Wednesday 16 December 2015

Queens and Princes: The Road Ahead for UK Carrier Aviation


 "The navy of any great power has the dream to have one or more aircraft carriers. The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier."
- Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Chinese Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Office.

As it stands the UK is currently in the middle of a long process, which will culminate in the regeneration of key national capability: the ability to fly fixed wing aircraft from the decks of its carriers. Once this process is complete, some time in the early 2020s, the Royal Navy will return to operating full size carriers for the first time since Ark Royal, the last of the Audacious class, decommissioned in 1979. The new Queen Elizabeth class are true supercarriers, though not cast from the same mold as the US Navy's current Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford classes, they can still employ an impressive array of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Although the class will be fitted with deck equipment for short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft like the F-35B, including the famous "ski-jump", they are of a similar size to the US Navy's former Forrestal and Kitty Hawk class carriers. It is easy to see that there is vast scope for modification and upgrade throughout their service lives, a process which every previous class of British carriers since the Second World War has undergone. The only certain thing is that these ships will end their service lives looking very different from the way they began them. Thankfully, unlike their predecessors, significant margins for growth have been built into the two ~70,000 ton ships from the start.

The short term shape of the carriers and their air groups is now mostly known, with the 2015 SDSR clearing up some of the speculation; especially with regards to the number of F-35B to be routinely embarked. The purchase of 42 airframes, with the specified purpose of arming the carriers with a "full air group", indicates that we could see the Tailored Air Group (TAG) routinely including an F-35B squadron; with a total of around 24 fixed-wing aircraft. This leaves a further 16 "slots" in the TAG available for a range of rotary wing assets, including the Army's Apache and the RAF operated Chinook. This is one of the most pioneering parts of the UK carrier concept: operating them as RN-led tri service assets. In theory these ships could simultaneously host RAF, Fleet Air Arm and Army Air Corps aircraft and maintainance crews. Making all this work in practice, in a challenging maritime environment, is likely to be a major test of the viability of the concept. It is encouraging that the tri service concept builds upon years of hard won experience, gained from the RAF/FAA Joint Force Harrier and the RAF/FAA/AAC Joint Helicopter Command. Small numbers of RAF Harriers have, in the past, operated from the decks of RN light carriers. As recently as 2011 the AAC flew some of its Apache gunships from HMS Ocean during the intervention in Libya. However, the scale of the Queen Elizabeth carriers and the sheer number of aircraft operating from her will inevitably complicate matters. Nevertheless, the concept is certainly exciting and will give the UK a truly flexible asset and a first class capability, if they can pull it off.

So, what might the future hold for these ships, the aircraft that fly from them and the people that will make the whole thing work?

"Jointness" and the Joint Strike Fighter:
As it stands the medium-term plan for the UK's fleet of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters has been spelled out. With the initial aircraft divided between the RAF's 617 "Dambusters" Sqdn. and the FAA's 809 "Immortals" Sqdn. Both of which will be based at RAF Marham in Norfolk, the UK hub for F-35. The pilots and maintainers in both squadrons will be a mix of RAF and FAA personnel, with the bulk likely being drawn from the RAF. The entirety of the UK F-35 fleet will also be officially "owned" by the RAF, this means that the RN will have a more limited degree of control over the FAA badged squadrons than in the past. Looking to history for a precedent for this sort of arrangement seems to throw up an eventual outcome that doesn't bode well for the current structure. Between 1924 and 1937 UK naval aviation was given over to a branch of the RAF, over the ensuing thirteen years a clear divide emerged between the naval aviators and their land based counterparts. While "FAA squadrons" will exist in the future structure they will, in effect, function as a naval branch of the RAF in all but name. Squadrons routinely deployed to the carriers, likely the FAA badged ones, will develop a more "naval mentality" and slowly diverge in skills and attitudes from those that do so far less frequently or not at all. While the planned common pool of pilots may seem like a way around this, it may in fact end up militating against the development of the skilled naval aviators necessary to get the most from the carriers.

Allowing some pilots, wearing light or dark blue uniforms, to spend much of their career conducting carrier operations at sea will eventually result in the slow re-emergence of a group of professional naval aviators that will not fit especially comfortably into the planned joint structure. The same could be said of the ground crews and maintainers, with certain people gravitating towards the naval environment and drafts on the carriers while others remain ashore. Whether this will eventually lead to a natural split in the joint force, with the navy taking control of some of the aircraft once the FAA rebuilds the necessary skills and personnel base to do so, remains to be seen. Although the cost of doing so for the RN will likely remain prohibitive. What is very much more likely is that de-facto divisions will emerge within the joint force, with the FAA badged squadrons containing the preponderance of experienced carrier pilots and "navalised" maintainers. The land-based squadrons' pilots will continue to qualify for carrier operations, but will likely spend less time at sea building up to the same levels of practical experience as their counterparts in the naval squadrons.

A USMC F-35B lands aboard the USS Wasp
Future of the air group:
The range of aircraft due to be flown from the decks of the Queen Elizabeth carriers in the medium-term is already clear at this point. The core of any TAG is always likely to be a number of F-35B to cover carrier air defence, strike and combat ISTAR. The number will vary depending on the task at hand, but I would think the ship would routinely deploy with a minimum of 12 on board-maintaining core naval aviation skills, providing CAP for the carrier group and allowing the ship to rapidly re-role for basic strike operations at very short notice. In the "maximum effort" scenario where both decks are in action simultaneously, with one acting as an enlarged LPH and the other a full strike carrier, I would still expect to see F-35B operating from both ships.
Merlin will form the second part of the core TAG, whether carrying the "Crowsnest" Airborne Early Warning (AEW) equipment, Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) gear or in the HC3/4 cargo and troop transport configuration. What is reasonably certain is that Merlin, especially in the "Crowsnest" configuration, will nearly always be present aboard these ships.
The RN's Wildcats will also likely be a regular feature covering the surveillance, utility and surface strike (with the new Sea Venom lightweight anti-ship missile) roles. However, the limited number of airframes in RN service and high demand for the aircraft from other parts of the fleet, especially the forward-deployed escorts, may stand in the way of a regular presence on the carriers. The same case could be made for the ASW variant of the Merlin, the HM.2, with only 18 front-line airframes available to cover the needs of the escort fleet and the carriers. With regards to Wildcat best use of the tri service operations concept should be made by looking at close co-operation with the AAC, exploiting the possibility of routinely hosting of a number of Army Wildcats to ease the strain on the RN's fleet. This would also have the benefit of building and then sustaining the skills base necessary to rapidly and effectively embark and integrate Army helicopters and AAC crews at short notice if necessary.

Outside the core component aircraft of the TAG the carriers are also likely to see Army Apaches and RAF Chinooks embarked occasionally, on a less frequent basis. In order to operate these aircraft effectively from the carriers, pilots and aircraft will need to be exposed to the demands of operating in the maritime environment on a semi-regular basis. Similarly the ship-side aircraft handlers will need to build and maintain their experience dealing with very large helicopters such as Chinook. While it is helpful that both Apache and Chinook have already been deployed at sea, aboard HMS Ocean, the scale and tempo of deck operations aboard a carrier that will be simultaneously operating large numbers of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will be very different. The RN is lucky that the basic needs of carrier operations, folding rotor blades and protection from salt corrosion, have already been built into the British Apaches. However, while Chinook does have the necessary corrosion resistance it lacks folding main rotors. Although the carriers' aircraft lifts have been designed to handle Chinook without folding blades these aircraft will take up a great deal of space in the hangar without them. This is acceptable if Chinook is only intermittently embarked for specific tasks. However, if it becomes a regular part of the air group then upgrading some or all of the Chinook fleet with powered folding rotors, or exploiting the unpowered folding mechanism already present, should be a high priority.

AAC WAH.64 Apache gunships operating from the deck of HMS Ocean
Looking slightly ahead into the next decade a single V-22 Osprey squadron should, if the money becomes available, be given serious consideration. The range of F-35B is already the shortest of all three variants, with forced loiter times an inherent part of carrier operations, air to air refueling (AAR) would be a very valuable support capability. The V-22 Aerial Refueling System (VARS) is a palletised probe and drogue tanking kit already in development for the US Marine Corps, for use with their F-35Bs. VARS initial operating capability is expected to be reached in 2017, so the system would be substantially de-risked in the event of a UK buy in the 2020s. While introducing a whole new aircraft and its supply chain into UK service would be costly, V-22 and VARS is the only realistic option open that is compatible with a STOVL carrier. With 16 airframes, for a squadron of 12 and a reserve of four, and eight VARS kits the UK could provide a continuous AAR capability for both carriers in the "maximum effort" scenario. The spare aircraft could also be flown from bases ashore to provide additional refueling capacity alongside the Voyager fleet during routine carrier operations, where only a single ship will be at sea. Of course, because VARS is a palletised kit, some of the aircraft could also be used in the heavy lift and troop transport roles for which they were originally designed; freeing up RAF Chinooks for operations ashore. The Osprey would also be able to cover most of what the US Navy calls the "Carrier Onboard Delivery" (COD) role, moving personnel and stores long distances from ship to shore and vice versa. Although the V-22 lacks the cargo space to carry the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine for the F-35, it's range and carrying capacity are still impressive. It seems to be the case anyway that in RN service the spare engines will be carried by the accompanying MARS solid support ship: able to transfer them to the carrier via their heavy RAS gear when needed. So the Osprey's lack of capability in that area wouldn't be a severe drawback. Overall the V-22 would be a very useful option to add to the Queen Elizabeth carriers' TAG if, in future, the money becomes available.

A USMC V-22 Osprey refueling an F-18 with the VARS drogue
Another interesting area for future development will be the operation of short takeoff and landing drones. A number of the current generation of propeller-driven long endurance UAVs operate at low enough speeds to consider carrier operations without catapults a serious proposition. A naval version of the Watchkeeper surveillance drone, or simply using some of the Army's could be one possibility for an initial round of trials to prove the concept. If successful, it could pave the way for trials with larger UAVs such as Predator, possibly using a simple pneumatic catapult for launch. All this is, however, a long way off. Although proving the concept and clearing the carriers to operate larger surveillance drones than the RN's ScanEagle would certainly be something to investigate and develop in the medium term.

Overall, by the time the Queen Elizabeth carriers reach their full operating capability in the mid-2020s the RN will have a pair of very capable ships with robust air groups, able to be tailored to suit specific missions. While the phrase "second only to the United States" is so often repeated by MoD and government officials that it's become a bit of a cliché, the capability offered by the Queen Elizabeths will almost certainly live up to those ambitious words. There are ways that this impressive capability could be further enhanced, with V-22 for AAR, heavy lift and COD, and grown over time by trialing UAVs; with a view to eventually including them in the array of aircraft that can be operated from the carriers' decks. If the TAG concept is properly implemented and a variety of aircraft from the RAF, FAA and AAC are routinely embarked for training in the maritime environment then these ships will deliver on the impressive flexibility they were designed to offer.

Operating both carriers:
SDSR 2015 delivered the pledge that the UK would operate both ships simultaneously to ensure one carrier will always be available for deployment 24/7/365. What this will mean in practice is that most of the time one ship will be alongside in the UK, usually undergoing repairs or a refit, while the other acts as the duty carrier: available to respond to events and deploy at short notice. However, as the RN discovered with its previous carriers, leaving ships alongside with minimal manning for prolonged periods of time leads to steady material deterioration and shortens the lives of the ships. Both Invincible and Ark Royal fell afoul of this, spending significant time unmanned and alongside in 3 Basin badly effected the material state of both ships. With only two Queen Elizabeth carriers available the RN cannot afford to make the same mistake, effectively mothballing one ship at a time for lack of crew will shorten the life of a class that could, given adequate care, serve for half a century. Failure to properly man and service both ships at all times would inevitably impose avoidable maintenance costs further down the line and steadily erode the RN's ability to surge two carriers as a "maximum effort" as a serious war fighting contingency against a near-peer opponent.

An Invincible Class carrier, tied up alongside in HMNB Portsmouth's 3 Basin
It has been said elsewhere but the 2020 SDSR needs to include a substantial increase in RN manpower, to enable the service to adequately crew both ships at all times and surge two carrier decks in an emergency: provided the spare ship isn't in deep refit. Providing adequate crew for both ships would also introduce additional opportunities for training in or near UK waters. The need to provide the RAF and AAC pilots and maintainers with experience of operating in the maritime environment has already been mentioned. With only one carrier deck operating at any time, which may be away on operations, the limited availability of a ship for the component elements of the TAG to train on is concerning. The flexible TAG concept only works if its constituent elements can be called upon at short-notice to form a mission-specific package. While the mock carrier at RNAS Culdrose will be a useful facility for training pilots in deck operations, it is no substitute for realistic training at sea. With a sufficiently manned second ship the RN could, when the ship is available, use the reserve carrier for training around the UK. Employing the Queen Elizabeths in this way ensures that the RN would always have more than enough ship-side crew to keep the duty carrier at full strength, and enough to make the two carrier "maximum effort" a realistic prospect. In order to achieve this though, the RN's total manpower must rise.

CATOBAR:
Finally, the thorny issue of whether these ships will ever be reconfigured and refitted with catapults and arrestor wires needs addressing. In 2012 the Coalition government looked at the costs of converting both ships, briefly committing to the cat & trap configuration, before reverting to the original STOVL configuration once it became clear that the costs of conversion would be prohibitive. The cost of converting the partially built Prince of Wales was stated to be an additional £2bn, while the class was supposed to be relatively easy to change from STOVL to CATOBAR in reality this does not seem to be the case. Some sources stated at the time the decision was reversed that conversion would have required modifications to over 200 compartments. A mid-life conversion may become necessary if there is no available STOVL replacement for F-35B after its 2045 out of service date. With so many unknowns inherent in predicting what could happen thirty years into the future, all that can be done is to restate much of what we already know.

The QE Carrier flight deck in both the STOVL and CATOBAR configurations
A CATOBAR conversion would be extremely expensive, it would involve very extensive rebuilds of the ships and the generation of a whole new set of training pipelines for pilots, flight controllers and deck crew. It would also mean learning a whole new way of doing things, and it could not be done cheaply or quickly. When all is said and done developing a bespoke UK STOVL aircraft to replace the F-35B might actually end up being the cheaper option, when compared with the cost of the substantial organisational changes that would be necessary. While many long time supporters of the Royal Navy's cause would, no doubt, love to see the UK return to catapult carrier operations the reality is that STOVL currently offers an effective capability at a tolerable cost. In the author's opinion the decision to convert to CATOBAR would only be taken if there was no other alternative, including the development of a bespoke UK STOVL aircraft. The hope at this point should be that the USMC continues to make a convincing case for STOVL aviation within the US armed forces and ultimately gets a like for like F-35B replacement. This would enable the UK to participate in a joint or multilateral programme, with orders large enough to drive down the unit cost. It must be stated again though that predicting the shape of UK naval aviation that far into the future is almost impossible. For all the sentimental and symbolic importance attached to CATOBAR, it is clear at this point that while a mid-life conversion would be possible, it is far from preferable.

Almost from their very inception the Queen Elizabeth class carriers have proved be a subject of controversy. Fierce and sometimes public debates have been held on their relevance in the modern world, usefulness for the UK and the difficulties involved in realising their potential capabilities in practice. The last point was expressed with a clarity that only tabloid journalism could manage in the oft-repeated phrase "carriers with no aircraft". Thankfully, it is now clear that the tabloids were wrong and the public's concern was partly misplaced, the carriers will have a robust TAG with a great deal of potential flexibility and, if necessary, striking power. While there is still a little room for improvement with regards to the air group such as the inclusion of an AAR tanker, Osprey VARS or otherwise, the concept is sound and the aircraft will be available to start realising it by the early-mid 2020s. While the author still has concerns over the long-term durability of the Joint RAF/FAA F-35B arrangement it is certainly a workable plan and may yet prove to be a success. The key to successfully realising the high-minded goal of turning the carriers into tri service aviation ships will be regular joint training for all component parts of the TAG, on the mock carrier deck at RNAS Culdrose but, more importantly: at sea. Without experience and training on a real carrier deck the individual TAG components will likely struggle to adapt to a very different working environment whilst also trying to conduct operations. The old adage train how you fight comes to mind, if we intend to embark RAF Chinooks and F-35s or AAC Apaches and Wildcats then they must spend regular time training aboard one of the carriers. In order to achieve this the RN needs to be given the manpower to operate both carriers simultaneously as often as repair and refit schedules will permit, with the off-duty carrier operating near the UK as a training platform. This would have the added benefit of keeping both ships out of what would effectively be time spent in mothballs: alongside in Portsmouth with a caretaker crew aboard, which shortened the lives of the preceding Invincible class. If the UK intends to make good on it's substantial investment in the Queen Elizabeth carriers they need to be manned sufficiently to maintain them over their 40-50 year lifespan, failure to do so would be yet another example of the MoD being "penny wise and pound foolish".
Finally, while a post-F-35B conversion to the catapult and arrestor wire configuration is theoretically possible, the costs of doing so, and the institutional upheaval it would cause, would be enormous. In the end, despite the emotional pull exerted by the idea of "proper" carriers and the drama of catapult operations, a CATOBAR conversion should only be embarked upon if the only other alternative is scrapping the ships prematurely and wasting the money already sunk into them.

While some commentators have been very dismissive of the UK carrier programme in the author's opinion they could, in time, give the UK a truly first-class capability "second only to the United States". However, in order to achieve that ambitious and, let's not forget, thoroughly attainable goal the UK needs to make good on its current investment in the carriers. This can be achieved by manning and operating both, potentially investing in AAR capability and most importantly ensuring all component parts of the TAG regularly embark and train on the carriers. At the close I will return to the words of Major General Lihua:

 "The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier."

Thursday 10 December 2015

After Type 26: The Royal Navy's Next Generation Frigate


"We will also launch a concept study and then design and build a new class of lighter, flexible general purpose frigates so that by the 2030s we can further increase the total number of frigates and destroyers. These general purpose frigates are also likely to offer increased export potential."
-SDSR 2015

The UK's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review brought a few surprises for those with an interest in the Royal Navy's future equipment programme. The review suggested that the Type 26 programme be capped at 8 hulls, rather than the 13 originally planned, and is to be followed by a class of at least five, but possibly more, lighter general purpose frigates. Commentators have already begun speculating about the meaning of the phrase "lighter, flexible general purpose frigates", with some suggesting that it means the RN will be getting a class of corvettes or lightly armed frigates. In the author's opinion this seems unlikely, for many years the RN's leadership has placed a great amount of stress on the credibility of it's surface escorts as platforms for intensive war fighting first and foremost, with other less demanding tasks coming second. It is difficult to believe that the service has made a radical change in this regard, as First Sea Lord Zambellas has continued to underscore the value of capable and credible warships. That said, it does not take the construction of a platform as comprehensively capable as the 8,000 ton cruiser-like Type 26 to produce a useful first class warship. Indeed, the current 5,000 ton Type 23 frigates have done sterling service, in both high and low threat environments, since HMS Norfolk commissioned in 1990; and were successfully built in very significant numbers: 16 in total.

Before we can begin any discussion about what the next generation frigate could look like, it's role and place within the RN's future fleet needs to be defined. The fleet of the 2030s will look quite different from the one the UK is currently used to: it will be centered on a high-readiness carrier battle group and a lower readiness amphibious group, both supported by escorts as well as other specialist shipping. Alongside the escorts required to support both of these groups, UK frigates and destroyers will almost certainly also have to provide a number of detached vessels to provide presence in areas considered important to national interests. These currently include, but are not limited to: the Falkland Islands, Persian Gulf and West Indies. Of these standing patrol tasks only one, the Persian Gulf, is likely to require the continuous presence of one or more of the UK's most capable warships. This almost certainly means the deployment of either Type 26 or Type 45. The Falklands patrol task would be suitable for the new GP frigate, as it requires presence and some capability to demonstrate the UK's enduring commitment to the Islands but the threat level is relatively low. As for the West Indies, in the author's opinion this tasking would ideally be covered by one or more forward based OPVs and one of the RFA's Bay Class LSDs, for disaster relief in the hurricane season. Occasionally an ASW frigate could be rotated into this region, for counter narcotics and to train submarine hunting in tropical conditions, but this would be when ships are not required for other essential tasking. With this in mind, it seems likely that the lighter frigate would spend most of its time in low to medium threat environments when deployed alone and would likely engage in high-intensity war fighting activities as part of, or supported by assets from, one of the RN's task groups.

The future frigate fleet could easily be compared with the RN's pre-2010 force structure. The large and highly capable 
Type 26 would act as a direct successor to the general purpose Batch 3 Type 22s, able to embark a command staff in order to act as the lead ship for a task group of British and/or allied escorts. 72 missile tubes, Artisan and Sea Ceptor give it a formidable armament for self protection and localised air defence. Type 26 will also act as the principal ASW escort for the Carrier and Amphibious groups, as it will almost certainly be the only class equipped with the 2087 towed array sonar and it's eventual replacement. With the very high end task group escort roles covered by Type 26 and Type 45 the "lighter frigate" need not require complex air defence or ASW equipment beyond that required for credible self-defence. I would suggest that these ships be specialised to some degree in favour of a certain niche capability, rather than simply being a less well equipped version of the Type 26.

While there are several concepts for differently configured ships I wish to explore later, there are a few common systems that the author considers necessary for the new frigate, if it is to be a credible platform able to operate in both high and low threat environments:

CODLAG/CODLOG propulsion: A proven and reliable system, unlike IEP used in the Type 45, with a good balance between sprint speed, reliability, noise, and fuel efficiency when cruising. The system could be a direct copy of the power plant from either the Type 23 or Type 26 if it would reduce costs.

5" Gun: Generally useful for shore bombardment and a range of low intensity constabulary activities. 5" will be the RN standard once Type 26 enters service, mounting a different calibre gun and introducing a whole new logistical support structure for it would be costly and offer few benefits.

Type 997 Artisan Radar: A modern and capable system which is soon to be the standard across the RN; with sets planned for the Type 23 and 26 frigates, Queen Elizabeth Carriers and Albion LPDs. Fleet wide commonality and a long production run should help keep costs down.

Sea Ceptor: In order to be able to operate alone the frigate needs, as a bare minimum, the ability to defend itself against attack by aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Sea Ceptor offers this minimum credible self defence capability and will be a common and proven system throughout the escort fleet once the Type 26 programme is complete.

Seaboats: facilities for operating two of the RN's existing Arctic 28 or Pacific 22/24 RIBs.

Countermeasures: A carbon copy of the RN standard, currently Seagnat, to exploit the benefits and cost savings of fleet wide commonality.

All the concepts below are envisioned to be in the 5,000-7000t range. Although much of what follows is speculative and oversimplified I intend it more as the beginning of a conversation on some of the options the RN has for it's post-Type 26 frigate.

The Type 81 "Tribal Class" General Purpose frigate HMS Eskimo
Type 83:
Drawing upon the legacy of the Tribal and Duke class general purpose frigates "Type 83" would be a frigate in the 4-5000 ton range with a broad, but shallow, general purpose equipment fit. These ships would be well suited to constabulary tasks where long range endurance, or increased threat, is a factor and OPVs would therefore be unsuitable. A modern armament would also allow them to operate in areas where the threat of attack from state actors or modern weapons systems is also present. In areas where the threat of such an attack is high these vessels could be deployed in pairs, to provide similar AAW and ASuW capabilities to a single Type 26, or as escorts for a carrier or amphibious task group.

As for the armament, twenty four Sea Ceptor and eight strike length Mk. 41 Cells would be a good place to start. As previously discussed Sea Ceptor is a highly credible system ideal for self and point defence, that will come with the major benefit of fleet wide commonality. It will also have been proven on the Type 26. The strike length Mk.41 cells would offer flexibility and access to the next generation of anti-surface and cruise missiles, ASROC could be used but the other options would probably be better suited to the ship's intended role. As a truly general purpose vessel the class would need ASW fit beyond the bare minimum torpedo defence system mentioned earlier. Therefore "Type 83" would include a bow-dome mounted 2050 sonar set, five of which could be salvaged from the last Type 23s in order to equip the new frigate class, assuming that the Type 26 will take the first eight sets. If this is not feasible then an alternative system with similar capabilities would need to be procured.

Aviation facilities would be a hangar and landing pad, able to accommodate a single Wildcat helicopter or smaller rotary wing UAVs. For a general purpose frigate a utility helicopter, such as Wildcat, is invaluable for surveillance, constabulary duties, ASW and surface strike.

The Type 23 frigate HMS Northumberland
Type 27:
Inspired by the excellent think defence article that can be found here, as well as the original concept for the Type 23, "Type 27" would be a dedicated task group towed array ship. The proliferation of quiet diesel electric submarines looks set to be a major impediment to the UK's ability to project power into the littoral in the coming years. Protecting the UK carrier and amphibious task groups against this threat will require more than a single Type 26 defending the group's capital ships. "Type 27" is conceived with area anti-submarine operations in mind. Its purpose would be to operate at some distance from the task group, screening it from underwater threats. Such a class, being more expendable than Type 26, would also be better suited to operating up-threat in the littoral against hostile submarines. Such operations may become an increasingly necessary preceding step before other activity can be conducted in the littoral zone. The weaknesses of the concept lie in the specialist nature of such a design, admittedly it would mainly exist to free up Type 26: the ship best suited to general purpose and lone cruiser operations.

Once again twenty four Sea Ceptor cells should be sufficient to provide adequate self defence capability against air attack and anti-ship missiles. These ships, as dedicated ASW platforms, would need to be equipped with both 2050 (or equivalent) bow dome and 2087 towed array sonars. Accepting that Mk.41 and ASROC would be prohibitively expensive, offensive action against underwater threats would have to be performed by the embarked helicopter. While Stingray torpedo launchers would be a useful addition for last ditch self-defence they are not a necessity, and could easily be omitted in order to reduce costs. Aviation facilities would have to be suitable for a single embarked helicopter. The hangar and landing pad would have to accommodate an aircraft up to the size of a Merlin.


A Japanese Shirane class helicopter destroyer
Type 63
The Royal Navy has a wealth of practical experience which demonstrates the immense value of rotary wing assets, for all manner of operations at sea. From counter piracy and disaster relief to surface strike and anti-submarine warfare, helicopters are valuable assets with a great deal of utility. To date almost all dedicated helicopter destroyers have been specialist anti-submarine warfare vessels. The RN's only experience with such ships was with the Tiger Class cruisers in the 1970s, after they were converted to carry Sea King helicopters. More recently both the Italian and Japanese navies have operated destroyers and cruisers in the 5-7000t range, optimised for helicopter operations. With the RN's current helicopter carrier, HMS Ocean, is slated for disposal in 2018 the need for a new class of helicopter carrying ship, capable of supporting amphibious operations, is apparent. While one of the intended uses of HMS Prince of Wales may be to act as a very large LPH, supporting amphibious operations, she will remain a very high value asset. There will inevitably be times where the risks inherent in putting her close to shore become unacceptably high. Nor can the UK's single large LPH be in more than one place at a time. The ability to sustain an ensuring presence for counter piracy, disaster relief or maritime interception operations with a light helicopter destroyer would be highly useful. In a high intensity war these ships could take on the more traditional role of supporting anti-submarine helicopters.

The ship wouldn't require more than 24 Sea Ceptor cells for self defence. Underwater protection would be minimal, a tried and tested commercially available military sonar would suffice. A very large portion of the deck space would need to be devoted to a very large hangar and helicopter deck, suitable for operating up to four Merlin or Wildcat aircraft. If the hangar can be made large enough, there would also be the possibility of accommodating a single Chinook with unfolded rotors. If the aim is to increase the utility of the ship by allowing the RN to tailor the air group to the specific task then the widest range of helicopters, and eventually unmanned rotary wing UAVs, need to be operable from the ship. In this case a simpler but larger ship could be justified, as fewer complex systems would hopefully help to keep costs manageable.

The Damen Sea Axe 1800 OPV, with a large multi-mission bay
Type 84
A major development of the Type 26 design is its mission bay, designed to accommodate a range of equipment from additional sea boats to air, surface and sub-surface unmanned vehicles and ISO containers. Depending on how quickly these systems mature they could soon play an increasingly significant role in maritime operations. Type 26 has, rightly, been equipped with the mission bay and space to operate a range of future systems currently under development. The potential of unmanned  systems is already being tapped with the Hazard boats and their mine countermeasures drones. In future these systems are intended to be operable from a range of surface combatants, including frigates. The US Navy is also exploring the potential of sub-surface drones for anti-submarine warfare. It is entirely plausible that some of these systems will have moved out of the development phase and into service by the time the next generation frigate begins construction in the late 2030s. Similar to the helicopter destroyer the ship itself would be able to stand-off outside the littoral, away from certain threats, and use its unmanned systems to greatly extend the area it can influence.

The focus of these ships would be their mission bay and unmanned systems, which could offer a great deal of flexibility. Ships would have a variety of mission packages, similar to the concept for the Type 26. Ideally the mission bay would be a copy of the Type 26's, with both classes able to embark tailored mission packages from a common pool of equipment. Like the other concepts 24 Sea Ceptor cells would provide a basic self-defence capability. Aviation facilities should be sufficient to embark a single Wildcat, or a number of smaller rotary-wing UAVs, with an aviation deck and hangar sized appropriately.

There you have it, some sketched concepts for the next generation of RN frigate. Hopefully this brief foray into the realm of fantasy fleets helps stimulate some thinking about alternatives to the simple resigned view that these ships must be a less capable Type 26. In order to get the most from this class the Royal Navy could opt to take a different approach, by learning the lessons of successful past designs (British or otherwise) or looking to the future of unmanned systems. The RN consistently stresses the importance of credible surface combatants, hopefully I've demonstrated that while "credibility" necessitates a complex baseline equipment fit there is also a great deal of flexibility in the way that future UK surface ships could be equipped to carry out their duties.

Post-script:
This article has come under scrutiny from some who dismiss it as a "fantasy fleet" piece. I fully accept that this is indeed the case, and that I went into writing this with the intention of stimulating thought and discussion about some possibilities outside the "normal" conception of a UK surface combatant. The ideas here were never intended to be serious proposals for future UK warship designs. I am, however, happy to see that there is a lively discussion on the UK's next generation frigate going on at the UK Defence Forum. As ever I'd like to thank you, dear reader, for taking the time to read what I've written.

Sunday 29 November 2015

British Military Shipbuilding: The Way Ahead


February of 2012 saw a new low for UK military shipbuilding, with almost all it's capacity tied up in the Carrier programme, not a single British firm put in a bid to build a class of 4 new fleet tankers for the RFA. Instead the order went to a yard in South Korea, with experience in building double hulled tankers- the new international standard - that no UK company can match. From the standpoint of the Royal Navy, MoD and Treasury this was absolutely the right decision. The ships are now arriving on time and under budget, reducing pressure on spending elsewhere. Decisions like this though fly in the face of good military-industrial strategy. The carriers have provided a glut of work for UK shipbuilders (equivalent to 20 Type 45 destroyers!). Over the last six years ~7,000 people have been employed across six yards building blocks for Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales, with a further ~3,000 further down the supply chain. The construction of ships this size has demonstrated that warship building capacity by tonnage is still relatively high. A single job, however,  does not make for a robust long term industrial strategy. This isn't about the here and now, it's about maintaining the ability to build ships of this size 50-100 years into the future. The failure of any UK firm to tender a bid for the MARS tankers demonstrated there are hard limits to what we can ask of our yards, and increasing those limits would be a difficult and costly task to do quickly. This is not an industry that can be readily scaled to meet the needs of the naval service. The near-death state of the UK commercial shipbuilding sector exacerbates this fact, unlike in the past we can no longer call upon a range of civilian yards to rapidly expand our ability to produce warships and auxiliaries in the event of a crisis.

A robust military shipbuilding sector is not simply something that's "nice to have" for the UK, but a vital strategic industry. One which is currently on life support. The Chancellor's grand sounding "national shipbuilding strategy" essentially amounts to stringing out the minimum amount of work possible to keep some yards open and experienced workers employed. After the completion of HMS Prince of Wales three Batch 2 River class OPVs will be the only warships under construction in the UK. It is lamentable that the recent SDSR has pushed the T26 programme even further to the right, with the first of class now not expected until 2025. What this means is that the UK is committed to building two more of the Batch 2 River class OPVs, likely at a similarly inflated cost and slowed build schedule as the previous three, under the terms of business agreement (TOBA) with BVT Surface fleet; which guarantees a minimum amount of work for their yards. This agreement exists in order to sustain the key industrial capability or KIC to "build and integrate a complex warship of up to 5,000 tonnes deep displacement at an interval of 1 shipbuild every 12 months" which the MoD pays to maintain even if it isn't actually using the yards to capacity. Bluntly, the 2009 TOBA is a costly life support system for the UK military shipbuilding sector, it exists because successive governments have refused to consistently order the warships necessary to sustain vital industrial capacity. The paucity of orders means that the ships the UK does build are constructed slowly, to retain essential skilled jobs and experience, driving up costs and killing any chance of exporting the design.

The 2009 TOBA guarantees a minimum level of work in exchange for maintaining
a set level of shipbuilding capacity.
Short term planning continues to dominate Britain's approach to military shipbuilding, resulting in the production of many more OPVs than the Royal Navy actually needs. Better long term planning might have seen the MoD close the gap in orders by ensuring that the start of the Type 26 programme dovetailed with the last of the Batch 2 River Class builds in 2018. As it is currently configured the next generation frigate programme is to deliver one ship every two years, rather than the 1.5 ships per 2 years that the BAE yards should be capable of under the TOBA. This can mean only one of two things: either BAE is unable to meet it's KIC commitment or the MoD is going to build Type 26 at an artificially slowed pace. For the record, my money is on the latter. What this means is that, with the first frigate complete and in the water by 2025 the planned order of 8 won't be completed until 2049. If the follow-on "lighter" frigates are built at the same pace then the last Type 23, HMS St Albans, will leave service in 2049 at the ripe old age of 49. The current situation is ludicrous: ships with an expected hull life of 18 years will serve for more than double that. Even taking into account that the Type 23 hulls haven't been exposed to the harsh North Atlantic climate that prediction was based upon they will very likely serve well beyond their intended lifespan, unless their replacements are accelerated. At a rate of 1.5 frigates every two years the existing fleet of 13 would be replaced six years sooner than at a reduced rate of 1 every two years. If the MoD was serious about prompt replacement of the current frigates then the suggested rate of 1.5 could potentially be increased to a rate of one per year, with some ships being built in blocks at other yards across the UK-similar to the way the Carriers and Type 45 were constructed. While the extensive life extension programme for the Type 23s is vital if the UK is to maintain its fleet of 13 frigates, until their replacements are built, it should not have been necessary. If the Royal Navy is to maintain it's surface fleet at the current inadequate level then it needs industry to supply the yard capacity and skilled workforce to build a complex warship, such as a frigate or destroyer, every year. More importantly, the MoD needs to make full use of that capacity, likely by aiming to regenerate the escort fleet of 19 ships completely every thirty years at a rate of one per year; with the remaining ~11 years in the cycle being used for capital programmes, MCMVs, OPVs, support ships and survey vessels.

Getting the best value for money out of our current shipbuilding establishment is first and foremost a matter of efficiently using the capacity available to us, rather than deliberately underutilising it. It is a matter of long term planning, raised expectations, regular orders and more rapid delivery. We are now seeing the consequences of not planning ahead: artificially slowed build rates which save industrial capacity but fail to meet the needs of the navy, construction of an unnecessary number of OPVs at an inflated cost, and the shameful under use of yard capacity we are paying for whether or not we're using that capacity to build ships that the navy needs. Some will make the argument that the government should simply abandon an unsustainable UK military shipbuilding sector, allow it to fail and buy its warships from abroad. I cannot stress how much I disagree with this view. BAE have been expensive and inefficient in the past, but the much of the money invested in UK-based military shipbuilding is recycled back into the British economy; whereas building abroad would add to our balance of trade deficit and contribute little to the national economy. It is also worth speculating that without the incentive to "build British" and support jobs at home, politicians would be even less likely to consider investment in the Royal Navy a worthwhile pursuit. So, we come back to my initial sentiment: UK-based military shipbuilding is a vital national industry. However, its current structure is failing to deliver the yard capacity and build rates that the Royal Navy requires to replace it's hulls on a one for one basis. I would suggest that the current situation will only improve if the MoD develops and implements a long-term shipbuilding strategy, suited to the navy's needs, rather than simply talking about one.

Islamic State: The Laughing Ghost of Saddam Hussein


There is an oft repeated argument, embedded in the UK's national dialogue about the ongoing conflict in Iraq, that goes something like this: "Saddam kept Iraq stable, when we deposed him we created the sectarian conflict which killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. Al Qaeda filled the vacuum he left and when we defeated them Islamic State filled the vacuum they left. Destroying Islamic State will just lead to another group replacing them and the cycle will continue ad infinitum." The people that make this argument, and variations of it, tend to sum up Saddam's rule with a single word: stability. To them I would ask where this fictitious "stable Iraq", that Saddam was apparently responsible for, was in 1968 when the Ba'ath party seized power in a military coup, or when they invaded Iran in 1980, or Kuwait in 1990, or when the government was busy alternately butchering the Kurds and the Shia up to 2003.

The fact of the matter is that, to keep the Sunni minority in power, the Ba'ath party headed by Saddam relied on a tremendous amount of violence. The Iraqi government didn't flinch from using poison gas and helicopter gunships on civilians if it meant they remained in power. It is unsurprising then that once the Ba'athist regime was deposed the newly empowered Shia majority would not be good friends of the Sunnis who had once backed Saddam. The dictator built a powder keg by dividing and ruling Iraq for a quarter century, which promptly blew up once he was deposed. I suggest that Saddam deliberately positioned himself as the strongman who could hold Iraq together, while simultaneously dividing it so it needed holding together. Now we are presented with a vision of Iraq's future without the 2003 Anglo-American invasion. In Syria a similarly brutal dictator, who divided and ruled his population and kept dissent in check with extreme repression, now "governs" a third of a failed state, currently tearing itself apart in a vicious civil war. Sooner or later this is where Saddam's "stable Iraq" would have ended up: a failed state at war with itself. Very few people pause and consider the possibility that what happened in the wake of the 2003 invasion was among the less bad outcomes after a quarter century of Saddam's rule.

I did not intend this to be a polemic on the evils of the Saddam regime, but rather an examination of the roots of the Islamic State. However, in the opinion of the author, the two are inextricable. In the 12 years since the Ba'ath party's removal from power, elements of the Sunni community have made concerted efforts to win back their minority rule by force. By disbanding the Ba'athist army the Americans inadvertently dumped thousands of dispossessed trained soldiers into Iraqi society, which undoubtedly fuelled the insurgency. More importantly though "de-Ba'athification" saw the forced retirement of senior members of the Iraqi military and security. Many of them went on to become part of the core leadership of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Following the bombing of the Al Askari mosque in 2006 AQI and other Sunni militias made a concerted effort to ethnically cleanse Baghdad of the Shia. Their attempt backfired horribly for them, by 2008 Baghdad's Sunni population had lost the sectarian contest and were concentrated in a small enclave on the West side of the city.

The genius of the so called "Tribal awakening", in which prominent Sunni militias switched their allegiance from AQI to the United States forces, was that Sunni leaders could use the US forces to pursue their own agendas and shield them from the worst of the retaliatory sectarian violence. Indeed it is likely that the Sunni alignment with the Americans, and the"Sons of Iraq" initiative, saved them from being driven from the capital completely. Intercommunal violence decreased so dramatically after 2008 largely because the process of ethnic cleansing in the capital and elsewhere was almost complete. Once mixed communities had become geographically segregated during the 2006-2008 insurgency.
The "sons of Iraq" programme likely saved Sunni communities from
annihilation in Baghdad after 2008.
What we have witnessed in Iraq after the 2003 invasion are the protracted death throes of Sunni minority rule. That community first turned to AQI to advance it's agenda; and after the departure of the Americans in 2011, and the implementation of increasingly sectarian policies by the Maliki government, they turned to the Islamic State. It is difficult to assess but the degree to which the experience of ex-Ba'athist officers underpins the military capability of IS cannot be understated. What is far more certain, however, is that their "caliphate" uses a near-identical copy of the Ba'athist security apparatus with some Islamist flavour added to it (as detailed in this article) to control it's population. Ba'athist officials have underwritten the ability of both AQI and IS to operate effectively in a military capacity. It is probably fair to say that without their expertise and experience both of the groups would be far less dangerous.

What the West is currently dealing with is the fallout from the inevitable collapse of an unsustainable system of Sunni minority rule, dating back to the time of the Ottoman Empire. Saddam demonstrated the sheer level of violence necessary to sustain this system, where ~25% of the population ruled over the other 75% with an iron fist. In the author's view the recent failure of the equally vicious Assad regime, based on a similar system of minority rule, has demonstrated that sooner or later Iraq would likely have collapsed in a similar manner. It is probable that this would have happened sooner or later, with or without the US led invasion. Much of the suffering Iraq has experienced after 2003 can be laid at the feet of the leaders of that country's Sunni community and the remnants of the Ba'ath party. Their refusal to accept that the system of minority rule, only sustainable because the Sunni government had control of a ruthless and powerful security apparatus, has come to an end. Until they find their place within the new Iraq the country will continue to bleed.

Wednesday 25 November 2015

A word on Light Frigates


The idea of a "two tier fleet" is often proposed as a solution to the Royal Navy's current shortage of surface escorts. Building a larger number of light frigates instead of some of the "tier 1" force of high end surface combatants. In the view of the author this approach is dangerously flawed. Not only are these types of ships profoundly unsuited to the RN's needs, but their introduction would put Britain's already stretched military credibility at risk; as well as the lives of a large number of sailors.

It is very easy to forget that the RN has been down this road before; and has seen the dead end that it leads to. The Falklands War cruelly exposed the severe deficiencies of low end surface combatants. A large part of the problem is that on the surface these ships appear little different from their more expensive high end counterparts. To a politician one grey hull with a gun on the front looks little different from another. However, their outward appearance of power hides the lack of real capability. Type 21, the RN's last light frigate, looked like a modern warship; bristling with guns and missiles. The only problem was that its Sea Cat missiles, intended for self defence against aircraft, were obsolete as soon as the ships were launched. Without the complex radars and computer systems necessary to manage a modern anti aircraft missile system, like Sea Wolf fitted to the Type 22s, Type 21 was essentially defenceless in the face of old aircraft dropping unguided bombs. Their missiles were so useless that the Type 21s entered "bomb alley" with crew lining the upper decks to fire small arms and 20mm Oerlikon cannons at their attackers. That's why of the seven Type 21 frigates that sailed to the South Atlantic in 1982 only three returned undamaged, and two did not return at all. If the Argentine ground crews has fuzed their bombs correctly, more would almost certainly be sat at the bottom of San Carlos Water. Even the large capable "high end" warships often struggled to defend themselves in 1982, but at least their modern armament gave them a fighting chance. As for the surviving Type 21s, they spent the rest of their careers patrolling the benign waters of the West Indies. The navy learned a hard lesson about light frigates in 1982. In response the Type 23, originally intended as a minimum towed array ship, was extensively redesigned and became a high end general purpose frigate.

This is why the government's recent talk of a "lighter general purpose frigate" to follow on after the 8 high end Type 26s arouses concerns in the mind of the author. There is a lot of room for maneuver here, it's perfectly possible to produce a credible warship smaller than the 7,000 tonne Type 26 (which, as I laid out here, is more akin to a cruiser anyway) but a design in which self defence capability is compromised in order to achieve a low unit cost would be a dangerous waste of money. If a light patrol ship is required for constabulary tasks and presence then a large OPV will suffice, it'll be cheaper and clearly not intended for combat. If, on the other hand, you're interested in warfighting then anything that can't defend itself against a range of likely threats is worse than useless and liable to get a lot of good people killed.

Thursday 19 November 2015

Roadmap to Victory: Defeating the Islamic State


The factors which make Islamic State relatively straightforward to contain geographically are the same ones which make it nearly impossible to drive them from the lands they currently occupy. The group relies upon the often irreconcilable divisions between their enemies in order to survive, these divisions allow them to face each of their enemies  on the ground in turn. I would suggest that the nightmare scenario for ISIS commanders, many of whom are experienced military men, is a war on multiple fronts. IS puts little stock in static defence, probably based on the assumption that to spread it's forces thinly along its borders would invite disaster. They realise that, in the words of Frederick the Great, "he who defends everything, defends nothing". It also tells us that the likelihood is that their army isn't nearly as large as some commentators suggest, they do not have experienced troops to spare for defensive action. Instead their strategy is to lightly defend their external borders. Using very small numbers of troops, suicide bombers and booby traps to harass and slow down their enemies. Importantly they do not attempt to blunt their attacks by fighting significant defensive actions. Again, they are probably right to do so. They likely judge that defending territory, even urban areas, in the face of Coalition air power is ill advised at best and suicidal at worst. Any fight where ISIS forces become pinned in place by enemy ground troops for more than a few days will likely result in disproportionate losses for the Islamic State, as the full weight of Coalition air power is brought to bear. We saw this happen when IS conducted protracted offensive action around Kobane. The experience of heavy losses in that battle: ~2000 fighters killed, an unknown number injured and 18 tanks destroyed, likely shaped their current mode of conducting operations. Their commanders understand that pushing against enemy strength, along a single axis, in order to seize an objective won't work. Instead they attack where their enemies are weakest. Short sharp offensives that take (or retake) ground at a low cost in the lives to their base of experienced fighters. By always holding the initiative, and an element of surprise, they continue to dictate the terms of the ground war; even when their enemies are on the offensive.

While the group is committed to a strategy of continued offensive action, which keeps their enemies off balance and prevents them from gathering the forces for a decisive thrust into the Islamic State itself, it has not been able to repeat it's initial rapid advances. This is almost certainly because they are constrained, like all the other warring factions, by their inability to operate effectively outside areas populated by their own ethno-religious group. It's probable that one reason for their initial gains in Iraq was Islamic State's ability to exploit the human landscape in Sunni majority areas far more effectively than their opponents in the Shia dominated Iraqi army. This factor makes them far easier to contain territorially, because the same factor which enabled them to expand so quickly into the Sunni parts of Iraq now works against them when they try to advance into Shia or Kurdish majority areas. Containing the group in Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria has drawbacks though. In order to maintain the appearance of continuous offensive success they have begun parallel strategies of terror attacks on the West and the establishment of franchises outside their main territory.

There are several important things we can infer from their behaviour, which will be essential in formulating a strategy to defeat them militarily.

1. Contrary to their own narrative they are acutely aware that they cannot sustain heavy casualties. This has led them to avoid protracted offensive action and to all but abandon the defensive as a viable option.

2. Their veteran field army is vital to their strategy, as it enables them to conduct effective offensive action. This prevents their enemies from concentrating enough force along a few axies of attack to seriously threaten their territory.

3. Their inability to make headway in non Sunni areas, south towards majority Shia Baghdad and North into Kurdish territory, is a product of the same forces which prevent Kurdish or Shia dominated Iraqi forces from making headway in the opposite direction. All the forces present in Iraq lack the ability to project their military power into areas controlled by different religious and ethnic groups, ISIS included.

4. ISIS rely on the divisions throughout the region and beyond it for their survival against conventional military intervention with ground forces. ISIS leaders likely know that the US will continue to veto Turkish intervention on the basis that it will likely be directed as much against their Kurdish allies as against IS. Many of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia seem content to watch as Assad's Iranian ally is drawn ever deeper into the Syrian quagmire. Of course it goes without saying that Assad and the Free Syrian Army will continue to battle one another far more intensely than ISIS.

5. Containing IS is likely pushing the group to adopt a new strategy, which includes acts of international terrorism and spreading franchise groups, in order to maintain the appearance of effective offensive action.

The ISIS field army is at the core of their strategy of continuous offensive action.
With these deductions in mind, what would an effective strategy for defeating ISIS look like? Any such action would have to start with the premise of destroying, or so badly damaging, their field army that they cease to be capable of conducting meaningful offensive or counter offensive action. This is far easier said than done, Western troops would not be able to achieve this. The leadership of IS will undoubtedly have prepared contingencies for the introduction of conventional forces by a major military power. Their reaction would probably be to immediately disperse their forces and adopt a purely guerilla strategy of protracted resistance. This is unappealing because it makes the wholesale destruction of their trained manpower base a near impossibility over any acceptable time span. In order to be drawn into a conventional battle IS commanders must believe that they stand a reasonable chance of success. This means the main ground component will have to be drawn from at least one, but likely more, of the factions currently fighting on the ground.

The fight to destroy IS' army cannot be a defensive action on the part of their enemies, so long as IS hold the initiative they remain free to break off costly offensive action and refocus their efforts elsewhere. Their army needs to be drawn into a battle they patently do not wish to fight, a protracted static defensive action, where coalition air power can be fully brought to bear against them. IS will not be forced to commit to such an action easily. It would probably require a land force threatening one of their major centers of power, Raqqa or Mosul, in order to force them to commit to a static defensive action in a single location. Their leaders will almost certainly understand the difficulty of assaulting a city filled with determined defenders and calculate that they stand a reasonable chance of success. In an action against dug in ISIS forces holding a major city, coalition members must set aside many of their reservations about conducting strikes in urban areas. Civilians will die and IS may seek to keep as many of them in place as possible, to limit the effectiveness of air power by exploiting the squeamishness of Western populations when it comes to unintended collateral damage. Embedding forward air controllers with trustworthy local forces such as the Peshmerga would be one way to reduce civilian casualties and increase the effectiveness of coalition air strikes.

We must seek to turn one of these cities and it's surrounding areas into a "Stalingrad" for ISIS, pushing them to the point where they commit totally to a symbolic battle  in which their army can be irreparably damaged; by inflicting severe losses on their base of experienced fighters. If IS refuse to deviate from their existing strategy, instead opting to avoid defensive action altogether, then they will lose control of one of their major power centers effectively without a fight. That would be a major propaganda coup for their enemies and deprive them of a substantial portion of their economic base and manpower pool. Putting ISIS between a rock and a hard place in this manner can be no bad thing, but I would expect there to be a good chance of them standing and fighting in place. To avoid such a battle would utterly shatter their aura of invincibility.

Of the two options Raqqa is by far the less attractive target. Situated deep within ISIS held territory in Syria, it would probably require a united Syrian force to successfully threaten it and then force IS into a defensive battle. Seeing as there is no real prospect of such a force existing in the near future, Raqqa must be discounted as currently unfeasible. That leaves us with only one real option: Mosul.

Mosul, surrounded on three sides in the Northeast by Kurdish forces.
Recent Kurdish operations have been focused on the corridor linking ISIS held territory in Eastern Syria to it's Iraqi stronghold in Mosul, with the town of Sinjar falling to a joint YPG/PKK and Peshmerga offensive aided by Yezidi militias earlier this month. In accordance with IS' current strategy, the area was not seriously contested, with estimates of around 700 fighters facing off against over 7,500 Kurdish troops. Even the Kurdish threat to and eventual capture of the logistically important Highway 47 did not force IS to commit it's main strength to the battle. As I've previously outlined I believe that IS will only commit itself to a defensive battle if one of their two major population centers are threatened.

The next question which requires addressing is do the Kurdish forces have the will and the capability to conduct such an operation? Clearly convincing the Kurds to engage their forces in a bloody urban battle of attrition, outside their own territory, will be a significant task. In this respect the West at least has it's track record of long standing friendship and co-operation to build upon. ISIS control of Mosul also presents a clear threat to Kurdish territory, acting as their primary base of operations in Northern Iraq. Kurdish leaders and commanders likely understand that sooner or later Mosul will have to be retaken, although their current hopes are probably that such a significant task could be left to the better equipped Iraqi Army to deal with at a later date. However, the now Shia dominated Iraqi Army has repeatedly displayed a profound unwillingness to advance into Sunni majority areas. It's front line is also ~180km further from Mosul than the Kurds, any advance towards Mosul on the part of the Iraqi Army would have to take a lot of time clearing the surrounding areas of resistance. This sort of action would also likely provoke a major attack from ISIS elsewhere, potentially in Anbar province, as they did earlier this year in order to preemptively blunt a similar northward offensive. An advance by the Iraqi Army would therefore be most likely to succeed if it were to fall after ISIS had committed their main strength to Mosul, removing the potential for a major offensive elsewhere. Convincing the Kurds to undertake a major offensive against Mosul would be difficult, but not impossible as part of a multi front offensive involving the Iraqi security forces.

More important than the Kurds willingness to conduct an offensive against Mosul is their military capacity to do so. If they lack the necessary military resources to undertake an operation of this scale and complexity then the plan is a non-starter.

Estimates on the military resources ISIS commands range from the CIA's conservative 2014 estimate of 31,000 fighters to the Kurds own claims of a force 200,000 strong. More recent reports from 2015 suggest that IS can call upon a force in the region of 40,000 fighters, although it is unclear what proportion of these are tied to garrison and rear echelon duties. Western troops usually require a ratio of 3-1 support to combat troops, but let us err on the side of caution and suggest that the ratio for ISIS is far lower. For the purpose of this exercise I will assume that a third of their troops would be unavailable or unsuitable for combat duties, meaning they can muster 2 combat troops for every fighter engaged in supporting activities. This gives them an estimated total strength of around 25,000 fighters. Their heavy equipment varies wildly in quality and age but IS is thought to have around 170 tanks, 150 armoured personnel carriers and a few hundred armoured cars. These numbers must come with the caveat that they are old, likely out of date, and certainly far higher than the strength they could actually deploy.

The estimated number of troops available to the Peshmerga varies wildly, ranging from 80,000 and 200,000. Accurate figures are difficult to come by but a conservative estimate would be that they command around 120,000 troops with a much greater proportion dedicated to rear echelon and garrison duties than IS. For the sake of argument let's say the Peshmerga can field one fighter for every two supporting troops.  This would produce a theoretical force of ~40,000 front line combat troops. The YPG and other allied militias could provide a few thousand more, but their equipment and is generally insufficient for much beyond the guerrilla or light infantry duties at which they admittedly excel.

While the raw numbers, although sketchy, suggest that the "Kurdish forces" do have a numerical advantage over IS; the numbers alone hide a range of issues that prevent the Kurds from putting such a force in the field. Firstly the political divisions within the Peshmerga are a major stumbling block, the 36 brigades are all independently controlled and many are aligned with the PUK, KDP and KRG factions. Although there have been efforts to unite these forces under a single unified command to fight IS, progress has so far been slow. Similarly, these politically divided brigades often struggle to cooperate with one another. Heavy equipment is another area where the Peshmerga has weaknesses. They actually do possess a sizable number of armoured vehicles and heavy artillery pieces, mostly ex - soviet, seized from the Ba'athist army's stockpile during the 2003 Iraq war. In total the Peshmerga have over 500 tanks and around 200 armoured personnel carriers. The lack of spare parts and ammunition, however, prevents most of it from being made available for front line use. Another problem is that, for the size of their forces, their logistical support structures are woefully inadequate. Conducting protracted offensive action will absolutely require a far more robust and effective logistics network backing it up.

Kurdish T-55 tanks: available in numbers but lacking vital spare parts 
Several of the highlighted areas of weakness can be remedied with outside help. Russia's recent commitment to directly combating IS makes the task of sourcing spares and ammunition for much of the Peshmerga's heavy equipment a more straightforward exercise. If the Russians refuse to cooperate then all of the required parts and ammunition are still readily available on the international market, but accessible only to state buyers. The US Army has over 30,000 M939 utility trucks currently set for disposal, transferring a portion of these to the Kurdish forces would go a long way towards solving some of their logistical problems. Importantly both these solutions avoid arming the Kurds with modern equipment that would allow them to challenge Iraqi government forces at a later date, supplies of ammunition and spare parts could easily be cut off after the conflict, to limit their potential for armed secession.

The politicised nature of many of the Peshmerga brigades, and lack of a unified command structure, are far more intractable but not insurmountable problems. Significant but slow progress has been made towards a unified Peshmerga command structure, a series of defeats and blunders fighting IS has made it clear that a more unified effort will be necessary to successfully combat ISIS. I would advise that if the Kurdish regional government manages to implement a functional unified command structure then the West should equip them with the spare parts and ammunition they need to deploy their existing heavy equipment and take the fight to IS around Mosul. If it is made clear that supplies will only come once the Kurds implement a workable unified command it could give the initiative the impetus it needs to be put into place.

The Peshmerga would very likely have an overall and local numerical advantage over IS, especially considering that the Islamist group would be taking an enormous risk if it concentrated a very large portion of it's strength on the defence of Mosul. As Operation Free Sinjar has demonstrated, the Kurds do seem able to concentrate the large forces necessary to execute complex urban assault operations. A battle for control of Mosul would be on an entirely different scale however, without their heavy equipment and a unified command it would be an enormously risky and costly undertaking; even with the Iraqi Army moving up from the south. It does, however, remain the best possible chance for anti-IS forces to inflict irreparable attrition to their trained fighters and prestige.

In summary, IS is militarily easy to contain. The difficulty lies in dislodging them from the territory they hold because of their strategy of harassment rather than static defence and continuous offensive action directed against their enemies weakest points. Despite this, I believe their commanders are acutely aware that their strategy would collapse if they were to lose enough of the trained field army to prevent their offensive action from being successful. This cannot simply be achieved by blunting their offensives, leaving them free to withdraw at will and attack elsewhere. In order to inflict the necessary damage they must be forced into conducting a static defensive battle that they do not wish to fight. The only way of doing this, in the author's opinion, is by seriously threatening one of their two major centers of power: Mosul or Raqqa. As there are currently no forces on the ground capable of conducting an offensive towards Raqqa, Mosul is left as the only realistic option open to us. While the Iraqi army is the better equipped force, they will remain unable to concentrate the force to advance northwards with IS threatening their flank in Anbar province. It will therefore have to be the geographically closer Kurdish forces which initiate the battle and begin the process of drawing IS reserves into the city before the Iraqis can advance, certain that those reserves couldn't be employed for offensive action against their Western flank. In the meantime the West needs to help the Kurdish forces build the logistical support structures necessary for them to conduct protracted offensive. The West must also seriously encourage the establishment of a functional unified command, possibly using the delivery of spare parts and ammunition for their existing heavy weapons as an incentive to do so.

Defeating IS is a matter of making their current military strategy for Iraq and Syria unworkable. This can only be achieved by forcing them to fight a battle that will result in the fatal degradation of their fighting power. I believe an attack on Mosul, coordinated in the manner I have laid out, could achieve this without the need for large Western conventional forces.

Monday 16 November 2015

Hunters of the Deep: the Modern Battleship


"Hit first, hit hard, and keep on hitting"
-Admiral John "Jackie" Fisher

On the 21st of October 1960 the sleek black hull of HMS Dreadnought, Britain's first nuclear powered attack submarine, slipped into the water at Barrow in Furness. Like her immediate predecessor and namesake she brought a sweeping change in her wake. For the first time in the history of the British naval service the decisive arm of sea control, the "battlefleet", would operate beneath the waves rather than upon them. By the time that Dreadnought was commissioned, the Royal Navy had been operating submarines for sixty years. Despite this even the most modern diesel electric boats were, in 1963, primitive by comparison. The 2000 ton Porpoise class boats, built throughout the 1950s, could make a maximum of  17 knots while submerged. They also needed to frequently surface and run their diesel generators to recharge the batteries they used while submerged, and their limited fuel supply gives them relatively short legs. In comparison, the nuclear powered Dreadnought could cruise at 28 knots or more and remain submerged indefinitely; only constrained, in theory, by the supply of food needed for the crew. Even today the most modern non-nuclear submarines can only make ~20 knots while submerged. The nuclear powered attack submarine is the true capital ship of the 21st century, like the battleships that pre-dated them they are designed to sweep the seas clean of enemy warships, and confine hostile fleets to their bases for fear of destruction.

This last point is especially important: the only time a nuclear submarine has ever acted against a surface ship in wartime it struck such a powerful blow to Argentine morale that the opposing fleet effectively confined itself to port for the rest of the conflict. Of course HMS Conqueror's famous attack on the Argentine cruiser Belgrano was hardly an even match, the Argentine navy had little experience with antisubmarine warfare and lacked the ability to effectively respond to Britain's fast nuclear powered submarines. What is far more telling though is the British experience of antisubmarine warfare in 1982. The Task force that sailed south was equipped with some of the most sophisticated ASW equipment available, designed to fight Soviet nuclear submarines in the Northeast Atlantic, and had no lack of experienced and well trained personnel. To put it bluntly the Royal Navy, even with modern equipment and training, failed to find and successfully engage the single semi-modern Argentine diesel electric submarine operating against the Task Force. It remains the case that the most effective weapon against a nuclear powered submarine is another submarine. Like the battleship before it the fast nuclear powered attack submarine is the supreme means of enforcing sea control, and denying the use of this space to the enemy.
HMS Conqueror returns from the 1982 Falklands war flying the
Jolly Rodger, signifying her successful attack on the Belgrano.

To see the true extent of the United State's capacity to control of the seas you need look no further than the following table of nuclear powered attack submarine operators, and their respective "battlefleets":


SSN & SSGN fleets by submerged tonnage:
USA- 63 boats, 492700 tons 
Russia- 23 boats, 297300 tons
UK- 6 boats, 36000 tons
China- 5 boats, 30500 tons
France- 6 boats, 15600 tons
India- 1 boat (leased), 12770 tons

At the height of it's power in the mid 1890s Britain maintained a "two power standard" which legally required the Royal Navy's battlefleet to be equal to the next two largest foreign fleets combined. The US Navy's submarine force currently stands more powerful, in numbers and tonnage of boats, than every other operator of nuclear attack submarines combined. It has a 3:1 advantage over it's only serious opponent, the Russian submarine force, which becomes close to 4:1 when it's European allies are factored in. It is this that ensures the US Navy is untouchable in almost any confrontation between fleets; and continues to reign supreme at sea, regardless of the deployment of ballistic missiles and advanced anti ship missiles designed to destroy aircraft carriers.

While the aircraft carrier may still be the ultimate symbol of naval power and prestige, the nuclear attack submarine is currently it's most potent expression. With the capability to destroy surface ships with limited difficulty, and in doing so seriously degrade enemy morale, they can effectively dominate the strategic space. SSNs may not be as glamorous as the battleships that preceded them, in most cases the submarine arm tends to remain out of the limelight. In the UK and USA they are commonly known as "the silent service". We should never forget that their low profile is a function of the secret nature of their work, rather than their unimportance.

In the 19th century Britain's "wooden walls", the battleships of Nelson's fleet, became ever more sophisticated walls of Iron and steam. Now those walls are invisible to most, lurking below the waves rather than riding atop them. Occasionally we glimpse the top of the sleek black pressure hull of a nuclear powered attack submarine, as a reminder that we are protected by the new hunters of the deep.