Soldiers from the Sea: Imagining a Future for the British Army

"The British Army should be a projectile to be fired by the British Navy"

- Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary 1905-1916

The recent history of the British Army has been one of apparently relentless decline. At the height of the Cold War in 1960 the UK had 316,000 Soldiers, many of whom were still National Service conscripts. The service's core purpose was at that time brutally evident, the defence of Western Europe in the case of a Soviet incursion. Now the Cold War is over, and the number of troops stands at 82,000 (plus a planned 30,000 reserves by 2020). It is fair to say that the Army has shrunk very significantly. What matters though is asking seriously if we should be worried by this fact, and if we are then should the decline in troop numbers be reversed?

When looking at what the shape of tomorrow's British Army should be it's only logical to start with an examination of yesterday's Army. By asking: why were there 316,000 Soldiers in 1960, and what were they doing? The major commitment, as I've already mentioned, was to the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), and the defence of West Germany against the Soviet Third Shock Army. It is also often forgotten that the BAOR was also an army of occupation, a product of the outcome of the Second World War, with substantial civil duties and powers. In 1960 it's strength stood at 52,000 men of all ranks, fewer than the 55,000 requested by NATO. Although this seems an impressive force it is important to note that the War Office was under no illusions that it would not be an effective force if it were required to fight a major war against the Soviets. The intention was to reinforce this number with some 114,000 troops based in the UK if the Soviets were detected mobilising for war. In reality, even with these reinforcements the BAOR would still have been horribly overmatched by it's intended opponent. Estimates made in the early 1970s were that they could hold the Soviets for 48-72 hours through conventional means alone. It's true purpose was always to act as a demonstration of the UK's continuing commitment to NATO and, like the rest of NATOs forces in Germany, to act as a tripwire for the release of nuclear weapons.
The army of 1960 also retained a substantial role in policing the UK's remaining colonies as many made the, often difficult, transition to independent states. During the Malayan Emergency, which reached it's conclusion in 1960, the UK had some 35,000 troops deployed to that country alone.
Finally there were enough forces set aside for a modest sized "fire brigade", available at short notice and deployable in the event of a crisis.

In summary, the army of 1960 was:
1.Mostly committed to NATO and the defence of West Germany.
2.Responsible for Imperial defence and overseeing the ongoing process of decolonisation.
3.Able to deploy a moderately sized force, at short notice, in support of UK interests in the event of a crisis.

The first two commitments, by their very nature, required a large continental-style army; something that the UK had historically not maintained in peacetime until after the First World War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the handing over of Britain's last major imperial possession, Hong Kong, in the 1990s two of the major reasons for a large British army had disappeared. The 1990 "Options for Change" defence review saw an 18% cut in manpower across the board, with the army reduced to 120,000, mostly through cuts to the combat arms. It's successor, the 1994 "Front Line First" review, saw much smaller reductions, falling mainly on support and logistics structures. Reductions have continued since then, although no single review imposed reductions as great as those under Options for Change, the regular Army has decreased in size by 38,000 since the 120,000 level set in 1990. Many former soldiers and members of the press have lamented the drop in the Army's size, most claiming that the UK is slowly becoming unable to conduct substantial ground operations and high-end warfighting. In the author's opinion this gives the lie to the idea that Britain has ever really been able to do these things alone. With the exception of the World Wars, both of which we fought in coalition with continental allies, the British Army has never been especially good at fighting large continental wars. It usually winds up to be too small and institutionally amateurish at the higher levels of command to be really effective. Some parts of the Army tend to perform better than others and the performance of individual regiments tends to depend more on the quality of individual officers and NCOs, and the command teams they form, than on an effective universal doctrine. Even the comparatively large army of 1960 could not hope to contend with it's intended enemy, the Soviet Third Shock Army, without the use of nuclear weapons and the help of it's European and US allies.

1st Battalion the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment on parade in 1969, part of Britain's large Cold War army

The large Army of the Cold War is now a relic of the past and the future looks set to include a much smaller role for the land component of Britain's armed forces. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that the Army could not sustain an enduring commitment, of an operationally useful size, for the purpose of counterinsurgency warfare. Nor was the force especially well equipped to deal with such a commitment. It took a major effort on the part of all three services to eventually sustain 10,000 British Soldiers and Marines in Helmand province. It would eventually take a combined force of more than double that to begin the process of winning a measure of security for the local population. The force deployed to Afghanistan was neither large enough nor well enough equipped with transport helicopters and suitable vehicles, to do the job asked of them. The UK's involvement in these two wars came at significant expense, with disproportionate cuts falling on the RAF and Royal Navy in the 2003 defence review in order to sustain the Army's strength for operations in both countries. Now Britain's involvement in both wars has come to an end it's necessary to assess what the army was able to achieve in five years in Iraq and thirteen in Afghanistan. Aside from preserving a somewhat larger army for the ten years from 2001 to 2011 the conflicts have proved to be bloody (for modern wars), expensive and have achieved little in the way of furthering the UK's international interests. They have also done immense damage to the prestige and standing of the British Army in the eyes of the United States. I would argue that the army has no foreseeable future in enduring counterinsurgency operations. It's experience of efficient counterinsurgency methods in the context of "colonial policing" is now far less relevant than it was during the wars of decolonisation, when the UK usually had direct control over large native police, military forces and civil institutions as well as extensive expertise on the countries they were fighting in. This would almost certainly not be the case in any future counterinsurgency operation, with the possible exception of the unlikely chance that the IRA returns to armed struggle in Northern Ireland.

This all now begs the question: what is the modern British Army actually for? 

There is no doubt that the success of military operations will always hinge on the ability of the armed forces to effect events on land. While control of the air and sea can be helpful, even essential, to achieving this aim it is their effect on events on the ground which ultimately matters. How, then, do we go about getting the most out of a comparatively small regular army?

The force structure currently envisioned by the government, entitled "Future Force 2020", includes a number of promising changes to the overall force structure. By assigning specific units to regions of interest or concern to the UK there is substantial scope, if correctly exploited, for substantial improvements to the army's institutional understanding of the unique problems and challenges faced in those areas. It also puts a greater focus on preventative measures such as native capability building and defence engagement, rather than allowing states to fail before intervening in a significant (and usually costly) way. In order to make the most of this structural change the increasing investment in intelligence needs to be kept up and effectively co-ordinated with the activities of the regional brigades. Improved co-ordination with the Department For International Development (DFID) and Foreign Office will also be necessary to realise the aim of conducting early and effective preventative action. To achieve the close interdepartmental civil/military co-ordination needed regional command teams, which would provide overall direction and leadership, should to be developed. They need only be small civilian-led organisations, equipped with area experts and put in command of substantial civil and military resources, to achieve the government's strategic goals in their area of responsibility. Returning to the Army, improving our capability for regional defence engagement will mean enduring deployments of small numbers of troops, in and around potential trouble spots. It is encouraging to see that their presence in Africa, an area with a young population and vast economic potential, is likely to be increased. If the UK follows in the footsteps of their successful training missions in Sierra Leone and Kenya there is much that could be achieved at a low cost and with small numbers of troops.

The areas of responsibility for Future Force 2020's regional brigades

That said, the army will always have an important role for when things do not go to plan, when preventative measures occasionally fail the Army will need the ability to go to the crisis and effect events on the ground. Now we can return to the third role I outlined when looking at the 1960 structure:

Able to deploy a moderately sized force, at short notice, in support of UK interests in the event of a crisis.

This will be just as necessary for the Army of tomorrow as it has been in the past. The ability to surge and sustain a capable land force into a potentially hostile area requires a broad array of specialised equipment. There are a few predictions that we can make about the shape and core requirements of such a force, based on the Future Force 2020 structure. The Army's main surge strength seems to be invested in the "Reaction Force", made up of 16 Air Assault Brigade ready to move at very short notice and 3rd (UK) Mechanised Division made up of three armoured infantry brigades on rotation, with one at short notice and the other two available with longer notice. These slot into the broader Joint Rapid Reaction Force, the tri-service structure whose land component also includes 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines. It's undeniable that either the bulk or the entirety of any UK reaction force would need to be moved, supplied and possibly introduced into the area of operations by sea. With uncertainty about where the next military mission may come from, Britain no longer has the luxury of being able to pre-position it's heavy equipment and quickly fly troops out to crew it when needed, as was the case for the BAOR. Despite this fact, the UK's rundown of it's military sealift since 2011 has become worryingly apparent. One of the UK's two Albion class LPDs has now been mothballed, the helicopter assault ship HMS Ocean will be paid off without replacement in 2018, RFA Largs Bay was sold to the Royal Australian Navy in 2011 and two of the six Point Class RO-RO merchant ships leased by the MOD had their contracts terminated. In total this amounts to a loss of almost a quarter of the UK's sealift. In real terms the cut has likely been even deeper, because of the demands of maintenance for the remaining platforms. Having a smaller, more regionally engaged and better equipped army will do Britain no good if it isn't deployable enough to "go to the crisis" and remain there until the job is done.

Sealift will become an essential force multiplier for a smaller army in the future

Unless we wish to become wholly reliant on the goodwill of the United States to cover our logistical needs then a substantial investment in military and civilian sealift will be necessary. The ability to move significant numbers of well equipped troops nearly anywhere in the world at a few weeks notice is essential if the UK is to make the most of a small but powerful army in the future. The costs involved in expanding the sealift force needn't be prohibitive either, the RFA's Bay Class cost £130 million each (2006 prices) or about a third the cost of a Type 26 Frigate. HMS Ocean, the centerpiece of the amphibious fleet, cost about the same as a Type 23 Frigate. Also to be considered is that the manning costs of sealift vessels operated by the RFA is substantially lower than that of Royal Navy warships of a comparable size.

In summary, the British Army at it's peacetime numerical height in the 1940s-1960s was neither large nor well enough equipped to actually fight the war it was intended for against the USSR. In the years that followed successive governments reduced the size of the army until it constituted a large, but still conventionally impotent, nuclear tripwire as part of NATO. Since the disintegration of the communist bloc between 1989-91 the army has seen even further reductions, largely as a function of the draw down from it's Cold War posture in Europe. There is now little popular or political stomach for protracted counterinsurgency operations following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the focus in future will become prevention through native capability building and defence engagement, with a robust intervention force available in the event of a crisis. In the author's opinion, to really make the most out of a smaller army the UK needs to be looking seriously at expanding it's sealift capability so the smaller army can remain a highly deployable independent force.

The EU Refugee Crisis: All Quiet on the Libyan Front?

As part of a growing series on the root causes of the EU Refugee crisis, and how the West could move to restore stability to the Mediterranean basin, today's article will take a look at the current situation in Libya.

Since the 2011 NATO intervention the situation on the ground in Libya has deteriorated significantly. The internationally recognised government, based in Tripoli, struggled to exert its authority in the wake of the Gaddafi regime's collapse. Faced with a weak central authority the country slowly began devolving into regionalism, based on tribal loyalties. By 2014 the ruling General National Congress (GNC), elected in the wake of the first civil war, was becoming increasingly unpopular. Amongst other things it was criticised for being dominated by the minority Islamist faction, directly and indirectly supporting Islamist groups and attempting to impose policies in line with strict Islamic legal practice against the wishes of the Libyan people. The political crisis finally came to a head in the winter of 2013-14, with the GNC unilaterally voting to extend their mandate for a further year. Their refusal to stand down at the end of the mandated governing period was met by protests and demands for the establishment of a new elected governing body with popular legitimacy. On the 14th of February 2014 General Haftar, the overall commander of the Libyan Army at the time, appeared in a televised address and ordered the dissolution of the GNC. Elections would be held for a ruling council of deputies, and the running of the country would be conducted in the interim by a "caretaker government".

As expected the GNC refused to comply with General Haftar's ultimatum, accusing him of an attempted military coup. The first fighting, in what can be described as the Second Libyan Civil War, broke out in mid May when the forces of the Libyan Army under General Haftar attacked the bases of several Islamist groups in Benghazi. A day later more forces loyal to the General forcibly dissolved and suspended the GNC parliament in Tripoli. In the following weeks much of the Libyan armed forces sided with General Haftar and a number of large pro-security forces protests were held, denouncing the GNC's support for the militias, seen by many of the protesters as destabilising the country. Elections were held soon after the military's move against the GNC, resulting in a landslide for the anti-Islamists and the formation of a new ruling Parliament. Although the turnout was low, at only 18%, due to the ongoing violence the result has been internationally recognised. The defeated Islamist political factions, mostly grouped around the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, reorganised themselves as the New General National Congress (NGNC) and declared the election illegitimate.

July of 2014 saw major moves by Islamist militias to capture Benghazi and Tripoli and substantially intensified fighting between Government and Islamist forces. By September the situation in the capital had deteriorated to such an extent that the national parliament was moved to Tobruk, conducting it's activities from a requisitioned Greek car ferry, the Elyros. October saw Islamist militias in control of Derna swear allegiance to ISIS' Islamic Caliphate. During the following three months the skirmishes, air strikes and bombings continued, some targeting the country's oil infrastructure.

A diplomatic breakthrough was reached in January of 2015, with the UN support mission in Libya (UNSMIL) helping to bring about a negotiated ceasefire and talks between the NGNC and Government factions. Since the ceasefire fighting has continued between Government forces and ISIS, who have expanded their control over the area around the city of Sirte and carried out terror attacks in the capital. In early March General Haftar was re-appointed as head of the Libyan Army by the national Parliament and Government forces conducted an offensive against the ISIS-held town of Derna, in an attempt to drive the militants out. Later that month Ansar al-Sharia, one of the major Libyan Islamist militias, also declared allegiance to ISIS. General Haftar also announced that Benghazi would be retaken from the Islamist militias.

The process of de-escalation between the Government and NGNC has continued apace, with an increasing number of local peace agreements coming into force. Interestingly, in August the people of Sirte revolted against ISIS rule, the ensuing reprisals killed 38 and the group was forced to threaten the use of poison gas against the population if attacks on their forces did not cease.

The Second Libyan Civil War, Mid August 2015. Government Forces (Red),
NGNC (Green), ISIS (Grey), Local Forces (Blue), Tribal Militias (Yellow).

What is surprising is the degree to which the situation on the ground in Libya has markedly improved this year, and how this improvement has been largely overshadowed by the war in Syria and the escalating Refugee crisis. Until recently the majority of refugees were being moved to Europe by sea, with people traffickers based in Libya providing boats to make the crossing to Italy. Despite the relative reduction in importance of the Libyan route, as tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have begun moving through the Balkans, the Mediterranean crossing still remains the second most popular route into Europe. Many of the refugees using the Libyan route have been displaced by conflicts in Africa, such as the ongoing conflicts in Nigeria and Eritrea, rather than the Middle East.

As the country has slowly been moving towards a peaceful settlement, the long-term result of which will likely be a far more stable North Africa better able to deal with migration and the people traffickers who exploit refugees fleeing conflict, it is vital that the West now give greater support the UN peace process. In the near future we will need to make a substantial investment in the future of that country, in the form of development aid, technical expertise, equipment and training for their security forces. The Libyan government and people have avoided sliding into the kind of serious sectarian violence that would have seen their country join the ranks of a handful of other failed states in Africa. They have done much of the heavy lifting and compromising necessary to begin bringing their country back together but we, in Europe, need to give them the tools to finish the job. If sustaining and building upon the ceasefire agreements requires the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force then we should support such a proposal with finance, logistics and military means if necessary.

Where the West can certainly help is with defeating the ISIS affiliated militias in control of the area around Sirte. Both the NGNC and Government have agreed that ISIS constitutes a common enemy, and both have focused substantial portions of their military effort, since the ceasefire, on attacking areas held by ISIS. Libya's lack of strategic depth, almost all of the population live along the coast, means naval artillery could be brought to bear, along with air strikes and commando raids in support of local ground forces. Striking a decisive blow against the Libyan branch of ISIS would do much to break that organisation's aura of invincibility, such a victory would be a propaganda coup for the West and Anti-ISIS forces in a battle where image is vital. Removing the "third force" from the Libyan internal conflict could also be used as a means of helping unify the country again, turning all forces against a common foe as part of a long-term peace process managed by the UN. It also seems that, unlike in Iraq, ISIS' presence in Libya is resented to by the local populations they control which greatly simplifies the problem.

The UK RFTG on exercise with partner navies in 2015

It just so happens that the UK has a near-ideal force to conduct the operations I have suggested, in support of the Libyan people currently occupied by ISIS militias. The Royal Navy's Response Force Task Group (RFTG) contains all the naval, rotary-wing and amphibious commando forces necessary, while air bases in Southern Italy could be used to conduct air strikes, as they were in 2011. A small military commitment and a short sharp intervention, co-ordinated closely with local forces, would be all that would be necessary to wrest control of the Sirte area from the estimated 5,000 ISIS militia members that currently occupy it. Rather than try to attack ISIS directly where they are the strongest, in Syria and Iraq, by striking and rapidly eliminating their "emirate" in Libya the UK could help further the ongoing Libyan peace process and win an important propaganda victory against ISIS' image of invincibility. In doing so we would make their cause less attractive and possibly hasten them to take rash and uncalculated action on their central fronts in the Middle East, in order to shore up their image.

Of all the places where a Western intervention could succeed against ISIS, Libya is by far the place where such action would result in the greatest good at the lowest cost in lives. We would be honoring the commitment we made to the Libyan people in 2011 and investing in a plan that would result in a more stable, pro-Western and democratic North Africa in the long-term. The great strength of the UK's modern armed forces is our ability to strike at our enemies' weaknesses with great accuracy, delivering a quick rapier thrust rather than a series of crushing sledgehammer blows. Now is our opportunity to strike at ISIS' weakness in North Africa, to cut out the cancer before it has the chance to spread and do more damage to a state still shakily finding its feet again.

The EU Refugee Crisis: A Collective Abandonment of Responsibility

The astonishing thing about the Europe's response to the ongoing refugee crisis is that it has been almost wholly passive. The debates have centred on the number of people to be let into various countries and how the total should be distributed throughout the 28 member states of the EU. This passive response, and the reluctance to seriously discuss action to address the root of the crisis: the Syrian Civil War, is indicative of the malaise that has eaten deep into the influence of the Great Powers of Europe. By abandoning responsibility for what goes on in areas that could be described as Europe's "back yard", North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, the great powers have contributed in no small measure to the deterioration of the situation in Syria and Libya. Military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have sapped any will for the introduction of ground troops into either conflict, even the idea of muscular peacekeeping forces under a UN flag hasn't been seriously mooted.

All of this is a sign, in the author's opinion, of the abrogation of responsibility by European states for their own foreign policy. Increasingly the nations of Europe look to the EU to manage their foreign policy, a body neither equipped nor designed for the purpose. When an issue is too large for the EU to manage, or when military action has been required, all eyes turn to the United States to provide the leadership and resolve to "sort out" a problem. What we're seeing today is a situation where a self-interested and increasingly reluctant United States has refused to take the lead in solving a problem which effects them very little, and which is beginning to effect Europe a great deal. The American response has been almost entirely focused on defeating ISIS in Iraq by bombing. Hardly a solution to the Civil War in Syria.

The sad message of the story seems to be that when everyone believes they're protected by a collective organisations like the EU and NATO they take less responsibility for the defence of their own interests. This has happened to such a great extent in Europe the great continental powers have become strikingly passive international actors. It was not always so, throughout the 1990s the major European powers took an active role in containing and eventually bringing to an end the war in the Balkans. Few should forget that at its worst that conflict was fought by groups just as ruthless as the jihadists of Syria or the militias of Libya. And yet now, we don't even seriously discuss intervention. The cancer of "someone else will sort it out" and "it's not our problem" has spread far, reducing states with the ability and capacity to act to mere onlookers. The fact that Europe accepts refugees is not concerning, what is worrying is that this is our main contribution and the subject of the whole debate.

British troops committed to the UN mission in Bosnia

At least Britain is one of the more involved states, trying to make a difference where it will count. The capitals of Europe should be ashamed that the UK has contributed more in aid to the people of Syria than all of them combined. While supporting US bombing of ISIS targets in Syria, through refuelling and intelligence missions in the region, is a feeble military commitment it's far more than the other great powers will even contemplate. At least the UK is willing to do something rather than stand aside and do nothing at all. Regardless of whether we, as Europeans, want to be involved with these problems or not we don't have a choice in the matter. Either we are willing and able to go to the crisis, or sooner or later the crisis will come to us.

We can no longer pretend that the EU can provide all the solutions to the serious international problems we face today. Nor can we continue to depend to such an unhealthy degree upon the largesse of the United States to pay the price in blood and treasure for maintaining stability in our geographic backyard. If this means spending more on the tools of foreign policy: aid, diplomatic services and defence then so be it. There is increasingly little choice in the matter, lest we are left as passive spectators in our own retreat into irrelevance.

A man of great standing once vocalised a similar feeling to the one that currently exists amongst most of the peoples of Europe when he said: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing." The man was Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the "far away country" was Czechoslovakia. 2015 is not 1938, but when we turn our backs on the world and "only wish to be left alone" the world has a tendency of coming knocking. Like every generation that has come before us we must constantly learn and relearn the vital value of action and the bankruptcy of trying to be a passive bystander on the world stage.

The EU Refugee crisis and the Syrian Civil War: a solution wrapped in a problem

Firstly I'd like to apologise because obviously this article is not the planned piece on Afghanistan, but this week's events have really resonated with me and I think that something needs to be said about how we deal with the refugee crisis currently engulfing Europe. Don't worry though, the article on Afghanistan is in the pipeline. That said, let's take a look at the current state of Syria.

The country has been engulfed in a grinding civil war since July 2011, protests against the depredations and misrule of the Assad government earlier that year spilled over into an insurgency that has steadily grown into the full blown civil war. Over the course of the following four years four more or less distinct actors have emerged.
   The Assad government still commands formidable military resources, and controls most of the South and West of the country, as well as the entire Mediterranean coast, The ports of Latakia and Tartus remain its critical lifeline to their main supplier of arms and equipment: Russia.
   The other major faction is ISIS, in control of most of the North Western half of the country. Their fighters are often able to offset their disadvantage in heavy equipment with an innovative style of fighting which combines conventional maneuver warfare with guerrilla tactics such as the use of mines and IEDs. From what we know from Iraq they also seem to be led by highly experienced people, some ex-Iraqi Ba'athist officers from the Saddam era included.
   On the peripheries of the country sit the remnants of the Free Syrian Army, who hold enclaves in the West of the country the largest of which is in the far North West along the border with Turkey. The FSA is by now an eclectic mix of democrats, communists, anti-ISIS jihadist movements and more. They do have a good number of experienced military personnel, mostly defectors from Assad's Army, and some western backing and equipment. Unlike ISIS the FSA has to rely mainly on guerrilla tactics and raiding, as it lacks the equipment and training to take on ISIS or the Assad government in conventional fighting. They also share an important alliance with the government of"West Kurdistan".
   The Kurds occupy two enclaves in the far North East and North West of the country, along the Turkish border. While the Kurdish armed forces are likely some of the most coherent in the conflict, their unity is based on a strong ethno-nationalist identity that seems to have broadly transcended political differences during this conflict. The socialist YPG or "people's protection" militia command the Kurdish military effort in Syria. Their fighters tend to be less experienced and trained than their ISIS counterparts, although the leadership has considerable military experience from the on-off guerrilla conflict waged against the Turkish and Assad governments. Despite this their fighters have proven steadfast when placed in good defensive terrain and given adequate support by Western air forces, inflicting an important reverse on ISIS at the border town of Kobane in late 2014.

Areas occupied by: Assad's forces (Red), ISIS (Grey), the FSA (Green) and the Kurds (Yellow)

The military situation on the ground seems to have become a stalemate, with the two major factions unable to make real progress against one another and the smaller factions reduced to defensive and guerrilla operations. The war, if it continues as it has until this point, looks set to grind on for years and destroy much of the country's infrastructure in its course.
   According to the UN High Commission for Refugees the conflict has officially displaced just over 4,013,000 people as of July 2015 (although the real number is likely higher). To put this into perspective the Syrian population in 2011 was just under 22,000,000, between a fifth and a quarter of the total population are now refugees in other countries. This doesn't include the estimated 6,500,000 internally displaced people. The largest refugee populations are in the countries nearest Syria, with 3/4 (3 million) of the refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Of the remaining 1/4 many have made their way to Europe via North Africa. Deciding how to manage these people has thrown the EU into crisis and proven to be politically divisive across the continent. Germany's preferred solution, a migrant quota system managed by the EU, proved unacceptable in the latest Brussels Summit. Since then the response has been largely deadlocked at the EU level and national governments have started taking measures of their own, such as Hungary's construction of a border fence.

Throughout all of this Britain has played a reasonably quiet but important role, contributing the second largest aid package after the United States (worth some £900 million) to improving the refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon as well as mitigating the effects of the conflict in Syria itself. However, the UK has come under intense recent criticism from some quarters, especially in Germany, for its refusal to accept greater numbers of refugees. This is especially important to the Germans, considering that Chancellor Merkel is predicting that they could see an influx of up to 800,000 asylum seekers, mostly from Syria, by the year's end. Crisis appears to be piling upon crisis, producing movement of people on a scale not seen since the Second World War. What has been missed is that Britain has been saying the right thing about the refugee crisis from the start: treating the symptoms by taking in refugees is no solution compared with treating the cause by bringing peace and stability back to Syria. While this is far easier said than done it is the correct position. The war in Syria is out of control, and now the crisis is sat staring at the White cliffs of Dover. We can no longer afford to remain a passive observer.

This may be where you could expect me to launch into a polemic on the necessity for Western intervention, as I suggested would be the right course of action in Iraq. But Syria is not Iraq and the solution to this problem is sitting right in front of our collective noses: the refugees themselves. Within the Syrian diaspora is all the manpower, leadership potential and technical skills necessary to retake and rebuild that country. What they need is housing, organising and equipping. I'm not just talking about recruiting and training a new Syrian Army from the refugee population (although this will be essential), but also creating a government, judiciary, medical services, brigades of people responsible for reconstruction of key infrastructure and a light paramilitary force capable of basic law enforcement. We would need to generate all the institutions necessary for the administration of a medium sized state, some as a nucleus to be built upon and some as fully formed services, before re-introducing them to the country as the leading force in an international intervention.

We have 1/4 to 1/5 of the country's total population sat in camps outside of Syria or displaced to Europe. By some predictions at the end of this year there will be over a million Syrians in Europe. If we in the West can tap into the sheer human potential of this body of people, give them purpose and help them retake and rebuild their country there really are few limits to what we could achieve.
  Let me be clear, this would not be taking in refugees because it looks like a good humanitarian thing to do. We would be pursuing a hard-nosed political and military strategy designed to further our interests in the region: removal of Russian influence from Syria by overthrowing Assad (something we're already committed to), the installation of a popular and democratic pro-Western regime in Damascus, the defeat of ISIS in Syria and the restoration of stability to the Eastern Mediterranean which would allow refugees to begin returning to Syria.

A sea of untapped human potential

This wouldn't be cheap or easy, the construction of a competent new Syrian army, to be trained and equipped to Western standards, alone would take years and cost billions. That said, by the debates over equipping the FSA and the dispatch of training missions to aid Iraqi forces the West seems comfortable with training and equipping local forces to do its fighting. What I'm suggesting is that we do this on a vast scale, dividing the effort across Europe and the United States. This is hardly a new experience for the West either, the UK and US (and NATO nations in Afghanistan) have built essentially new armed forces from scratch in the past in far more difficult conditions. If we can muster the will and leadership we could do it again.

Earlier I stated that the crisis was "producing movement of people on a scale not seen since the Second World War". Well maybe we should look to the free forces of WW2 for inspiration, drawn from refugee populations and the shattered remnants of armies from all over Europe. Britain took them in, trained them to modern standards and armed them with US equipment before they symbolically led the liberation and rebuilding of their countries alongside the Allies. Maybe General David Richards was right when he said that the UK "must go onto a war footing" to defeat ISIS. The only real solution is for the Syrian people to liberate their own country from the tyrants and terrorists who have taken control of it. If we in the West enable them to do this, by turning the refugee population into the basis of a new Syrian state, then we may just achieve a truly great liberal intervention. So yes, we should accept more Syrian refugees into the UK, but as part of a concerted effort to put an end to the Syrian Civil War and ultimately rebuild that country.

The sun never sets: going back East of Suez

The phrase East of Suez is so inextricably linked with Britain's imperial past that even the mention of it evokes images of cruisers on far flung tropical stations, colonial officials in white linen suits, and all the mystery and adventure of 'the Orient'. Almost inevitably, like all of the other trappings of empire, East of Suez was abandoned and consigned to the history books in 1968. Britain had simply become too small, backwards and poor to continue pretending that it could project force half way around the world. All it took was a government willing to accept Britain's new place in the world, as a diminished regional power, before all the Imperial pretense fell by the wayside. This is how the story usually ends, with a nation in terminal decline, a defining moment in the steady fall of an empire.

Unfortunately for the neat and ordered history of the rise and fall of empires, there is another story of Britain's involvement East of Suez, and it's not nearly as clear cut. While it is true that British troops withdrew from a range of military bases from the Gulf to the Far East, following the 1967 Sterling crisis, the UK never fully disengaged from the region. Before the 1971 date for final withdrawal Britain had already helped establish the five powers defence arrangements, a series of bilateral defence treaties with the leading commonwealth countries in the region, that guarantee the sovereignty of Malaysia and Singapore. By working closely with the new and old commonwealth partners Britain laid the foundations for a 'quiet alliance' that has kept the peace in the region for over 40 years. The security and independence of Malaysia and Singapore remain vital interests for the UK. The strait of Malacca, which borders both countries, handles around one quarter of global traded goods and keeping the waterway open and free ensures that oil, commodities and manufactured goods can flow freely between Europe and the rising Asian economies. The British permanent commitment is small and very cheap: a dock complex in Sembawang, Singapore and 'Naval Party 1022'- the few staff required to man it. Recent developments seem to suggest that post Afghanistan the UK intends to become more, rather than less, involved with the FPDA. Suggestions that for the first time in quite a while British soldiers and airmen will be exercising with their five powers partners is a sign that this 'soft alliance' is stronger and more important than ever.

While the Royal Navy's presence in South East Asia has reduced significantly since the 1968-71 withdrawal from its bases in the region the UK has maintained an impressive ability to surge maritime forces to the region when necessary. The 1983-4 Orient Express deployment saw a UK Task Group conduct a tour of the Indian Ocean and Far East. Led by the light carrier Invincible and including three frigates, a destroyer, a diesel-electric submarine and two RFA support ships the group visited a number of ports in India before heading on to Singapore and exercising with the American and South Korean navies in the South China sea. Similar large group naval deployments to the Far East were conducted in 1992 and 1997. The increased pressure on the surface fleet, due to diminishing escort numbers since the end of the Cold War and the heavy burdens imposed by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have made these large flag-flying exercises a rare occurrence since 2001. The Task Group deployments have been replaced by single-ship tours of the region, such as Daring's 2013 visit to Australia. Despite a smaller surface fleet, the UK has continued to demonstrate an impressive ability to surge substantial naval forces into the region when necessary. This was demonstrated in the same year, when Typhoon Haiyan devastated the Philippines. Daring and the carrier Illustrious was sprinted out to South East Asia to provide disaster relief, stopping to take on supplies at Sembawang dock in Singapore. This just goes to show that the UK's ability to reach around the globe, and into East Asia, with naval forces remains substantial.

The other major military component of Britain's presence in Southeast Asia is the army's garrison in Brunei. Some 2000 troops remain permanently based in the small sultanate near the North coast of Borneo, centered on one of the Gurkha infantry battalions and its supporting forces. The forces are funded by the Sultan and base facilities have been provided to Britain on a five year rolling lease since 1962. Political and military ties between the two countries remain exceptionally strong and look set to remain so for the foreseeable future. The forces stationed in Brunei currently form the UK's Far East acclimatised reserve, in recent years they have taken part in the interventions in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. The British army's jungle warfare courses are also taught there, using the thick rain forests and tropical climate as the ideal location for practical training, particularly for special forces. In support of this mission the army also stations a number of Bell 212 Twin Huey helicopters in the country, as part of 7 flight Army Air Corps. These were deployed following the 2004 Tsunami which struck Indonesia, as part of the disaster relief operation in Northern Sumatra. Brunei became the sole permanent UK military base in the Far East after the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 but, unlike the former colony, its use as a jumping-off point for action in the region has been relatively uncontroversial.

The Armilla Patrol laid the foundations for current UK presence in the Gulf

Ostensibly the British withdrawal from the Middle East and Persian Gulf in 1971 was a clear sign of retreat from imperial responsibilities. The UK was no longer prepared to act as the guarantor of regional stability and consequently pulled out of its military bases in the Gulf States. Under the pressures of the Cold War the United States very rapidly stepped in to fill the vacuum left by Britain's exit, laying the foundations for the current regional order. However, in spite their apparent 'withdrawal' in 1971 Britain has maintained an almost continuous presence ever since. Between 1970 and 1976 the UK deployed some 500 soldiers, Royal Marines and special forces personnel to Oman, to combat communist guerrillas in the Dhofar rebellion. With the support of Iranian troops and forces trained, and in some cases led, by the British the campaign was brought to a successful conclusion and the Adoo insurgents defeated.

The first step towards a post-imperial role for the UK was taken in 1980, the Iran-Iraq war threatened to spill over into the Persian Gulf, an area vital for the movement of crude oil and petroleum products at this time. To safeguard shipping during the conflict the Armilla patrol was established. This has entailed a constant minimum presence of at least one frigate, destroyer and a nuclear powered attack submarine, supported by an RFA tanker, ever since. These forces have been scaled up and down in proportion to the needs of the government, as well as the threat to UK interests at the time. During the 1990-91 Gulf War eleven RN warships and six RFA supporting vessels were assigned to Operation Granby, with the destroyers Gloucester and Cardiff playing a leading role in the destruction of the Iraqi navy. An even larger force was assembled for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Seventeen warships, including the carrier Ark Royal and the assault ship Ocean, supported by thirteen RFAs, deployed to the Gulf. Although the two surge efforts during the wars with Iraq were atypical, constant naval presence with powerful surface and sub surface combatants, has formed the bedrock of the UK's Gulf presence since 1980. In view of this, the recent news that the UK is to establish a naval base in Bahrain shouldn't come as a great surprise. Substantial maritime forces have been deployed in the region for so long that significantly shortening their logistics train through forward basing makes sense. In terms of military value alone the move will free up a number of RFAs currently dedicated to supporting the RN's presence in the region. Forward maintenance facilities will be essential to get the most out of the current small pool of nineteen high-end surface escorts.

Due to the rise in piracy around East Africa between 2005 and 2013 the UK has contributed surface escorts and RFAs intermittently to the multinational combined task force, established in 2009, to safeguard merchant shipping in the area. Since 2010 there has been a marked decline in the seizure of vessels by pirates in the area, in part because of the efforts of international maritime forces.

The Gulf and surrounding region looks set to remain the area where the greatest military threats to Britain's economic prosperity could emerge in the future. The recent nuclear deal with the Iranian regime is a positive start, but there still remains a great divide between the Islamic republic and the West. In concert with partners in the region and around the world the UK presence will continue to act as a deterrent to any state or non-state actors that would threaten the freedom of merchant shipping in these important waterways.

Afghanistan: projecting UK power East of Suez

Finally we come to Afghanistan, the army's largest sustained deployment since Korea. To lay the success of sustaining a force of nearly ten thousand British service personnel in the country solely at the feet of the army would do a disservice to the marines, sailors and airmen, without whom a campaign on this scale would not have been possible. Although the UK did not provide a huge proportion of the total manpower, the US at the height of the war had just under 100,000 troops deployed. Despite this the British troops were likely some of the most militarily capable of the ISAF forces. Unlike some of the other European forces in Afghanistan, UK troops were generally prepared and trained for intensive combat and equipped with robust rules of engagement. They also brought an impressive array of equipment with them, which was steadily tailored and upgraded as the threat from Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents developed. The procurement of a specialised fleet of mine-resistant vehicles is only one example of how the system designed to provide equipment deemed an "urgent operational requirement" was refined throughout the conflict.

Few other countries can boast the ability to sustain such a large and capable force in high intensity combat for as long as the UK did. It must also be remembered that this force was projected into a land-locked country half way around the world, and that until 2008 the army also had significant forces deployed to southern Iraq. This ability alone demonstrates that Britain deserves to be counted amongst the world's serious military players. I'll reserve a finer analysis of the conflict and it's outcome until a later date. However, the essential take away is that the British armed forces have fought some of their hardest battles since the 1950s, in one of the longest wars fought in recent years, with large and capable forces projected East of Suez.

Royal Navy forces contribute to maritime security in the Persian Gulf

In view of the last forty years of history we can clearly see that Britain's 1968-71 withdrawal from its East of Suez commitments occurred in name only. While the way the UK continues to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf, East Africa, South East Asia and the Far East has certainly changed over time it is arguable that they are just as involved in these areas as before. Much of the instability of the 21st century looks set to play out far from the shores of the British Isles and the armed forces remain equipped and able to 'go to the crisis' in ways that few other countries can. As the draw down from Afghanistan is completed, and the defence effort is re-balanced in the wake of that conflict, equipment programmes such as the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, F35 Joint Strike Fighter and Type 26 frigate look set to ensure the armed forces remain able to deploy military force globally. Flexible and deployable forces will be necessary to face new challenges and threats from state and non-state actors.

The huge variety of defence activity that still takes place East of Suez is anything but an anachronism. The imagery of a long lost colonial past may still resonate strongly, but since 1968 Britain has transformed it's role in that area. No longer the declining colonial power but a dynamic and vibrant medium power with security needs and national interests that spread around the world, backed up by an enviable raft of defence agreements and alliances and in possession of highly capable armed forces. Just like the title of this post, Britain's 'withdrawal' from East of Suez is a misnomer. We never really left.

Killing people and breaking things: dealing with the Islamic State

In June of 2014 the previously obscure Islamist militia known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant stormed over the Syrian border, into Western Iraq and onto the TV screens of millions of people around the world. Their initial blitzkrieg offensive culminated on the 29th of that month, with the proclamation of a caliphate by their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the group renaming itself simply 'Islamic State'. A further offensive in August, directed against Kurdish territory to the West of Mosul, trapped thousands of Yazidi refugees atop Mount Sinjar and brought the first concerted Western intervention in the developing conflict. Since then the front lines have largely stabilised, with back and forth fighting mainly on the roads leading North and West out of Baghdad and in the area between Mosul and the Kurdish regional capital of Erbil. Neither Iraqi government or Islamic State forces have been able to break the deadlock thus far, both lacking the military capability to do so. The slightly better led and motivated Kurds seem unlikely to advance far outside their own territory.

Broadly speaking the Iraqi Army has been poorly led and motivated, suffering especially badly in the face of mass desertions during the initial offensives of 2014. Its real strength though is the constant supply of US arms and equipment it can count upon. In comparison IS has appeared thus far to be well led and motivated, with its command structure built around a core of experienced ex-Iraqi Baathist officers and highly motivated Jihadist fighters. Their lack of a steady supply of arms, and likely inability to maintain the heavy equipment captured in Mosul and Syria over anything more than the short-term, may however prove to be their Achilles heel. If the war remains a drawn out attritional affair then it seems unlikely that IS will survive in the long-term. The Iraqi government forces will slowly improve as the pressures of war weed out the incompetent leaders, and protracted combat experience hardens their previously green troops. For IS though, a prolonged conflict almost certainly spells eventual defeat. Casualties amongst their mid and low level officers will prove increasingly difficult to replace with leaders of the same quality and skill. Once the group loses its tactical advantage, afforded to them by competent battlefield leaders, it will start losing. The higher ups will be unable to impose greater central control to counteract the effects of this attrition, because of the limits placed on electronic communication by Coalition signals intelligence aircraft. If they decide to lead from the front they too will be exposing themselves to injury or death.

It seems then that the current US strategy of 'degrading' IS will eventually prove successful and result in the defeat of the group. However, while their logic is sound the consequences of a victory won by slow grinding pressure on IS in Iraq will likely prove catastrophic for the people of Western Iraq and the region. As IS is slowly ground down it will inevitably press ever more of the population it controls into military service. We have seen what this sort of victory looks like before, a country of old women and young children living amidst the rubble of towns and cities leveled by fighting. Even with the enormous Marshal aid programme it took Germany more than thirty years to rebuild much of its infrastructure and, make no mistake, there will be no such comprehensive programme for the reconstruction of Iraq. This doesn't even begin to address the even greater numbers of people that will be displaced as the Iraqi army drives IS back street by street, adding to the more than 4 million people already displaced by the wars against IS. A vast swathe of the Iraqi state will effectively be reduced to prolonged and extreme poverty and hardship. This could very well breed the next generation of jihadist fighters to throw Iraqi state into another prolonged conflict it can ill afford.
In human terms alone this is a victory that Iraq and the West cannot afford to win, especially if blame for the current conflict continues to be laid at the foot of the US and UK for initiating the 2003 invasion.

Iraq's future is Syria's present if the current strategy of slow attrition is maintained

The involvement of regional powers is not a real solution to the problems Iraq faces either. As we have seen with Turkey's recent involvement in the conflict, directing most of its bombing against the Kurds rather than IS, most of the region's powers have ulterior motives or too much at stake to risk involvement. The conflict is likely already another outlet for the Middle Eastern Cold War between the major Sunni and Shia powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Of all the regional powers Egypt and Jordan would seem best suited as allies in the fight against IS, but like all things in that area of the world once action is taken things tend to become very complicated indeed. Some commentators, Malcom Rifkind among them, have suggested alignment with President Assad's beleaguered regime under the idea that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'. Despite evidence that suggests that the Baathist regime has engaged in a truce with IS, so that both sides can focus on destroying what remains of the Free Syrian Army. Russia can play the game of supporting President Assad's 'lesser evil' but the West has come too far, by supporting the FSA and threatening to bomb the regime over the use of chemical weapons, to go down this path now.

So what is Britain currently doing to combat IS? Operation Shader is the UK's tri-service military effort in Iraq, led by the efforts of the RAF's 903rd Expeditionary Air Wing flying out of the Akrotiri air base on Cyprus. The ten MQ-9A Reaper drones, eight Tornado GR4s and Tomahawk-armed nuclear powered submarine form the sum total of the UK's striking forces currently in the region. The range of intelligence gathering assets deployed is certainly the key British contribution to the bombing campaign. The two Sentry AEW, and four assorted Shadow, Sentinel and Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft, as well as special forces teams on the ground provide a robust array of assets that enable the use of coalition air power. This is especially important for the smaller European and regional coalition members who tend to possess strike aircraft but lack the support and intelligence gathering assets necessary for effective targeting. Alongside these striking forces are two battalions from the Yorkshire and the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiments, stationed in Iraq to provide training to the Iraqi Army and Kurdish forces.

The current level of commitment and military engagement by the UK is commensurate with the requirements of the current US-led attrition strategy. Small numbers of combat aircraft, flying missions principally directed against the logistical and command structure of IS, will succeed in the slow degradation of the combat capabilities of IS. However, as previously discussed, the current attritional strategy is destined to produce disastrous results for the areas of Iraq occupied by IS. If the current coalition strategy of slow attrition and building up the Iraqi Army is destined to result in a Pyrrhic victory that will be catastrophic for Iraq, and likely continue to propagate instability within the country and in the wider region. What I would suggest is that Britain argues the case for a different strategy altogether. Intervention on the ground and a 'counter blitzkrieg'.

Warrior fighting vehicles of the Welsh Guards advance towards Basra in 2003

To call this option controversial is a gross understatement, for Britain and the United States the scars of the 2003 war are still uncomfortably fresh. Even the phrase 'boots on the ground' has become politically toxic and shifting public opinion on the issue will take time, concerted effort and critically honesty on the part of Western political leaders. There can be no 'dodgy dossiers' this time, no lying to the public. Yet, in spite of the very significant political problems, it is what must be done if we are to avoid incalculable damage to the Iraqi state and regional stability.

So how would a Western ground war against IS prove less damaging to the country than the current Iraqi-led ground war? Firstly, the speed that Western armed forces can move and fight at would almost certainly take IS by surprise. Their role would be to conduct the 'blitzkrieg', small powerful armored formations that drive deep into IS held territory, disrupt logistics, sow confusion and ferment panic amongst disoriented and isolated troops. The aim would be to keep the amount of fighting that takes place in built up areas to a minimum, engaging always with overwhelming force but only when absolutely necessary. Following this Western advanced guard would be the Iraqi Army, who would be tasked with reducing the significant pockets of IS forces that had been cut off by the armored spearheads and garrisoning liberated areas. Speed, logistical damage and the rapid capture of enemy territory would substitute for the current strategy of slow attrition. As for an exit strategy, we already have one - continue to build up the Iraqi Army as an inclusive national force with Sunni elements capable of securing their own communities in tandem with local actors, as per the Anbar Awakening of 2006. Some Western troops would have to remain to secure the Syrian border and block further IS incursions, but a large scale 2003 style occupation would be unnecessary. I make no suggestion that Western troops will not be killed if we choose to conduct this sort of operation, but the sacrifice of a few will save the lives of countless Iraqis, who would otherwise be pressed into military service by IS or have their homes destroyed by prolonged back and forth urban fighting. If we are truly humanitarians, concerned with the fate of the Iraqi people, then this is the only option available to us.

If we do this, and do it properly then maybe, just maybe, we can put the ghosts of the last war to bed. For good this time.

The Bear and the Lion: Russia and Britain, European outsiders?

If there is a single word which sums up the Anglo - Russian geo-strategic rivalry it is history. To be precise the 200 years of history after 1815 have, with few notable exceptions, featured foreign policy competition between these two states. Both sit on the periphery of the European continent, separated from the core not only by geography but also different political traditions from the central European states. For Britain constitutional monarchy, liberal values and the rule of law have formed the basis of political life for two hundred years. In contrast the Russian system has tended towards autocracy, illiberalism, and the rule of oligarchs, with each political 'dynasty' eventually collapsing and giving way to the next. The Russian Federation under President Putin is simply the latest expression of a political culture that dates back hundreds of years.

It is fair to say that both countries are located in Europe, but neither is truly European. Both look outside of the continent for important aspects of their national character. Britain's cultural, economic and military ties with the Anglosphere states (The United States, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) exert a powerful force that still draws the country away from the politics of the European core. Similarly, the vast and sparsely populated territory east of the Ural mountains lends Russia its distinct Eurasian character. In times past this distinct Eurasian Russian-ness was coupled with the Communist ideology and a command economy to form a variant for state organisation very different from the Western model. Over a quarter century since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia is still yet to demonstrate any significant moves towards becoming more European. Britain's Atlanticist traditions, especially its 'special relationship' with the United States has exerted a similar draw on Britain away from a purely European future.

So what to make of the conflict in the Ukraine? To really get an understanding of what is driving Russia's involvement in the country it is essential to consider natural defensive barriers as more than a way of keeping hostile armies out of a state's territory, but also a means of insulating that same state from unwanted foreign influences. Both Britain and Russia used their natural defenses to insulate themselves from the political ideas carried by the armies of revolutionary France in the 19th century and fascist Germany in the 20th. To understand why the Ukraine is so vital to Russia's perceived security interests it is necessary to understand the nature of Russia's particular natural defensive advantage. While the English Channel obviously constitutes a formidable British 'moat' the thousand or more miles between the nearest Western NATO state and the Russian Capital is what insulates the 'Russian system' from unwanted European influences. Until recently pro-Russian regimes in Belarus and the Ukraine, and the reluctance of NATO to station troops in the Baltic States, has maintained an ideological and military protective buffer zone between central Europe and Russia. It now seems inevitable that the collapse of the corrupt regime of President Yanukovych in 2014, and its replacement with a Westward looking provisional government, would have illicited a response from Russia in any case.

Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine, winter 2014.

The speed and ferocity of the response seems to have taken many Western capitals by surprise, war had returned to Europe seemingly out of the blue. 'Little Green Men' suddenly appeared in the Crimea and so much confusion and doubt was sown that before a coherent response could be formulated the Russian flag was flying in Sevastopol. By the time the smoke had cleared and it had become obvious that Russia was waging near open war against one of its neighbors their troops and Eastern Ukrainian separatists had occupied over a third of the country. The NATO response to date has included the imposition of damaging sanctions on Russia, which have reportedly shaved 9% off the GDP of an economy already struggling due to the recent collapse in oil and gas prices. The US plans to station equipment for an armored brigade in Poland, and the forces assigned to the Baltic air patrol mission (active since 2004) have had small additions made to them. While certain news outlets in the UK have hailed the crisis in Ukraine as the beginning of 'a new Cold War', for which Britain is woefully unprepared, the Western reaction has generally been rather subdued.

So, should more be done? Is this really the first move by a resurgent and militarist Russia bent on re-establishing its domination over Eastern Europe? To both questions I would issue a resounding no. Russia has fallen far since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the state has become increasingly reliant on the export of oil and gas for much of its revenue and the tumble in prices since the American 'fracking revolution' is hitting them hard. The Russian armed forces may appear formidably large on paper, but much of their equipment is old or obsolete. Of their 12,800(!) tanks only 2600 are assigned to 'active' units, and 1700 of those are aging Soviet-built T-72s. In total Russia possesses around 900 relatively modern tanks assigned to active military units. In comparison the US army has just under 1200 extremely modern M1A2 SEP Abrams tanks in its inventory, some of which have already been moved back into bases in Germany. In truth, while the Russian armed forces look large and impressive on parade in Red Square, in an offensive conventional war against NATO they would lose badly. Make no mistake, we won't be seeing the Third Shock Army rolling through the Fulda Gap anytime soon. Instead, I would argue that Russia is fighting in the Ukraine in an attempt to preserve a rump buffer zone between them and the pro-European government in the West of that country. Without this their leaders fear that a Westward looking 'Europeanised' Ukraine will eventually undermine the current system to such an extent that it could bring about civil unrest and the possibility of another revolution. Russia is fighting to remain an European outsider, because to be anything else would mean the collapse of the current system of corruption and patronage that underwrites the power of President Putin.

The Russian armed forces: formidably large but largely obsolete

So where does this leave Britain? If Russia feels threatened by European ideas to such an extent that it is willing to go to war with its neighbors, in spite of the serious economic damage that it has incurred for doing so, then it seems that we're dealing with that rarest of things, a 'vital national interest'. While it is nice for Britain to support freedom and democracy around the world, and we should politically oppose the illegal annexation of any and all Ukranian territory by Russia in forums like the UN and EU, a less corrupt Ukraine is not worth radically altering our defence and foreign policy posture towards Russia for. Their track record of intervening in neighboring states to prevent the spread of Western institutions like NATO, just look at the 2008 war in Georgia, seems pretty clear. If institutions like the EU and NATO want to expand into these areas then they should expect serious push back from a Russian regime that believes it is fighting to preserve its long term existence. In the opinion of the author it is simply not worth meddling in these areas. Talk of arming the regime in West Ukraine is dangerous. Russia has already made it clear that they are not going to be overly cautious or use half-measures, they're playing for keeps. We have to ask ourselves to what extent are we seriously invested in a Western future for Ukraine, and are we willing to go as far as Russia has to achieve that?

In the meantime Britain is fighting its own battle to remain the other 'European outsider'. In the capitals of Europe and in Brussels the future direction of the European Union, and Britain's place in it, is being shaped. Like Russia, Britain is struggling against the embrace of a purely European future, as powerful cultural and political forces ensure that we will continue to question and challenge many European institutions, from an outsider's standpoint.