Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson,
Probably...
These
twin screw ships were propelled by a pair of large 10-or 12-cylinder marine
diesel engines (Sir Lancelot was a slightly larger variant and came equipped
with the more powerful 12-cylinder engines). The LSLs were amongst the first
ships in British military service to be ‘roll-on roll-off’ (RO-RO), achieved by
using their stern ramp and bow doors. The same bow doors, flat bottom and twin
anchors at the stern, with attendant powerful winding gear also allowed the
class to run up onto a beach and disembark troops and equipment directly. While
a useful capability on-paper as the class matured it was found that this
capability was used less and less, it required a very specialised skillset on
the part of the ship’s officers and crew, as well as the right beach and
environmental conditions to achieve safely. Things that were not always present
during exercises and on operations. More often they relied on their ample
cranage, their own and others’ landing craft as well as the utilitarian
mexeflote modular powered raft to get their cargo ashore without port
facilities.
Through their careers they also, increasingly, found themselves used outside of
their traditional cargo-hauling and amphibious roles. Notably they took on
logistical and C2 support functions for minehunting groups during exercises and
the 2003 Iraq War. By the end of their lives in the 2000s had absorbed a broad
range of tasks not envisaged by their 1960s designers. It was therefore
reasonably inevitable that what followed them would most likely take a somewhat
different form.
Genesis
The first two of what would become the Bay class
LSD(A)s were placed on contract with Swan Hunter in December of 2000, with the
contract for a further two ships awarded to BAE’s Govan yard a year later at an
initial projected cost of £270m. The new ships would move away from the
tank-landing ship archetype of their predecessors and instead build upon the
Royal Schedle (now Damen) Enforcer dock landing ship design, three of which had
been built during the 1990s. These included the Royal Netherlands Navy’s Rotterdam
along with the Spanish Navy’s Galicia and Castilla. A second Enforcer
type LSD for the Dutch Navy, Johan de Witt, would be laid down in 2003.
These ships dispensed with the Landing Ship Tank’s beaching concept and instead
used a floodable well-dock and landing craft to deliver cargo from ship to
shore, in lieu of a port. The class would retain the RO-RO capability of its
predecessor with the inclusion of a large side ramp as well as the ability to
deploy the mexeflote raft. Notably the new ships had accommodation and hotel
services scaled to be able to semi-comfortably embark and support over 350
troops (up to 700 for limited durations under overload conditions), unlike
their predecessors.
Unfortunately the construction of these ships hardly went smoothly. They
overran in terms of time and budget, in the end all four ships would be
delivered around 28 months late and 120% over budget; at a final cost of £596m.
Significant problems at Swan Hunter meant that only one of the two ships
intended to be built on the Tyne was actually completed there, the partially
completed second ship, Lyme Bay, had to be towed to BAE’s Govan yard to
be completed. Due to this, while she was the second to have been laid down Lyme
Bay was the last to be commissioned into the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.
Following the failure to deliver Lyme Bay and with no prospect of
further naval orders the Swan Hunter yard was effectively shuttered and its
equipment put up for sale in November 2006.
While
their birth may have been typified by industrial and financial problems the
class has gone on to be regarded as one of the stalwarts of the modern Naval Service.
Large and flexible, with a small core crew of only 60-70 RFA personnel, the
full-length internal vehicle and cargo deck, plentiful embarked forces
accommodation, well dock, twin 30-ton cranes and large flight deck have made
them highly sought after assets across a number of roles.
Pulled in Multiple Directions
Almost from their inception the class has been in high demand, required to
support an increasing number of tasks outside of its ‘core’ function: provision
of second echelon amphibious lift(1) in support of the Royal Marines’ 3 Cdo Bde. Almost immediately additional tasks
started to gnaw at the edges of the class’ time available to support military
land forces. For example, within her short 4 years spent in commission with the
RFA Largs Bay had spent 11 months conducting operations, mainly
counter-narcotics and disaster relief, in the Caribbean.
|
Ship |
Total Months in RFA Service |
Months Assigned to |
Months Assigned to |
|
LARGS |
53 |
15 |
11 |
|
LYME |
168 |
65 |
72 |
|
CARDIGAN |
180 |
16 |
111 |
|
MOUNTS |
173 |
97 |
33 |
|
TOTAL |
574 |
193 |
227 |
The case is much the same with the other ships of the class. Only Mounts Bay has spent the preponderance of her time postured to be available for, or actively conducting, amphibious tasking. Lyme Bay has split her time more or less evenly between amphibious availability and operations and periods spent conducting counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, disaster relief and support to the UK’s forward-deployed minehunters. This has not been assisted by the mothballing of the second Wave class fleet tanker, which was previously often utilised to cover the RFA’s Caribbean commitments. Cardigan Bay has, with few exceptions, spent most of her career in the Gulf operating outside the amphibious warfare role. With the withdrawal of RFA Diligence in 2016, which had previously reprised the MCM support role in the Gulf in the early 2000s, that task now falls solely on the Bay class. Unsurprisingly, as no other class in-service possesses the dynamic positioning, cranage and stores capacity to perform the role effectively.
With the sale of Largs Bay to Australia in 2011 the
demands of lifting an amphibious force now fall largely on one ship of the
class: Mounts Bay. It is unsurprising that this was the hull selected
for modification, with the addition of a fixed hangar to replace the temporary
structure currently in-use by the class, to better support the new Littoral
Strike concept. Although the future of that programme now appears to be
uncertain. The ambition to create two Littoral Strike Groups, with one
forward-deployed into the Indian Ocean, will not be achievable without
withdrawing one of the existing Bay class ships from either the periodic
support to UK overseas territories in the Caribbean, or the Gulf MCM support
tasking. It is reasonably obvious that the 2010 withdrawal of Largs Bay has
substantially narrowed the available options and generated only marginal annual
savings of some £8m(2).
With the gap in the Solid Support shipping available to support 3 Cdo Bde, with
the retirement and subsequent sale to Egypt of the elderly Fort Austin class
this year, further demands to support contingent military operations may fall
upon the already stretched availability of the three remaining Bay class.
There was much to-ing and fro-ing between the UK’s 2015 and 2021 defence and security reviews around the future of the Royal Navy’s two Albion class LPDs. One of which has been laid up in extended readiness for the last decade, following a decision made in the 2010 review. While broadly similar in conception to the Bay class LSD(A)s, both classes fundamentally carry troops and equipment and deliver it using embarked landing craft, the LPDs remain qualitatively different. Crewed by approximately 325 Royal Navy personnel they can sustain high-intensity 24/7 amphibious operations in a way that the Bay class, even with substantial numbers of augmentees on top of its core crew, simply cannot. While the Albions have slightly under half the number of lane-meters as the Bays for vehicles and cargo (500 vs 1150), they can carry four times the number of large LCU type landing craft, along with four smaller LCVP Mk.5s. The Command and Control facilities aren’t comparable either: “the LSD is utterly unsuited to command and control this most complicated of all forms of warfare.”(3)
“The Bay class LSD(A)s are valuable vessels for supporting amphibious operations alongside amphibious warships and have recently shown their suitability for conducting a range of tasks including disaster relief operations. For the reasons we have set out, they are, nevertheless, no substitute for dedicated amphibious assault warships.”(4)Yet there persists, in some quarters, the notion that the LSD(A) could, if necessary, substitute for the LPD in the event that the latter were withdrawn from service. Not only is it reasonably clear that the capability sets are very different, but it remains concerning that yet another task could be foist upon the already extremely busy LSD(A)s should the decision be made to withdraw the LPD from service in the next decade.
It is also notable that the decision to sell Largs Bay, rather than place her in extended readiness, similar to the condition of the second Albion or the Fort Austin class solid support ships, has left the Naval Service in a worse position than may otherwise have been the case. If it were sought at this stage, the only remaining options for an additional hull to support a modestly enhanced commitment to Littoral Strike would be either the pursuit of a costly new-build, an extensive conversion (such as the abortive Littoral Strike Ship concept) or the reactivation of the second LPD, which would be extremely costly to operate at c.£24m per year[1] and crew-intensive to a point where it is doubtful the Royal Navy could generate the required additional personnel in the short-term even if such an uplift were approved. Hardly an easy task in circumstances where the overall defence budget looks to remain broadly flat in the near-term.
And a Hospital Ship Too
Presently the RFA provides an afloat Role 3 medical facility in the Primary
Casualty Receiving Ship RFA Argus. Role 3 is defined as:
“Role/Echelon 3 support is normally provided at Division level and above. It includes additional capabilities, including specialist diagnostic resources, specialist surgical and medical capabilities, preventive medicine, food inspection, dentistry, and operational stress management teams when not provided at level 2. The holding capacity of a level 3 facility will be sufficient to allow diagnosis, treatment, and holding of those patients who can receive total treatment and be returned to duty within the evacuation policy laid down by the Force Surgeon for the theatre. Classically, this support will be provided by field hospitals of various types. Maritime Echelon 3 is equivalent to land/air forces Role 3, though it will normally have increased specialty capabilities. Echelon 3 is normally found on some major amphibious ships, on hospital ships, at Fleet Hospitals, at some FLS, and at a few Advanced Logistics Support Sites (ALSS).”(5)
There is presently no plan, or allocated budget,
to replace this capability with another specialist vessel capable of delivering
the Role 3 afloat and helicopter carrying capabilities presently provided by Argus
once she goes out of service in 2024, with limited potential for a
short-term extension to 2026:
“At the moment there is a potential gap from
2024 onwards. We are looking at a range of mitigations, one of which is to
extend Argus. That would be a relatively modest extension to 2026.
Another is to start to look at how we provide a
role 3 capability, and do we do it slightly differently? Less of a bespoke ship
and more similar to what we have seen with our hospitals on land, where you
look at, from a ship-going point of view, containers, and can that provide some
of the capability rather than having it designed into the ship?
That starts to link with both the FSS
programme and the programme that follows, the multi-role support ships (MRSS).
That is at the back end of the decade. Does that allow us to reintroduce the
role 3 capability?
In the meantime, we have to acknowledge that we
are limited purely to Role 2 and having to link with what might be
provided from shore. There is a potential gap and we are looking at various
options to try to ease it.”(6)
Multi
Role Support Ships, the eventual Solution?
The latest stated out of service dates for the three
Bay class are 2031-2032(7).
This places their expected service lives at around 25 years, unsurprising given
how hard the class as a whole is worked. Notably the LPDs Albion and Bulwark
follow shortly after, retiring in 2033 and 2034 respectively. Thankfully
things have moved slightly since the 2016 FOI request rather bluntly stated:
As
of the 2021 Defence review things have changed somewhat, with a new commitment
to have “Multi Role Support Ships in build.”(8) in 2030. These ships will “provide the platforms to deliver Littoral Strike,
including Maritime Special Operations, in the early 2030s.” but are, as yet, rather
lightly-defined in form and function in the public domain. The former First Sea
Lord’s comments about the possibility of pursuing a modular Role 3 medical
facility, coupled with the wider NavyPODS concept, might give some idea of the
direction of travel. A unified class to replace both the LPDs and the LSD(A)s would
certainly appear to make some sense, but the practicalities of designing a ship
around two radically different crewing models – Royal Navy and RFA – may prove
a significant challenge to overcome.
There is also the rather dull and ‘old fashioned’ matter of the number of hulls
required to fulfil the tasks this new class will be required to perform. There
are presently six ships in-service that fit the broad categories that MRSS may
seek to replace. The two LPDs, the three LSD(A)s and Argus. However, if
we reach even a little way back into our recent history and consider ships such
as Diligence, or the aborted Joint Sea Based Logistics Vessel (JSBL) and
Littoral Strike Ship (LSS) programmes, we may find that the actual requirement
to fill all the gaps in this corner of the fleet’s force structure sits closer to
eight or nine hulls. Not something the naval service is likely to get, despite
the long proven utility and relative affordability of the current generation.
This number could be somewhat ameliorated in the event that a potential future
mine warfare mothership were better able to self-sustain than the current
generation of small, crewed minehunters. Or through continued greater
utilisation of the Point class strategic RO-RO ships(9),
operated by Foreland Shipping on behalf of the MOD, in support of military
operations.
Conclusions
While the Bay class have undoubtedly proven
a resounding success for the Naval Service, they have been progressively driven
out of their amphibious support role by a range of standing tasks and responses
to emergent circumstances. Some of those pressures, such as the requirement to
support the UK’s forward deployed mine warfare force, are carry-overs from
before the inception of the Bay class. Some, such as Lyme Bay’s
extended counter-piracy deployments off East Africa in the late 2000s, were
transient. With hindsight the decision to withdraw Largs Bay from
service appears short-sighted, although Australia has certainly gotten good
service from her in a new life as HMAS Choules. While reductions had to
be made in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the decision to sell rather
than mothball that particular ship is one which we’re probably right to be regretting
in the medium to long-run.
It is also important to recognise where the class’s limitations lie, the Bay
is not an LPD and while it may look similar in form and function at a glance;
beneath the surface they are very different beasts. While the risk of the LPDs being
withdrawn from service appears to have receded since the late 2010s we should
beware the idea that the already hard-worked LSD(A)s have the capability, or
the capacity in their schedules, to fill the hole that deleting the LPDs would
leave. While the loss of the LPDs is a bullet we have, so far, dodged the looming
loss of Argus is one we cannot. Whether retired in 2024 or extended to 2026
there will be a gap in medical provision afloat, even if it is eventually
filled in the early 2030s by MRSS. This will likely place the Bays, with
their Role 2 medical facilities (when activated with appropriate crew augmentation),
in even greater demand.
Ultimately the present intent is to replace the LPDs, Bays and
potentially Argus with a number of Multi-Role Support Ships. As I have
highlighted, replacing the current force structure will require six such ships.
However, given the Naval Service’s recent loss of Diligence and the search
for additional amphibious hulls through the abortive JSBL and LSS programmes filling
the gaps may require up to nine such ships. A prospect that we would be extremely
fortunate to see come to pass, therefore a shortfall that should be planned and
mitigated against.
Undoubtedly the Bays have many years of continued service ahead of them,
but we should be wary of expecting too much of a precious and limited resource
and maybe consider working to relieve them of some of the peripheral tasks
which would otherwise continue to draw them away from sitting at the heart of
the Future Commando Force’s shipping.
(1) FOI 2015/06440, “Royal Navy surface vessels average yearly costs”
There is also the rather dull and ‘old fashioned’ matter of the number of hulls required to fulfil the tasks this new class will be required to perform. There are presently six ships in-service that fit the broad categories that MRSS may seek to replace. The two LPDs, the three LSD(A)s and Argus. However, if we reach even a little way back into our recent history and consider ships such as Diligence, or the aborted Joint Sea Based Logistics Vessel (JSBL) and Littoral Strike Ship (LSS) programmes, we may find that the actual requirement to fill all the gaps in this corner of the fleet’s force structure sits closer to eight or nine hulls. Not something the naval service is likely to get, despite the long proven utility and relative affordability of the current generation. This number could be somewhat ameliorated in the event that a potential future mine warfare mothership were better able to self-sustain than the current generation of small, crewed minehunters. Or through continued greater utilisation of the Point class strategic RO-RO ships(9), operated by Foreland Shipping on behalf of the MOD, in support of military operations.
While the Bay class have undoubtedly proven a resounding success for the Naval Service, they have been progressively driven out of their amphibious support role by a range of standing tasks and responses to emergent circumstances. Some of those pressures, such as the requirement to support the UK’s forward deployed mine warfare force, are carry-overs from before the inception of the Bay class. Some, such as Lyme Bay’s extended counter-piracy deployments off East Africa in the late 2000s, were transient. With hindsight the decision to withdraw Largs Bay from service appears short-sighted, although Australia has certainly gotten good service from her in a new life as HMAS Choules. While reductions had to be made in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the decision to sell rather than mothball that particular ship is one which we’re probably right to be regretting in the medium to long-run.
It is also important to recognise where the class’s limitations lie, the Bay is not an LPD and while it may look similar in form and function at a glance; beneath the surface they are very different beasts. While the risk of the LPDs being withdrawn from service appears to have receded since the late 2010s we should beware the idea that the already hard-worked LSD(A)s have the capability, or the capacity in their schedules, to fill the hole that deleting the LPDs would leave. While the loss of the LPDs is a bullet we have, so far, dodged the looming loss of Argus is one we cannot. Whether retired in 2024 or extended to 2026 there will be a gap in medical provision afloat, even if it is eventually filled in the early 2030s by MRSS. This will likely place the Bays, with their Role 2 medical facilities (when activated with appropriate crew augmentation), in even greater demand.
Ultimately the present intent is to replace the LPDs, Bays and potentially Argus with a number of Multi-Role Support Ships. As I have highlighted, replacing the current force structure will require six such ships. However, given the Naval Service’s recent loss of Diligence and the search for additional amphibious hulls through the abortive JSBL and LSS programmes filling the gaps may require up to nine such ships. A prospect that we would be extremely fortunate to see come to pass, therefore a shortfall that should be planned and mitigated against.
Undoubtedly the Bays have many years of continued service ahead of them, but we should be wary of expecting too much of a precious and limited resource and maybe consider working to relieve them of some of the peripheral tasks which would otherwise continue to draw them away from sitting at the heart of the Future Commando Force’s shipping.
(1) FOI 2015/06440, “Royal Navy surface vessels average yearly costs”
(2) Southby-Tailyour, E. Parliamentary Written Evidence RMA 0051, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-committee/the-royal-marines-and-uk-amphibious-capability/written/75166.html
(3) Traditionally the ‘first echelon’ would be provided by the Royal Navy’s
amphibious shipping: particularly the Albion class Landing Platform
Docks (LPDs) and a ship, or ships, in the Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) role,
whether it be Argus, Ocean, one of the Invincible class or,
latterly, a Queen Elizabeth.
(4) Defence Select Committee, Sunset for the Royal Marines? The Royal Marines and UK amphibious capability, (HC 2018-622) para 75
(5) NATO logistics Handbook, 1997, Ch.16, Para. 13.
