Beyond NATO: Part Two, An EU Army

"With its own army, Europe could react more credibly to the threat to peace in a member state or in a neighboring state"
-Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission

This is the second part in an ongoing series that examines some alternative European defence structures, that could arise in the wake of the US withdrawing its forces and security guarantees from the continent. As we've already seen in the "NATO Minus" scenario the Atlantic alliance would be very hard pressed to generate credible forces to adequately defend its external borders and deter potential Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. However, trying to muddle through by attempting to perpetuate as much of the status-quo as possible is far from the only option that would be open to European states, following American disengagement. One of the most superficially attractive alternatives would be the expansion of the European Union's (EU) defence identity and the creation of a single "EU Army" greater than the sum of its parts. An ongoing process of European defence integration is provided for in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon:

"The Common Security and Defence Policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the member states the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements."

A security guarantee, the "mutual defence clause", similar in practice to NATO's Article 5 is also included in the terms of the treaty:

"If a Member State is a victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States."

These components of the existing treaty could very well become the core of a more Eurocentric alliance in the event that NATO lapsed or dissolved following a US withdrawal from its structures. With the mutual defence clause and a broad statement, committing the members to creating "a common defence", that could be interpreted in many ways the EU has the tools to create a defence union. While the prospect of achieving the unanimous support of the Council of Ministers (i.e. the governments of the EU member states) for such a policy currently seems remote, the US pulling out of NATO could very well provide the impetus for a significant policy shift amongst many of the states currently reluctant to pursue the idea. If the decision was made to develop the EU, rather than NATO, as the core European defence alliance this would undoubtedly have profound consequences for the long-term evolution of the EU's role and the shape of defence on the continent.

However, while the groundwork may have been laid for the EU to assume a much broader and deeper role in European defence, little of substance has actually been built on those foundations. Some progress towards the goal of increased European defence integration was made in the early 2000s: the creation of the EU military committee (2000), EU Institute for Strategic Studies (2002). a European Security Strategy (2003) and the establishment of the European Defence Agency (2004), an EU Military Staff (2004) and EU Battlegroups (2007). While this may seem like an impressive timeline, tracking the progress of an increasingly mature European Union defence identity, a brief look at "the man behind the curtain" reveals just how hollow these structures really are. In reality the whole EU defence project to date amounts to little more than an organisation playing with a handful of feeble military instruments.

Take for example the EU Battlegroups that were heralded by Eurosceptics as the beginning of the end of their national armed forces, and by Federalists as a key step on the road towards a fully-fledged EU armed forces at the core of an increasingly state-like union. To date neither of those predictions have come to pass although, admittedly it is likely still too early to tell where the end point will be. However, what we currently have are a handful of toothless regiment-sized "rapid reaction" forces theoretically capable of deploying within 5-10 days and sustaining themselves for about a month, this can be extended to 120 days "if resupplied appropriately". When you consider that the combat capabilities of these formations are, frankly, pathetic it is unsurprising that deploying them remains politically impossible and that none have ever been used. The only conclusion that can be made about the EU Battlegroups is that their purpose is as a symbolic political project, rather than a serious attempt to create an EU military that is at all credible.

EU Battlegroups: small, toothless and nearly impossible to deploy. 

If the EU Battlegroups are currently the apex of the European Union's defence identity, then it is clear that if the organisation would have a very long way to go if it was to take on the expansive defence and security role currently provided for by NATO. One way of achieving this on a much shorter timescale would be for the EU to "adopt" the, now highly Eurocentric, NATO alliance following American withdrawal. This would have the very significant advantage of not having to build 70 years of military experience almost overnight, along with the continuation of mature NATO structures. Such an arrangement could also provide crucial impetus to progress Turkey's application for entry into the EU. Alternatively, "Europeanisation" of the NATO alliance may lead to political tensions that could see non-EU members such as Turkey and Canada depart altogether. The continued participation and commitment of non-EU states would almost certainly be in doubt, so long as they remained outside the formal political union.

Although the adoption of NATO as a "European" institution is a possibility that could be made to work, the practical difficulties in achieving this aim would seem to be quite significant. Under these circumstances it has to be asked that if NATO should lapse or fall apart, following a US withdrawal, how well placed is the EU to recreate its functions? From the perspective of institutional experience it's fair to say that the EU is extremely poorly equipped to take on NATO's principal roles of collective defence. The EU Military Staff itself remains incapable of conducting operations, instead delegating this responsibility to an "Operational Headquarters" (OHQ) drawn from an existing military alliance (such as the NATO Allied Command Operations centre) or a member state (such as the UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood). While a parallel "EU Operations Centre" has existed since 2007 it is not a formal standing headquarters and would be assembled on an ad-hoc basis. This body's capacity to plan and conduct complex military operations, without extensive support from the member states, remains extremely limited. While a permanent standing EU operational headquarters would certainly enhance the institution's capacity to plan and conduct complex military operations, it is unclear why it would be necessary, when it would simply duplicate a capability that already exists across Europe. Currently there are headquarters in the UK, France, Germany and Italy (as well as the NATO HQ in Belgium) capable of acting in the EU OHQ role. In terms of command and control the EU remains almost wholly reliant on its members to provide the necessary facilities and personnel to coordinate complex operations. Without "adopting" the NATO OHQ, building the existing ad-hoc EU Operations Centre into a fully fledged military command and control facility would undoubtedly be a lengthy and very expensive process.

Another serious issue is the EU's lack of institutional military experience. To date EU operations on land have been characterised by their relatively small scale, low-intensity and multinational nature. Since 2002 five ground operations have been conducted under the EU Force (EUFOR) banner in the following countries: Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic. The largest of these operations (EUFOR Chad/CAR) comprised 4,300 troops drawn from twenty nations, of which 3,700 were actually deployed and 600 held in Europe as a reserve force. More than half the troops assigned to the operation were French, with significant Irish and Polish contingents also present. This relatively modest out of area operation suffered significant logistical problems from the outset, taking six months to achieve its full in-country operating capabilities and only then with significant additional support from the French and Russian armed forces. Only with the deployment of Russian helicopters in late 2008, in support of the EU mission, were these finally overcome.

Russian helicopters proved essential to solving EUFOR's logistical problems
during their deployment to Chad in 2008-2009.

Although the EU has some institutional experience with low-intensity peacekeeping operations, such as the ones listed above, its current capacity to do much more is doubtful; considering the significant problems it appears to have had deploying small forces overseas. On the European periphery the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Macedonia are essentially a continuation of the NATO missions to those countries, the only things that have changed in practice are the overall commanders and the addition of the EU brand to the mission. Functionally these deployments have changed very little since their handover from NATO to the EU in 2004. Since 2008 there have been two significant EU naval operations, Atlanta and Sophia/Triton. The former was the EU's response to the spike in piracy off Somalia between 2005 and 2013 and the latter is the ongoing operation to deal with the Mediterranean refugee crisis. Operation Atlanta was part of a wider international effort, involving many other states through the multinational Combined Task Force 151. Its goals were limited and the operating environment permissive, essentially amounting to a complex maritime constabulary task far removed from high intensity war-fighting. As for the EU's Mediterranean operations, Sophia and Triton, both have (to date) failed to match the operational effects achieved during the Italian government's unilateral effort: "Operation Mare Nostrum" conducted between 2013 and 2014 but ended on cost grounds. If these missions were to be summed up with a single word it would be "unambitious". EU missions to date have been defined by their narrow scope, small scale, permissive operating environments and limited duration. This is likely indicative of the institution's structural inability to manage more ambitious or complex military tasks in its current form.

So what of the prospects of deeper integration and a unified EU armed forces? It is unquestionable that mechanisms do exist within the Lisbon Treaty to facilitate increased military integration, the ultimate goal of which is a "common defence". Although the terms used in the treaty are broad and any progress requires unanimous consent from the Council of Ministers (effectively giving every state a veto) it is fair to say that structural provisions do exist to facilitate more defence integration. However, the requirement for unanimity ensures that, in practice, very little real progress can be made towards an EU defence union at present. The final report of the Future of Europe Group identified this issue in 2012, suggesting that in order for progress to be made towards defence union the principal of unanimity would have to be given up in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and replaced by the Qualified Majority Voting system. Such a change would indeed be required if progress were to be made towards a more federated EU defence structure. That said, the prospect of member states unanimously rescinding their veto in this area currently remains a remote one. The key question therefore becomes: would a US withdrawal from NATO be a significant enough strategic shock to convince EU members to abandon the principle of unanimity on the CFSP?

Of course there is some possibility that such an event might trigger a much broader reconsideration of the EU's role as a serious European defence player and there will be some within the EU institutions that would push hard for it but, in the author's opinion, there would simply be too many structural problems to overcome in order to turn the EU into a credible military player. Such a significant change in the status of the union as the movement towards a meaningful defence union would undoubtedly trigger referendums in a number of countries and these would be plebiscites that the federalist position would be unlikely to carry, given the significant unpopularity of moves towards further political integration in a number of key EU states. Not least of which is the union's foremost military power: the United Kingdom. In practice an EU defence union could not work without the wholehearted support of Britain and France, something it is unlikely to receive for domestic political reasons rather than foreign policy concerns. Even if the vast political hurdles to such an enterprise could be surmounted, they would inevitably be followed by even greater practical issues. How would an EU military be funded, raised, trained and equipped? Taking on one of the core functions of a state, defence, would inevitably lead to the growth of other federalising pressures: centralised powers of taxation foremost amongst them. This is simply one of the many reasons upon which the "EU Army" concept falls apart, to build a credible army the EU would need to become far more like a state than it currently is and there simply isn't the appetite amongst the peoples of Europe to see that idea realised.

The closest that Europe has currently got to a unified military organisation, a "European Army" (albeit not an especially credible one) is Eurocorps. Established over three years between 1992 and 1995 Eurocorps is a multinational military organisation centered on a permanently attached combined Franco-German brigade. While Eurocorps is not an EU organisation it does explicitly state that its purpose is as a force that can be made available to the EU, along with other international organisations and NATO, when necessary. To date the Corps only has five permanent members: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain alongside five associate states: Greece, Italy, Romania, Poland and Turkey. While Eurocorps may seem to be a European Army in the making to an outside observer in practice it is in fact similar in execution to NATO's multinational Response Force and Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. The principal difference being that Eurocorps can also be used for or in support of EU missions, hardly a model for a future EU armed forces.

Eurocorps, a very long way from a real "EU Army"

The final assessment of the EU's ability to assume NATO's role of collective defence, in the event that the alliance lapsed or dissolved following American withdrawal, is that in all likelihood it could not. The EU's existing military structures are, in all honesty, pathetically feeble and principally symbolic. They are the follies of an almost exhausted federalist dream rather than a serious attempt at building a set of armed forces for the EU that could perform the roles currently covered by the member states themselves and coordinated through NATO. Although NATO could be "adopted" as an increasingly European institution, following US withdrawal, this would have the likely effect of driving a wedge between EU NATO members and non-EU members. A wedge that could potentially lead to the withdrawal of allies, such as Turkey and Canada, from European defence structures entirely. Furthermore, the political difficulties inherent in setting in motion the processes which would enable the creation of a European Army remain so great as to be almost insurmountable. They are tied far too closely to an unpopular federalist direction for the EU to gain the support needed to carry the creation of a single military force for the union through to its conclusion. The, almost certain, outcome would be a series of unwinnable national referendums on the issue, which would undoubtedly kill it.

The reality of the EU's military structures is that they are a "Potemkin Village", a symbolic facade with no real substance behind them. They cannot be relied upon to provide for Europe's defence because they are incapable of managing all but the simplest and lowest intensity conventional operations. In effect the institution would remain wholly dependent on its members and unified EU armed forces will remain an unattainable federalist dream.

The EU Refugee Crisis: All Quiet on the Libyan Front?

As part of a growing series on the root causes of the EU Refugee crisis, and how the West could move to restore stability to the Mediterranean basin, today's article will take a look at the current situation in Libya.

Since the 2011 NATO intervention the situation on the ground in Libya has deteriorated significantly. The internationally recognised government, based in Tripoli, struggled to exert its authority in the wake of the Gaddafi regime's collapse. Faced with a weak central authority the country slowly began devolving into regionalism, based on tribal loyalties. By 2014 the ruling General National Congress (GNC), elected in the wake of the first civil war, was becoming increasingly unpopular. Amongst other things it was criticised for being dominated by the minority Islamist faction, directly and indirectly supporting Islamist groups and attempting to impose policies in line with strict Islamic legal practice against the wishes of the Libyan people. The political crisis finally came to a head in the winter of 2013-14, with the GNC unilaterally voting to extend their mandate for a further year. Their refusal to stand down at the end of the mandated governing period was met by protests and demands for the establishment of a new elected governing body with popular legitimacy. On the 14th of February 2014 General Haftar, the overall commander of the Libyan Army at the time, appeared in a televised address and ordered the dissolution of the GNC. Elections would be held for a ruling council of deputies, and the running of the country would be conducted in the interim by a "caretaker government".

As expected the GNC refused to comply with General Haftar's ultimatum, accusing him of an attempted military coup. The first fighting, in what can be described as the Second Libyan Civil War, broke out in mid May when the forces of the Libyan Army under General Haftar attacked the bases of several Islamist groups in Benghazi. A day later more forces loyal to the General forcibly dissolved and suspended the GNC parliament in Tripoli. In the following weeks much of the Libyan armed forces sided with General Haftar and a number of large pro-security forces protests were held, denouncing the GNC's support for the militias, seen by many of the protesters as destabilising the country. Elections were held soon after the military's move against the GNC, resulting in a landslide for the anti-Islamists and the formation of a new ruling Parliament. Although the turnout was low, at only 18%, due to the ongoing violence the result has been internationally recognised. The defeated Islamist political factions, mostly grouped around the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, reorganised themselves as the New General National Congress (NGNC) and declared the election illegitimate.

July of 2014 saw major moves by Islamist militias to capture Benghazi and Tripoli and substantially intensified fighting between Government and Islamist forces. By September the situation in the capital had deteriorated to such an extent that the national parliament was moved to Tobruk, conducting it's activities from a requisitioned Greek car ferry, the Elyros. October saw Islamist militias in control of Derna swear allegiance to ISIS' Islamic Caliphate. During the following three months the skirmishes, air strikes and bombings continued, some targeting the country's oil infrastructure.

A diplomatic breakthrough was reached in January of 2015, with the UN support mission in Libya (UNSMIL) helping to bring about a negotiated ceasefire and talks between the NGNC and Government factions. Since the ceasefire fighting has continued between Government forces and ISIS, who have expanded their control over the area around the city of Sirte and carried out terror attacks in the capital. In early March General Haftar was re-appointed as head of the Libyan Army by the national Parliament and Government forces conducted an offensive against the ISIS-held town of Derna, in an attempt to drive the militants out. Later that month Ansar al-Sharia, one of the major Libyan Islamist militias, also declared allegiance to ISIS. General Haftar also announced that Benghazi would be retaken from the Islamist militias.

The process of de-escalation between the Government and NGNC has continued apace, with an increasing number of local peace agreements coming into force. Interestingly, in August the people of Sirte revolted against ISIS rule, the ensuing reprisals killed 38 and the group was forced to threaten the use of poison gas against the population if attacks on their forces did not cease.

The Second Libyan Civil War, Mid August 2015. Government Forces (Red),
NGNC (Green), ISIS (Grey), Local Forces (Blue), Tribal Militias (Yellow).

What is surprising is the degree to which the situation on the ground in Libya has markedly improved this year, and how this improvement has been largely overshadowed by the war in Syria and the escalating Refugee crisis. Until recently the majority of refugees were being moved to Europe by sea, with people traffickers based in Libya providing boats to make the crossing to Italy. Despite the relative reduction in importance of the Libyan route, as tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have begun moving through the Balkans, the Mediterranean crossing still remains the second most popular route into Europe. Many of the refugees using the Libyan route have been displaced by conflicts in Africa, such as the ongoing conflicts in Nigeria and Eritrea, rather than the Middle East.

As the country has slowly been moving towards a peaceful settlement, the long-term result of which will likely be a far more stable North Africa better able to deal with migration and the people traffickers who exploit refugees fleeing conflict, it is vital that the West now give greater support the UN peace process. In the near future we will need to make a substantial investment in the future of that country, in the form of development aid, technical expertise, equipment and training for their security forces. The Libyan government and people have avoided sliding into the kind of serious sectarian violence that would have seen their country join the ranks of a handful of other failed states in Africa. They have done much of the heavy lifting and compromising necessary to begin bringing their country back together but we, in Europe, need to give them the tools to finish the job. If sustaining and building upon the ceasefire agreements requires the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force then we should support such a proposal with finance, logistics and military means if necessary.

Where the West can certainly help is with defeating the ISIS affiliated militias in control of the area around Sirte. Both the NGNC and Government have agreed that ISIS constitutes a common enemy, and both have focused substantial portions of their military effort, since the ceasefire, on attacking areas held by ISIS. Libya's lack of strategic depth, almost all of the population live along the coast, means naval artillery could be brought to bear, along with air strikes and commando raids in support of local ground forces. Striking a decisive blow against the Libyan branch of ISIS would do much to break that organisation's aura of invincibility, such a victory would be a propaganda coup for the West and Anti-ISIS forces in a battle where image is vital. Removing the "third force" from the Libyan internal conflict could also be used as a means of helping unify the country again, turning all forces against a common foe as part of a long-term peace process managed by the UN. It also seems that, unlike in Iraq, ISIS' presence in Libya is resented to by the local populations they control which greatly simplifies the problem.

The UK RFTG on exercise with partner navies in 2015

It just so happens that the UK has a near-ideal force to conduct the operations I have suggested, in support of the Libyan people currently occupied by ISIS militias. The Royal Navy's Response Force Task Group (RFTG) contains all the naval, rotary-wing and amphibious commando forces necessary, while air bases in Southern Italy could be used to conduct air strikes, as they were in 2011. A small military commitment and a short sharp intervention, co-ordinated closely with local forces, would be all that would be necessary to wrest control of the Sirte area from the estimated 5,000 ISIS militia members that currently occupy it. Rather than try to attack ISIS directly where they are the strongest, in Syria and Iraq, by striking and rapidly eliminating their "emirate" in Libya the UK could help further the ongoing Libyan peace process and win an important propaganda victory against ISIS' image of invincibility. In doing so we would make their cause less attractive and possibly hasten them to take rash and uncalculated action on their central fronts in the Middle East, in order to shore up their image.

Of all the places where a Western intervention could succeed against ISIS, Libya is by far the place where such action would result in the greatest good at the lowest cost in lives. We would be honoring the commitment we made to the Libyan people in 2011 and investing in a plan that would result in a more stable, pro-Western and democratic North Africa in the long-term. The great strength of the UK's modern armed forces is our ability to strike at our enemies' weaknesses with great accuracy, delivering a quick rapier thrust rather than a series of crushing sledgehammer blows. Now is our opportunity to strike at ISIS' weakness in North Africa, to cut out the cancer before it has the chance to spread and do more damage to a state still shakily finding its feet again.

The EU Refugee Crisis: A Collective Abandonment of Responsibility

The astonishing thing about the Europe's response to the ongoing refugee crisis is that it has been almost wholly passive. The debates have centred on the number of people to be let into various countries and how the total should be distributed throughout the 28 member states of the EU. This passive response, and the reluctance to seriously discuss action to address the root of the crisis: the Syrian Civil War, is indicative of the malaise that has eaten deep into the influence of the Great Powers of Europe. By abandoning responsibility for what goes on in areas that could be described as Europe's "back yard", North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, the great powers have contributed in no small measure to the deterioration of the situation in Syria and Libya. Military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have sapped any will for the introduction of ground troops into either conflict, even the idea of muscular peacekeeping forces under a UN flag hasn't been seriously mooted.

All of this is a sign, in the author's opinion, of the abrogation of responsibility by European states for their own foreign policy. Increasingly the nations of Europe look to the EU to manage their foreign policy, a body neither equipped nor designed for the purpose. When an issue is too large for the EU to manage, or when military action has been required, all eyes turn to the United States to provide the leadership and resolve to "sort out" a problem. What we're seeing today is a situation where a self-interested and increasingly reluctant United States has refused to take the lead in solving a problem which effects them very little, and which is beginning to effect Europe a great deal. The American response has been almost entirely focused on defeating ISIS in Iraq by bombing. Hardly a solution to the Civil War in Syria.

The sad message of the story seems to be that when everyone believes they're protected by a collective organisations like the EU and NATO they take less responsibility for the defence of their own interests. This has happened to such a great extent in Europe the great continental powers have become strikingly passive international actors. It was not always so, throughout the 1990s the major European powers took an active role in containing and eventually bringing to an end the war in the Balkans. Few should forget that at its worst that conflict was fought by groups just as ruthless as the jihadists of Syria or the militias of Libya. And yet now, we don't even seriously discuss intervention. The cancer of "someone else will sort it out" and "it's not our problem" has spread far, reducing states with the ability and capacity to act to mere onlookers. The fact that Europe accepts refugees is not concerning, what is worrying is that this is our main contribution and the subject of the whole debate.

British troops committed to the UN mission in Bosnia

At least Britain is one of the more involved states, trying to make a difference where it will count. The capitals of Europe should be ashamed that the UK has contributed more in aid to the people of Syria than all of them combined. While supporting US bombing of ISIS targets in Syria, through refuelling and intelligence missions in the region, is a feeble military commitment it's far more than the other great powers will even contemplate. At least the UK is willing to do something rather than stand aside and do nothing at all. Regardless of whether we, as Europeans, want to be involved with these problems or not we don't have a choice in the matter. Either we are willing and able to go to the crisis, or sooner or later the crisis will come to us.

We can no longer pretend that the EU can provide all the solutions to the serious international problems we face today. Nor can we continue to depend to such an unhealthy degree upon the largesse of the United States to pay the price in blood and treasure for maintaining stability in our geographic backyard. If this means spending more on the tools of foreign policy: aid, diplomatic services and defence then so be it. There is increasingly little choice in the matter, lest we are left as passive spectators in our own retreat into irrelevance.

A man of great standing once vocalised a similar feeling to the one that currently exists amongst most of the peoples of Europe when he said: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing." The man was Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the "far away country" was Czechoslovakia. 2015 is not 1938, but when we turn our backs on the world and "only wish to be left alone" the world has a tendency of coming knocking. Like every generation that has come before us we must constantly learn and relearn the vital value of action and the bankruptcy of trying to be a passive bystander on the world stage.

The EU Refugee crisis and the Syrian Civil War: a solution wrapped in a problem

Firstly I'd like to apologise because obviously this article is not the planned piece on Afghanistan, but this week's events have really resonated with me and I think that something needs to be said about how we deal with the refugee crisis currently engulfing Europe. Don't worry though, the article on Afghanistan is in the pipeline. That said, let's take a look at the current state of Syria.

The country has been engulfed in a grinding civil war since July 2011, protests against the depredations and misrule of the Assad government earlier that year spilled over into an insurgency that has steadily grown into the full blown civil war. Over the course of the following four years four more or less distinct actors have emerged.
   The Assad government still commands formidable military resources, and controls most of the South and West of the country, as well as the entire Mediterranean coast, The ports of Latakia and Tartus remain its critical lifeline to their main supplier of arms and equipment: Russia.
   The other major faction is ISIS, in control of most of the North Western half of the country. Their fighters are often able to offset their disadvantage in heavy equipment with an innovative style of fighting which combines conventional maneuver warfare with guerrilla tactics such as the use of mines and IEDs. From what we know from Iraq they also seem to be led by highly experienced people, some ex-Iraqi Ba'athist officers from the Saddam era included.
   On the peripheries of the country sit the remnants of the Free Syrian Army, who hold enclaves in the West of the country the largest of which is in the far North West along the border with Turkey. The FSA is by now an eclectic mix of democrats, communists, anti-ISIS jihadist movements and more. They do have a good number of experienced military personnel, mostly defectors from Assad's Army, and some western backing and equipment. Unlike ISIS the FSA has to rely mainly on guerrilla tactics and raiding, as it lacks the equipment and training to take on ISIS or the Assad government in conventional fighting. They also share an important alliance with the government of"West Kurdistan".
   The Kurds occupy two enclaves in the far North East and North West of the country, along the Turkish border. While the Kurdish armed forces are likely some of the most coherent in the conflict, their unity is based on a strong ethno-nationalist identity that seems to have broadly transcended political differences during this conflict. The socialist YPG or "people's protection" militia command the Kurdish military effort in Syria. Their fighters tend to be less experienced and trained than their ISIS counterparts, although the leadership has considerable military experience from the on-off guerrilla conflict waged against the Turkish and Assad governments. Despite this their fighters have proven steadfast when placed in good defensive terrain and given adequate support by Western air forces, inflicting an important reverse on ISIS at the border town of Kobane in late 2014.

Areas occupied by: Assad's forces (Red), ISIS (Grey), the FSA (Green) and the Kurds (Yellow)

The military situation on the ground seems to have become a stalemate, with the two major factions unable to make real progress against one another and the smaller factions reduced to defensive and guerrilla operations. The war, if it continues as it has until this point, looks set to grind on for years and destroy much of the country's infrastructure in its course.
   According to the UN High Commission for Refugees the conflict has officially displaced just over 4,013,000 people as of July 2015 (although the real number is likely higher). To put this into perspective the Syrian population in 2011 was just under 22,000,000, between a fifth and a quarter of the total population are now refugees in other countries. This doesn't include the estimated 6,500,000 internally displaced people. The largest refugee populations are in the countries nearest Syria, with 3/4 (3 million) of the refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Of the remaining 1/4 many have made their way to Europe via North Africa. Deciding how to manage these people has thrown the EU into crisis and proven to be politically divisive across the continent. Germany's preferred solution, a migrant quota system managed by the EU, proved unacceptable in the latest Brussels Summit. Since then the response has been largely deadlocked at the EU level and national governments have started taking measures of their own, such as Hungary's construction of a border fence.

Throughout all of this Britain has played a reasonably quiet but important role, contributing the second largest aid package after the United States (worth some £900 million) to improving the refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon as well as mitigating the effects of the conflict in Syria itself. However, the UK has come under intense recent criticism from some quarters, especially in Germany, for its refusal to accept greater numbers of refugees. This is especially important to the Germans, considering that Chancellor Merkel is predicting that they could see an influx of up to 800,000 asylum seekers, mostly from Syria, by the year's end. Crisis appears to be piling upon crisis, producing movement of people on a scale not seen since the Second World War. What has been missed is that Britain has been saying the right thing about the refugee crisis from the start: treating the symptoms by taking in refugees is no solution compared with treating the cause by bringing peace and stability back to Syria. While this is far easier said than done it is the correct position. The war in Syria is out of control, and now the crisis is sat staring at the White cliffs of Dover. We can no longer afford to remain a passive observer.

This may be where you could expect me to launch into a polemic on the necessity for Western intervention, as I suggested would be the right course of action in Iraq. But Syria is not Iraq and the solution to this problem is sitting right in front of our collective noses: the refugees themselves. Within the Syrian diaspora is all the manpower, leadership potential and technical skills necessary to retake and rebuild that country. What they need is housing, organising and equipping. I'm not just talking about recruiting and training a new Syrian Army from the refugee population (although this will be essential), but also creating a government, judiciary, medical services, brigades of people responsible for reconstruction of key infrastructure and a light paramilitary force capable of basic law enforcement. We would need to generate all the institutions necessary for the administration of a medium sized state, some as a nucleus to be built upon and some as fully formed services, before re-introducing them to the country as the leading force in an international intervention.

We have 1/4 to 1/5 of the country's total population sat in camps outside of Syria or displaced to Europe. By some predictions at the end of this year there will be over a million Syrians in Europe. If we in the West can tap into the sheer human potential of this body of people, give them purpose and help them retake and rebuild their country there really are few limits to what we could achieve.
  Let me be clear, this would not be taking in refugees because it looks like a good humanitarian thing to do. We would be pursuing a hard-nosed political and military strategy designed to further our interests in the region: removal of Russian influence from Syria by overthrowing Assad (something we're already committed to), the installation of a popular and democratic pro-Western regime in Damascus, the defeat of ISIS in Syria and the restoration of stability to the Eastern Mediterranean which would allow refugees to begin returning to Syria.

A sea of untapped human potential

This wouldn't be cheap or easy, the construction of a competent new Syrian army, to be trained and equipped to Western standards, alone would take years and cost billions. That said, by the debates over equipping the FSA and the dispatch of training missions to aid Iraqi forces the West seems comfortable with training and equipping local forces to do its fighting. What I'm suggesting is that we do this on a vast scale, dividing the effort across Europe and the United States. This is hardly a new experience for the West either, the UK and US (and NATO nations in Afghanistan) have built essentially new armed forces from scratch in the past in far more difficult conditions. If we can muster the will and leadership we could do it again.

Earlier I stated that the crisis was "producing movement of people on a scale not seen since the Second World War". Well maybe we should look to the free forces of WW2 for inspiration, drawn from refugee populations and the shattered remnants of armies from all over Europe. Britain took them in, trained them to modern standards and armed them with US equipment before they symbolically led the liberation and rebuilding of their countries alongside the Allies. Maybe General David Richards was right when he said that the UK "must go onto a war footing" to defeat ISIS. The only real solution is for the Syrian people to liberate their own country from the tyrants and terrorists who have taken control of it. If we in the West enable them to do this, by turning the refugee population into the basis of a new Syrian state, then we may just achieve a truly great liberal intervention. So yes, we should accept more Syrian refugees into the UK, but as part of a concerted effort to put an end to the Syrian Civil War and ultimately rebuild that country.

The Bear and the Lion: Russia and Britain, European outsiders?

If there is a single word which sums up the Anglo - Russian geo-strategic rivalry it is history. To be precise the 200 years of history after 1815 have, with few notable exceptions, featured foreign policy competition between these two states. Both sit on the periphery of the European continent, separated from the core not only by geography but also different political traditions from the central European states. For Britain constitutional monarchy, liberal values and the rule of law have formed the basis of political life for two hundred years. In contrast the Russian system has tended towards autocracy, illiberalism, and the rule of oligarchs, with each political 'dynasty' eventually collapsing and giving way to the next. The Russian Federation under President Putin is simply the latest expression of a political culture that dates back hundreds of years.

It is fair to say that both countries are located in Europe, but neither is truly European. Both look outside of the continent for important aspects of their national character. Britain's cultural, economic and military ties with the Anglosphere states (The United States, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) exert a powerful force that still draws the country away from the politics of the European core. Similarly, the vast and sparsely populated territory east of the Ural mountains lends Russia its distinct Eurasian character. In times past this distinct Eurasian Russian-ness was coupled with the Communist ideology and a command economy to form a variant for state organisation very different from the Western model. Over a quarter century since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia is still yet to demonstrate any significant moves towards becoming more European. Britain's Atlanticist traditions, especially its 'special relationship' with the United States has exerted a similar draw on Britain away from a purely European future.

So what to make of the conflict in the Ukraine? To really get an understanding of what is driving Russia's involvement in the country it is essential to consider natural defensive barriers as more than a way of keeping hostile armies out of a state's territory, but also a means of insulating that same state from unwanted foreign influences. Both Britain and Russia used their natural defenses to insulate themselves from the political ideas carried by the armies of revolutionary France in the 19th century and fascist Germany in the 20th. To understand why the Ukraine is so vital to Russia's perceived security interests it is necessary to understand the nature of Russia's particular natural defensive advantage. While the English Channel obviously constitutes a formidable British 'moat' the thousand or more miles between the nearest Western NATO state and the Russian Capital is what insulates the 'Russian system' from unwanted European influences. Until recently pro-Russian regimes in Belarus and the Ukraine, and the reluctance of NATO to station troops in the Baltic States, has maintained an ideological and military protective buffer zone between central Europe and Russia. It now seems inevitable that the collapse of the corrupt regime of President Yanukovych in 2014, and its replacement with a Westward looking provisional government, would have illicited a response from Russia in any case.

Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine, winter 2014.

The speed and ferocity of the response seems to have taken many Western capitals by surprise, war had returned to Europe seemingly out of the blue. 'Little Green Men' suddenly appeared in the Crimea and so much confusion and doubt was sown that before a coherent response could be formulated the Russian flag was flying in Sevastopol. By the time the smoke had cleared and it had become obvious that Russia was waging near open war against one of its neighbors their troops and Eastern Ukrainian separatists had occupied over a third of the country. The NATO response to date has included the imposition of damaging sanctions on Russia, which have reportedly shaved 9% off the GDP of an economy already struggling due to the recent collapse in oil and gas prices. The US plans to station equipment for an armored brigade in Poland, and the forces assigned to the Baltic air patrol mission (active since 2004) have had small additions made to them. While certain news outlets in the UK have hailed the crisis in Ukraine as the beginning of 'a new Cold War', for which Britain is woefully unprepared, the Western reaction has generally been rather subdued.

So, should more be done? Is this really the first move by a resurgent and militarist Russia bent on re-establishing its domination over Eastern Europe? To both questions I would issue a resounding no. Russia has fallen far since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the state has become increasingly reliant on the export of oil and gas for much of its revenue and the tumble in prices since the American 'fracking revolution' is hitting them hard. The Russian armed forces may appear formidably large on paper, but much of their equipment is old or obsolete. Of their 12,800(!) tanks only 2600 are assigned to 'active' units, and 1700 of those are aging Soviet-built T-72s. In total Russia possesses around 900 relatively modern tanks assigned to active military units. In comparison the US army has just under 1200 extremely modern M1A2 SEP Abrams tanks in its inventory, some of which have already been moved back into bases in Germany. In truth, while the Russian armed forces look large and impressive on parade in Red Square, in an offensive conventional war against NATO they would lose badly. Make no mistake, we won't be seeing the Third Shock Army rolling through the Fulda Gap anytime soon. Instead, I would argue that Russia is fighting in the Ukraine in an attempt to preserve a rump buffer zone between them and the pro-European government in the West of that country. Without this their leaders fear that a Westward looking 'Europeanised' Ukraine will eventually undermine the current system to such an extent that it could bring about civil unrest and the possibility of another revolution. Russia is fighting to remain an European outsider, because to be anything else would mean the collapse of the current system of corruption and patronage that underwrites the power of President Putin.

The Russian armed forces: formidably large but largely obsolete

So where does this leave Britain? If Russia feels threatened by European ideas to such an extent that it is willing to go to war with its neighbors, in spite of the serious economic damage that it has incurred for doing so, then it seems that we're dealing with that rarest of things, a 'vital national interest'. While it is nice for Britain to support freedom and democracy around the world, and we should politically oppose the illegal annexation of any and all Ukranian territory by Russia in forums like the UN and EU, a less corrupt Ukraine is not worth radically altering our defence and foreign policy posture towards Russia for. Their track record of intervening in neighboring states to prevent the spread of Western institutions like NATO, just look at the 2008 war in Georgia, seems pretty clear. If institutions like the EU and NATO want to expand into these areas then they should expect serious push back from a Russian regime that believes it is fighting to preserve its long term existence. In the opinion of the author it is simply not worth meddling in these areas. Talk of arming the regime in West Ukraine is dangerous. Russia has already made it clear that they are not going to be overly cautious or use half-measures, they're playing for keeps. We have to ask ourselves to what extent are we seriously invested in a Western future for Ukraine, and are we willing to go as far as Russia has to achieve that?

In the meantime Britain is fighting its own battle to remain the other 'European outsider'. In the capitals of Europe and in Brussels the future direction of the European Union, and Britain's place in it, is being shaped. Like Russia, Britain is struggling against the embrace of a purely European future, as powerful cultural and political forces ensure that we will continue to question and challenge many European institutions, from an outsider's standpoint.