicit goods and trafficked people at sea is a far more attractive option than policing them once they reach British shores. Seizures of illegal drugs at sea tend to be measured in tonnes rather than pounds and have the potential to dent the formidable criminal industry in ways that policing alone cannot. Once again we find that tackling these challenges requires a range of government bodies working in tandem: from the intelligence services to HM Revenue and Customs and the Royal Navy. In this role the five customs cutters currently operated by HMRC have proven extremely useful. While unarmed under normal circumstances they have demonstrated their worth by acting as a visible deterrent through presence and monitoring, as well as taking a very active role in boarding, enforcement and constabulary duties around the UK. Interceptions and boarding operations by the customs cutters increased four-fold between 1999 and 2009 to nearly 2,000 operations a year. Some of these operations have resulted in the capture of huge quantities of illicit goods, early in 2015 the cutter HMC Valiant and the frigate HMS Somerset seized three tonnes of Cocaine with a street value of £500 million. Recently the government took the unusual step of deploying two of the cutters to the Aegean to help with the Mediterranean search and rescue effort related to the ongoing migrant crisis. HMC Protector and HMC Seeker were together responsible for rescuing 1650 people and arresting 26 smugglers while they were forward deployed.

HMC Valiant, one of HMRC's 42-metre customs cutters

While a range of civilian organisations contribute to the UK's maritime security in home waters it largely falls to the Royal Navy to protect British maritime interests further from home. As it stands the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Royal Fleet Auxiliary are the principal maritime arms of Britain's military. Between them they operate a force of 77 surface ships, 11 submarines, 33 specialist landing craft and 152 helicopters. The surface ships range in size from small patrol craft and mine hunters to the two new 70,000 ton Queen Elizabeth class supercarriers. While the presence of a sleek grey-hulled warship can often be enough to deter certain threats to the UK's commercial maritime interests, the prolonged presence of surface ships is usually necessary to achieve the desired effect. Since the early 1980s the Royal Navy's warships have patrolled the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf in order to ensure that body of water remains open to safe merchant navigation, especially for the large tankers bound for Europe through the Suez Canal. The deterrent patrol around the Falkland Islands has required a similar long-term commitment of the navy's limited resources. For patrol and presence tasks in global hotspots the navy currently relies on it's fleet of 19 surface escorts. The six Type 45 air defence destroyers and thirteen Type 23 general purpose frigates constitute the UK's front line maritime forces: forward deployed to trouble spots around the world.

To put it bluntly the number of these ships is currently woefully inadequate to support the level of defence activity required to safeguard Britain's maritime interests. The current force of 19 escorts in reality generates a deployable force of some 6-7 ships. The rule that three ships are required to keep one permanently on station, or available at high readiness, still holds true, vessels have always needed maintenance and crews need time ashore. Almost the entire escort fleet is committed to sustaining the UK's few remaining standing patrols in the South Atlantic, Gulf, home waters and the West Indies. There is no strategic reserve, no replacements available for losses to combat, sabotage, technical faults or accidents and few to no escorts are available to protect Britain's capital ships. In 2004 the New Labour government sold three relatively new Type 23 frigates to Chile, in 2010 the Liberal/Conservative coalition scrapped the four remaining Batch 3 Type 22 frigates. The replacement of 12 Type 42 destroyers with half as many Type 45s between 2003 and 2013 amounted to another cut of six hulls. In the decade between 2004 and 2014 the RN lost 13 escorts, almost half of it's major surface combatants.

For a country that is so totally reliant on the sea for it's survival and prosperity the current situation is nothing less than unacceptable. An opportunity currently exists to reduce the pressure on the escort fleet by bringing the new Batch 2 River class OPVs into service in addition to the existing Batch 1 ships, rather than as replacements for them. Forward basing these three new ships in the West Indies, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands would free up three or four high-end warships for operations elsewhere, in areas where their greater combat capability is required. Reintroducing a small but permanent RN presence in the Mediterranean, based out of Gibraltar, would also send a strong message to the Spanish; who have consistently violated the UK territory's sovereign waters in recent years. I would argue strongly that this is the only reasonable coarse of action in the short term, but in the medium to long term the number of escorts must rise. In the author's opinion the best way of achieving this long-term expansion would be to extend the Type 26 production run by at least seven hulls, to give a minimum of 20 frigates plus the six Type 45s. Crucially this increase could be achieved without increasing the total number of crew needed for the frigate fleet. Trained military manpower is a major expense and the smaller compliment of just 118 for each ship (compared with 185 for a Type 23) would allow the RN to man 20 ships with roughly the same number of people needed for 13 Type 23s. Combined with reduced pressure on the escort fleet as a whole, by handing over the Falklands and West Indies patrol tasks to forward based OPVs, this should allow the RN to hold a properly escorted carrier and/or amphibious group at high readiness, available for deployment anywhere in the world at short notice. Importantly, this should be achieved without severely disrupting ships' repair and maintenance cycles, and would also create a small reserve to cover unforeseen contingencies, accidents or combat losses.

The Type 23 frigate HMS Somerset, one of the UK's 19 remaining
surface escorts.

It is quite clear that Britain's maritime sector is both diverse and vital to its economic well being. Although the UK no longer sits at the heart of a global empire knitted together by maritime communications, the country's place as one of a very few centers essential to the management of the modern maritime order is indisputable. While a third of all the ships on the sea may no longer sail under the red ensign of the merchant navy; but 90% of them use British Admiralty charts, one in three is insured by a London-based company, and over a thousand ships are managed in some way by UK companies. Britain alone has more than half of the total offshore wind generation capacity in Europe and is the third largest producer of oil and natural gas on the continent after Russia and Norway. The UK moves 40% of it's food and 95% of it's traded goods by sea. The country is dependent on the maritime sector for hundreds of thousands of jobs, and millions more further down the supply chain.  This broad range of vital interests is supported and protected by an equally broad range of government bodies. From the warships of the Royal Navy, to the research vessels of the British Antarctic Survey, the fisheries protection ships of Marine Scotland to HMRC's customs cutters: Britain's maritime interests are afforded security every day by their work.

It is therefore shameful and shortsighted that Britain's premier means of safeguarding it's maritime interests should be in such poor shape. As I have discussed, the economic health of the UK depends to an extraordinary extent upon the freedom of the seas not only at home but also much further afield. The inner sphere of British maritime security is not in bad shape, with the return of a dedicated maritime patrol aircraft almost an assured part of the upcoming SDSR the future looks good. However, when it comes to the needs of the outer sphere which guards UK interests further afield there is much left to be desired.

It is too rarely expressed that Britain is a maritime nation, for which the sea is the ultimate source of power and the ultimate source of vulnerability. By failing to understand those two words, and the vast, complex and vital systems they so neatly describe, we are failing to understand ourselves. This is something that each generation must learn and relearn, because working out who we are requires us "To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."