Queens and Princes: The Road Ahead for UK Carrier Aviation

 "The navy of any great power has the dream to have one or more aircraft carriers. The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier."

- Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Chinese Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Office.

As it stands the UK is currently in the middle of a long process, which will culminate in the regeneration of key national capability: the ability to fly fixed wing aircraft from the decks of its carriers. Once this process is complete, some time in the early 2020s, the Royal Navy will return to operating full size carriers for the first time since Ark Royal, the last of the Audacious class, decommissioned in 1979. The new Queen Elizabeth class are true supercarriers, though not cast from the same mold as the US Navy's current Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford classes, they can still employ an impressive array of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Although the class will be fitted with deck equipment for short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft like the F-35B, including the famous "ski-jump", they are of a similar size to the US Navy's former Forrestal and Kitty Hawk class carriers. It is easy to see that there is vast scope for modification and upgrade throughout their service lives, a process which every previous class of British carriers since the Second World War has undergone. The only certain thing is that these ships will end their service lives looking very different from the way they began them. Thankfully, unlike their predecessors, significant margins for growth have been built into the two ~70,000 ton ships from the start.

The short term shape of the carriers and their air groups is now mostly known, with the 2015 SDSR clearing up some of the speculation; especially with regards to the number of F-35B to be routinely embarked. The purchase of 42 airframes, with the specified purpose of arming the carriers with a "full air group", indicates that we could see the Tailored Air Group (TAG) routinely including an F-35B squadron; with a total of around 24 fixed-wing aircraft. This leaves a further 16 "slots" in the TAG available for a range of rotary wing assets, including the Army's Apache and the RAF operated Chinook. This is one of the most pioneering parts of the UK carrier concept: operating them as RN-led tri service assets. In theory these ships could simultaneously host RAF, Fleet Air Arm and Army Air Corps aircraft and maintainance crews. Making all this work in practice, in a challenging maritime environment, is likely to be a major test of the viability of the concept. It is encouraging that the tri service concept builds upon years of hard won experience, gained from the RAF/FAA Joint Force Harrier and the RAF/FAA/AAC Joint Helicopter Command. Small numbers of RAF Harriers have, in the past, operated from the decks of RN light carriers. As recently as 2011 the AAC flew some of its Apache gunships from HMS Ocean during the intervention in Libya. However, the scale of the Queen Elizabeth carriers and the sheer number of aircraft operating from her will inevitably complicate matters. Nevertheless, the concept is certainly exciting and will give the UK a truly flexible asset and a first class capability, if they can pull it off.

So, what might the future hold for these ships, the aircraft that fly from them and the people that will make the whole thing work?

"Jointness" and the Joint Strike Fighter:
As it stands the medium-term plan for the UK's fleet of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters has been spelled out. With the initial aircraft divided between the RAF's 617 "Dambusters" Sqdn. and the FAA's 809 "Immortals" Sqdn. Both of which will be based at RAF Marham in Norfolk, the UK hub for F-35. The pilots and maintainers in both squadrons will be a mix of RAF and FAA personnel, with the bulk likely being drawn from the RAF. The entirety of the UK F-35 fleet will also be officially "owned" by the RAF, this means that the RN will have a more limited degree of control over the FAA badged squadrons than in the past. Looking to history for a precedent for this sort of arrangement seems to throw up an eventual outcome that doesn't bode well for the current structure. Between 1924 and 1937 UK naval aviation was given over to a branch of the RAF, over the ensuing thirteen years a clear divide emerged between the naval aviators and their land based counterparts. While "FAA squadrons" will exist in the future structure they will, in effect, function as a naval branch of the RAF in all but name. Squadrons routinely deployed to the carriers, likely the FAA badged ones, will develop a more "naval mentality" and slowly diverge in skills and attitudes from those that do so far less frequently or not at all. While the planned common pool of pilots may seem like a way around this, it may in fact end up militating against the development of the skilled naval aviators necessary to get the most from the carriers.

Allowing some pilots, wearing light or dark blue uniforms, to spend much of their career conducting carrier operations at sea will eventually result in the slow re-emergence of a group of professional naval aviators that will not fit especially comfortably into the planned joint structure. The same could be said of the ground crews and maintainers, with certain people gravitating towards the naval environment and drafts on the carriers while others remain ashore. Whether this will eventually lead to a natural split in the joint force, with the navy taking control of some of the aircraft once the FAA rebuilds the necessary skills and personnel base to do so, remains to be seen. Although the cost of doing so for the RN will likely remain prohibitive. What is very much more likely is that de-facto divisions will emerge within the joint force, with the FAA badged squadrons containing the preponderance of experienced carrier pilots and "navalised" maintainers. The land-based squadrons' pilots will continue to qualify for carrier operations, but will likely spend less time at sea building up to the same levels of practical experience as their counterparts in the naval squadrons.

A USMC F-35B lands aboard the USS Wasp

Future of the air group:
The range of aircraft due to be flown from the decks of the Queen Elizabeth carriers in the medium-term is already clear at this point. The core of any TAG is always likely to be a number of F-35B to cover carrier air defence, strike and combat ISTAR. The number will vary depending on the task at hand, but I would think the ship would routinely deploy with a minimum of 12 on board-maintaining core naval aviation skills, providing CAP for the carrier group and allowing the ship to rapidly re-role for basic strike operations at very short notice. In the "maximum effort" scenario where both decks are in action simultaneously, with one acting as an enlarged LPH and the other a full strike carrier, I would still expect to see F-35B operating from both ships.
Merlin will form the second part of the core TAG, whether carrying the "Crowsnest" Airborne Early Warning (AEW) equipment, Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) gear or in the HC3/4 cargo and troop transport configuration. What is reasonably certain is that Merlin, especially in the "Crowsnest" configuration, will nearly always be present aboard these ships.
The RN's Wildcats will also likely be a regular feature covering the surveillance, utility and surface strike (with the new Sea Venom lightweight anti-ship missile) roles. However, the limited number of airframes in RN service and high demand for the aircraft from other parts of the fleet, especially the forward-deployed escorts, may stand in the way of a regular presence on the carriers. The same case could be made for the ASW variant of the Merlin, the HM.2, with only 18 front-line airframes available to cover the needs of the escort fleet and the carriers. With regards to Wildcat best use of the tri service operations concept should be made by looking at close co-operation with the AAC, exploiting the possibility of routinely hosting of a number of Army Wildcats to ease the strain on the RN's fleet. This would also have the benefit of building and then sustaining the skills base necessary to rapidly and effectively embark and integrate Army helicopters and AAC crews at short notice if necessary.

Outside the core component aircraft of the TAG the carriers are also likely to see Army Apaches and RAF Chinooks embarked occasionally, on a less frequent basis. In order to operate these aircraft effectively from the carriers, pilots and aircraft will need to be exposed to the demands of operating in the maritime environment on a semi-regular basis. Similarly the ship-side aircraft handlers will need to build and maintain their experience dealing with very large helicopters such as Chinook. While it is helpful that both Apache and Chinook have already been deployed at sea, aboard HMS Ocean, the scale and tempo of deck operations aboard a carrier that will be simultaneously operating large numbers of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will be very different. The RN is lucky that the basic needs of carrier operations, folding rotor blades and protection from salt corrosion, have already been built into the British Apaches. However, while Chinook does have the necessary corrosion resistance it lacks folding main rotors. Although the carriers' aircraft lifts have been designed to handle Chinook without folding blades these aircraft will take up a great deal of space in the hangar without them. This is acceptable if Chinook is only intermittently embarked for specific tasks. However, if it becomes a regular part of the air group then upgrading some or all of the Chinook fleet with powered folding rotors, or exploiting the unpowered folding mechanism already present, should be a high priority.

AAC WAH.64 Apache gunships operating from the deck of HMS Ocean

Looking slightly ahead into the next decade a single V-22 Osprey squadron should, if the money becomes available, be given serious consideration. The range of F-35B is already the shortest of all three variants, with forced loiter times an inherent part of carrier operations, air to air refueling (AAR) would be a very valuable support capability. The V-22 Aerial Refueling System (VARS) is a palletised probe and drogue tanking kit already in development for the US Marine Corps, for use with their F-35Bs. VARS initial operating capability is expected to be reached in 2017, so the system would be substantially de-risked in the event of a UK buy in the 2020s. While introducing a whole new aircraft and its supply chain into UK service would be costly, V-22 and VARS is the only realistic option open that is compatible with a STOVL carrier. With 16 airframes, for a squadron of 12 and a reserve of four, and eight VARS kits the UK could provide a continuous AAR capability for both carriers in the "maximum effort" scenario. The spare aircraft could also be flown from bases ashore to provide additional refueling capacity alongside the Voyager fleet during routine carrier operations, where only a single ship will be at sea. Of course, because VARS is a palletised kit, some of the aircraft could also be used in the heavy lift and troop transport roles for which they were originally designed; freeing up RAF Chinooks for operations ashore. The Osprey would also be able to cover most of what the US Navy calls the "Carrier Onboard Delivery" (COD) role, moving personnel and stores long distances from ship to shore and vice versa. Although the V-22 lacks the cargo space to carry the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine for the F-35, it's range and carrying capacity are still impressive. It seems to be the case anyway that in RN service the spare engines will be carried by the accompanying MARS solid support ship: able to transfer them to the carrier via their heavy RAS gear when needed. So the Osprey's lack of capability in that area wouldn't be a severe drawback. Overall the V-22 would be a very useful option to add to the Queen Elizabeth carriers' TAG if, in future, the money becomes available.

A USMC V-22 Osprey refueling an F-18 with the VARS drogue

Another interesting area for future development will be the operation of short takeoff and landing drones. A number of the current generation of propeller-driven long endurance UAVs operate at low enough speeds to consider carrier operations without catapults a serious proposition. A naval version of the Watchkeeper surveillance drone, or simply using some of the Army's could be one possibility for an initial round of trials to prove the concept. If successful, it could pave the way for trials with larger UAVs such as Predator, possibly using a simple pneumatic catapult for launch. All this is, however, a long way off. Although proving the concept and clearing the carriers to operate larger surveillance drones than the RN's ScanEagle would certainly be something to investigate and develop in the medium term.

Overall, by the time the Queen Elizabeth carriers reach their full operating capability in the mid-2020s the RN will have a pair of very capable ships with robust air groups, able to be tailored to suit specific missions. While the phrase "second only to the United States" is so often repeated by MoD and government officials that it's become a bit of a cliché, the capability offered by the Queen Elizabeths will almost certainly live up to those ambitious words. There are ways that this impressive capability could be further enhanced, with V-22 for AAR, heavy lift and COD, and grown over time by trialing UAVs; with a view to eventually including them in the array of aircraft that can be operated from the carriers' decks. If the TAG concept is properly implemented and a variety of aircraft from the RAF, FAA and AAC are routinely embarked for training in the maritime environment then these ships will deliver on the impressive flexibility they were designed to offer.

Operating both carriers:
SDSR 2015 delivered the pledge that the UK would operate both ships simultaneously to ensure one carrier will always be available for deployment 24/7/365. What this will mean in practice is that most of the time one ship will be alongside in the UK, usually undergoing repairs or a refit, while the other acts as the duty carrier: available to respond to events and deploy at short notice. However, as the RN discovered with its previous carriers, leaving ships alongside with minimal manning for prolonged periods of time leads to steady material deterioration and shortens the lives of the ships. Both Invincible and Ark Royal fell afoul of this, spending significant time unmanned and alongside in 3 Basin badly effected the material state of both ships. With only two Queen Elizabeth carriers available the RN cannot afford to make the same mistake, effectively mothballing one ship at a time for lack of crew will shorten the life of a class that could, given adequate care, serve for half a century. Failure to properly man and service both ships at all times would inevitably impose avoidable maintenance costs further down the line and steadily erode the RN's ability to surge two carriers as a "maximum effort" as a serious war fighting contingency against a near-peer opponent.

An Invincible Class carrier, tied up alongside in HMNB Portsmouth's 3 Basin

It has been said elsewhere but the 2020 SDSR needs to include a substantial increase in RN manpower, to enable the service to adequately crew both ships at all times and surge two carrier decks in an emergency: provided the spare ship isn't in deep refit. Providing adequate crew for both ships would also introduce additional opportunities for training in or near UK waters. The need to provide the RAF and AAC pilots and maintainers with experience of operating in the maritime environment has already been mentioned. With only one carrier deck operating at any time, which may be away on operations, the limited availability of a ship for the component elements of the TAG to train on is concerning. The flexible TAG concept only works if its constituent elements can be called upon at short-notice to form a mission-specific package. While the mock carrier at RNAS Culdrose will be a useful facility for training pilots in deck operations, it is no substitute for realistic training at sea. With a sufficiently manned second ship the RN could, when the ship is available, use the reserve carrier for training around the UK. Employing the Queen Elizabeths in this way ensures that the RN would always have more than enough ship-side crew to keep the duty carrier at full strength, and enough to make the two carrier "maximum effort" a realistic prospect. In order to achieve this though, the RN's total manpower must rise.

CATOBAR:
Finally, the thorny issue of whether these ships will ever be reconfigured and refitted with catapults and arrestor wires needs addressing. In 2012 the Coalition government looked at the costs of converting both ships, briefly committing to the cat & trap configuration, before reverting to the original STOVL configuration once it became clear that the costs of conversion would be prohibitive. The cost of converting the partially built Prince of Wales was stated to be an additional £2bn, while the class was supposed to be relatively easy to change from STOVL to CATOBAR in reality this does not seem to be the case. Some sources stated at the time the decision was reversed that conversion would have required modifications to over 200 compartments. A mid-life conversion may become necessary if there is no available STOVL replacement for F-35B after its 2045 out of service date. With so many unknowns inherent in predicting what could happen thirty years into the future, all that can be done is to restate much of what we already know.

The QE Carrier flight deck in both the STOVL and CATOBAR configurations

A CATOBAR conversion would be extremely expensive, it would involve very extensive rebuilds of the ships and the generation of a whole new set of training pipelines for pilots, flight controllers and deck crew. It would also mean learning a whole new way of doing things, and it could not be done cheaply or quickly. When all is said and done developing a bespoke UK STOVL aircraft to replace the F-35B might actually end up being the cheaper option, when compared with the cost of the substantial organisational changes that would be necessary. While many long time supporters of the Royal Navy's cause would, no doubt, love to see the UK return to catapult carrier operations the reality is that STOVL currently offers an effective capability at a tolerable cost. In the author's opinion the decision to convert to CATOBAR would only be taken if there was no other alternative, including the development of a bespoke UK STOVL aircraft. The hope at this point should be that the USMC continues to make a convincing case for STOVL aviation within the US armed forces and ultimately gets a like for like F-35B replacement. This would enable the UK to participate in a joint or multilateral programme, with orders large enough to drive down the unit cost. It must be stated again though that predicting the shape of UK naval aviation that far into the future is almost impossible. For all the sentimental and symbolic importance attached to CATOBAR, it is clear at this point that while a mid-life conversion would be possible, it is far from preferable.

Almost from their very inception the Queen Elizabeth class carriers have proved be a subject of controversy. Fierce and sometimes public debates have been held on their relevance in the modern world, usefulness for the UK and the difficulties involved in realising their potential capabilities in practice. The last point was expressed with a clarity that only tabloid journalism could manage in the oft-repeated phrase "carriers with no aircraft". Thankfully, it is now clear that the tabloids were wrong and the public's concern was partly misplaced, the carriers will have a robust TAG with a great deal of potential flexibility and, if necessary, striking power. While there is still a little room for improvement with regards to the air group such as the inclusion of an AAR tanker, Osprey VARS or otherwise, the concept is sound and the aircraft will be available to start realising it by the early-mid 2020s. While the author still has concerns over the long-term durability of the Joint RAF/FAA F-35B arrangement it is certainly a workable plan and may yet prove to be a success. The key to successfully realising the high-minded goal of turning the carriers into tri service aviation ships will be regular joint training for all component parts of the TAG, on the mock carrier deck at RNAS Culdrose but, more importantly: at sea. Without experience and training on a real carrier deck the individual TAG components will likely struggle to adapt to a very different working environment whilst also trying to conduct operations. The old adage train how you fight comes to mind, if we intend to embark RAF Chinooks and F-35s or AAC Apaches and Wildcats then they must spend regular time training aboard one of the carriers. In order to achieve this the RN needs to be given the manpower to operate both carriers simultaneously as often as repair and refit schedules will permit, with the off-duty carrier operating near the UK as a training platform. This would have the added benefit of keeping both ships out of what would effectively be time spent in mothballs: alongside in Portsmouth with a caretaker crew aboard, which shortened the lives of the preceding Invincible class. If the UK intends to make good on it's substantial investment in the Queen Elizabeth carriers they need to be manned sufficiently to maintain them over their 40-50 year lifespan, failure to do so would be yet another example of the MoD being "penny wise and pound foolish".
Finally, while a post-F-35B conversion to the catapult and arrestor wire configuration is theoretically possible, the costs of doing so, and the institutional upheaval it would cause, would be enormous. In the end, despite the emotional pull exerted by the idea of "proper" carriers and the drama of catapult operations, a CATOBAR conversion should only be embarked upon if the only other alternative is scrapping the ships prematurely and wasting the money already sunk into them.

While some commentators have been very dismissive of the UK carrier programme in the author's opinion they could, in time, give the UK a truly first-class capability "second only to the United States". However, in order to achieve that ambitious and, let's not forget, thoroughly attainable goal the UK needs to make good on its current investment in the carriers. This can be achieved by manning and operating both, potentially investing in AAR capability and most importantly ensuring all component parts of the TAG regularly embark and train on the carriers. At the close I will return to the words of Major General Lihua:

 "The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier."

After Type 26: The Royal Navy's Next Generation Frigate

"We will also launch a concept study and then design and build a new class of lighter, flexible general purpose frigates so that by the 2030s we can further increase the total number of frigates and destroyers. These general purpose frigates are also likely to offer increased export potential."

-SDSR 2015

The UK's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review brought a few surprises for those with an interest in the Royal Navy's future equipment programme. The review suggested that the Type 26 programme be capped at 8 hulls, rather than the 13 originally planned, and is to be followed by a class of at least five, but possibly more, lighter general purpose frigates. Commentators have already begun speculating about the meaning of the phrase "lighter, flexible general purpose frigates", with some suggesting that it means the RN will be getting a class of corvettes or lightly armed frigates. In the author's opinion this seems unlikely, for many years the RN's leadership has placed a great amount of stress on the credibility of it's surface escorts as platforms for intensive war fighting first and foremost, with other less demanding tasks coming second. It is difficult to believe that the service has made a radical change in this regard, as First Sea Lord Zambellas has continued to underscore the value of capable and credible warships. That said, it does not take the construction of a platform as comprehensively capable as the 8,000 ton cruiser-like Type 26 to produce a useful first class warship. Indeed, the current 5,000 ton Type 23 frigates have done sterling service, in both high and low threat environments, since HMS Norfolk commissioned in 1990; and were successfully built in very significant numbers: 16 in total.

Before we can begin any discussion about what the next generation frigate could look like, it's role and place within the RN's future fleet needs to be defined. The fleet of the 2030s will look quite different from the one the UK is currently used to: it will be centered on a high-readiness carrier battle group and a lower readiness amphibious group, both supported by escorts as well as other specialist shipping. Alongside the escorts required to support both of these groups, UK frigates and destroyers will almost certainly also have to provide a number of detached vessels to provide presence in areas considered important to national interests. These currently include, but are not limited to: the Falkland Islands, Persian Gulf and West Indies. Of these standing patrol tasks only one, the Persian Gulf, is likely to require the continuous presence of one or more of the UK's most capable warships. This almost certainly means the deployment of either Type 26 or Type 45. The Falklands patrol task would be suitable for the new GP frigate, as it requires presence and some capability to demonstrate the UK's enduring commitment to the Islands but the threat level is relatively low. As for the West Indies, in the author's opinion this tasking would ideally be covered by one or more forward based OPVs and one of the RFA's Bay Class LSDs, for disaster relief in the hurricane season. Occasionally an ASW frigate could be rotated into this region, for counter narcotics and to train submarine hunting in tropical conditions, but this would be when ships are not required for other essential tasking. With this in mind, it seems likely that the lighter frigate would spend most of its time in low to medium threat environments when deployed alone and would likely engage in high-intensity war fighting activities as part of, or supported by assets from, one of the RN's task groups.

The future frigate fleet could easily be compared with the RN's pre-2010 force structure. The large and highly capable Type 26 would act as a direct successor to the general purpose Batch 3 Type 22s, able to embark a command staff in order to act as the lead ship for a task group of British and/or allied escorts. 72 missile tubes, Artisan and Sea Ceptor give it a formidable armament for self protection and localised air defence. Type 26 will also act as the principal ASW escort for the Carrier and Amphibious groups, as it will almost certainly be the only class equipped with the 2087 towed array sonar and it's eventual replacement. With the very high end task group escort roles covered by Type 26 and Type 45 the "lighter frigate" need not require complex air defence or ASW equipment beyond that required for credible self-defence. I would suggest that these ships be specialised to some degree in favour of a certain niche capability, rather than simply being a less well equipped version of the Type 26.

While there are several concepts for differently configured ships I wish to explore later, there are a few common systems that the author considers necessary for the new frigate, if it is to be a credible platform able to operate in both high and low threat environments:

CODLAG/CODLOG propulsion: A proven and reliable system, unlike IEP used in the Type 45, with a good balance between sprint speed, reliability, noise, and fuel efficiency when cruising. The system could be a direct copy of the power plant from either the Type 23 or Type 26 if it would reduce costs.

5" Gun: Generally useful for shore bombardment and a range of low intensity constabulary activities. 5" will be the RN standard once Type 26 enters service, mounting a different calibre gun and introducing a whole new logistical support structure for it would be costly and offer few benefits.

Type 997 Artisan Radar: A modern and capable system which is soon to be the standard across the RN; with sets planned for the Type 23 and 26 frigates, Queen Elizabeth Carriers and Albion LPDs. Fleet wide commonality and a long production run should help keep costs down.

Sea Ceptor: In order to be able to operate alone the frigate needs, as a bare minimum, the ability to defend itself against attack by aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Sea Ceptor offers this minimum credible self defence capability and will be a common and proven system throughout the escort fleet once the Type 26 programme is complete.

Seaboats: facilities for operating two of the RN's existing Arctic 28 or Pacific 22/24 RIBs.

Countermeasures: A carbon copy of the RN standard, currently Seagnat, to exploit the benefits and cost savings of fleet wide commonality.

All the concepts below are envisioned to be in the 5,000-7000t range. Although much of what follows is speculative and oversimplified I intend it more as the beginning of a conversation on some of the options the RN has for it's post-Type 26 frigate.

The Type 81 "Tribal Class" General Purpose frigate HMS Eskimo

Type 83:
Drawing upon the legacy of the Tribal and Duke class general purpose frigates "Type 83" would be a frigate in the 4-5000 ton range with a broad, but shallow, general purpose equipment fit. These ships would be well suited to constabulary tasks where long range endurance, or increased threat, is a factor and OPVs would therefore be unsuitable. A modern armament would also allow them to operate in areas where the threat of attack from state actors or modern weapons systems is also present. In areas where the threat of such an attack is high these vessels could be deployed in pairs, to provide similar AAW and ASuW capabilities to a single Type 26, or as escorts for a carrier or amphibious task group.

As for the armament, twenty four Sea Ceptor and eight strike length Mk. 41 Cells would be a good place to start. As previously discussed Sea Ceptor is a highly credible system ideal for self and point defence, that will come with the major benefit of fleet wide commonality. It will also have been proven on the Type 26. The strike length Mk.41 cells would offer flexibility and access to the next generation of anti-surface and cruise missiles, ASROC could be used but the other options would probably be better suited to the ship's intended role. As a truly general purpose vessel the class would need ASW fit beyond the bare minimum torpedo defence system mentioned earlier. Therefore "Type 83" would include a bow-dome mounted 2050 sonar set, five of which could be salvaged from the last Type 23s in order to equip the new frigate class, assuming that the Type 26 will take the first eight sets. If this is not feasible then an alternative system with similar capabilities would need to be procured.

Aviation facilities would be a hangar and landing pad, able to accommodate a single Wildcat helicopter or smaller rotary wing UAVs. For a general purpose frigate a utility helicopter, such as Wildcat, is invaluable for surveillance, constabulary duties, ASW and surface strike.

The Type 23 frigate HMS Northumberland

Type 27:
Inspired by the excellent think defence article that can be found here, as well as the original concept for the Type 23, "Type 27" would be a dedicated task group towed array ship. The proliferation of quiet diesel electric submarines looks set to be a major impediment to the UK's ability to project power into the littoral in the coming years. Protecting the UK carrier and amphibious task groups against this threat will require more than a single Type 26 defending the group's capital ships. "Type 27" is conceived with area anti-submarine operations in mind. Its purpose would be to operate at some distance from the task group, screening it from underwater threats. Such a class, being more expendable than Type 26, would also be better suited to operating up-threat in the littoral against hostile submarines. Such operations may become an increasingly necessary preceding step before other activity can be conducted in the littoral zone. The weaknesses of the concept lie in the specialist nature of such a design, admittedly it would mainly exist to free up Type 26: the ship best suited to general purpose and lone cruiser operations.

Once again twenty four Sea Ceptor cells should be sufficient to provide adequate self defence capability against air attack and anti-ship missiles. These ships, as dedicated ASW platforms, would need to be equipped with both 2050 (or equivalent) bow dome and 2087 towed array sonars. Accepting that Mk.41 and ASROC would be prohibitively expensive, offensive action against underwater threats would have to be performed by the embarked helicopter. While Stingray torpedo launchers would be a useful addition for last ditch self-defence they are not a necessity, and could easily be omitted in order to reduce costs. Aviation facilities would have to be suitable for a single embarked helicopter. The hangar and landing pad would have to accommodate an aircraft up to the size of a Merlin.

A Japanese Shirane class helicopter destroyer

Type 63
The Royal Navy has a wealth of practical experience which demonstrates the immense value of rotary wing assets, for all manner of operations at sea. From counter piracy and disaster relief to surface strike and anti-submarine warfare, helicopters are valuable assets with a great deal of utility. To date almost all dedicated helicopter destroyers have been specialist anti-submarine warfare vessels. The RN's only experience with such ships was with the Tiger Class cruisers in the 1970s, after they were converted to carry Sea King helicopters. More recently both the Italian and Japanese navies have operated destroyers and cruisers in the 5-7000t range, optimised for helicopter operations. With the RN's current helicopter carrier, HMS Ocean, is slated for disposal in 2018 the need for a new class of helicopter carrying ship, capable of supporting amphibious operations, is apparent. While one of the intended uses of HMS Prince of Wales may be to act as a very large LPH, supporting amphibious operations, she will remain a very high value asset. There will inevitably be times where the risks inherent in putting her close to shore become unacceptably high. Nor can the UK's single large LPH be in more than one place at a time. The ability to sustain an ensuring presence for counter piracy, disaster relief or maritime interception operations with a light helicopter destroyer would be highly useful. In a high intensity war these ships could take on the more traditional role of supporting anti-submarine helicopters.

The ship wouldn't require more than 24 Sea Ceptor cells for self defence. Underwater protection would be minimal, a tried and tested commercially available military sonar would suffice. A very large portion of the deck space would need to be devoted to a very large hangar and helicopter deck, suitable for operating up to four Merlin or Wildcat aircraft. If the hangar can be made large enough, there would also be the possibility of accommodating a single Chinook with unfolded rotors. If the aim is to increase the utility of the ship by allowing the RN to tailor the air group to the specific task then the widest range of helicopters, and eventually unmanned rotary wing UAVs, need to be operable from the ship. In this case a simpler but larger ship could be justified, as fewer complex systems would hopefully help to keep costs manageable.

The Damen Sea Axe 1800 OPV, with a large multi-mission bay

Type 84
A major development of the Type 26 design is its mission bay, designed to accommodate a range of equipment from additional sea boats to air, surface and sub-surface unmanned vehicles and ISO containers. Depending on how quickly these systems mature they could soon play an increasingly significant role in maritime operations. Type 26 has, rightly, been equipped with the mission bay and space to operate a range of future systems currently under development. The potential of unmanned  systems is already being tapped with the Hazard boats and their mine countermeasures drones. In future these systems are intended to be operable from a range of surface combatants, including frigates. The US Navy is also exploring the potential of sub-surface drones for anti-submarine warfare. It is entirely plausible that some of these systems will have moved out of the development phase and into service by the time the next generation frigate begins construction in the late 2030s. Similar to the helicopter destroyer the ship itself would be able to stand-off outside the littoral, away from certain threats, and use its unmanned systems to greatly extend the area it can influence.

The focus of these ships would be their mission bay and unmanned systems, which could offer a great deal of flexibility. Ships would have a variety of mission packages, similar to the concept for the Type 26. Ideally the mission bay would be a copy of the Type 26's, with both classes able to embark tailored mission packages from a common pool of equipment. Like the other concepts 24 Sea Ceptor cells would provide a basic self-defence capability. Aviation facilities should be sufficient to embark a single Wildcat, or a number of smaller rotary-wing UAVs, with an aviation deck and hangar sized appropriately.

There you have it, some sketched concepts for the next generation of RN frigate. Hopefully this brief foray into the realm of fantasy fleets helps stimulate some thinking about alternatives to the simple resigned view that these ships must be a less capable Type 26. In order to get the most from this class the Royal Navy could opt to take a different approach, by learning the lessons of successful past designs (British or otherwise) or looking to the future of unmanned systems. The RN consistently stresses the importance of credible surface combatants, hopefully I've demonstrated that while "credibility" necessitates a complex baseline equipment fit there is also a great deal of flexibility in the way that future UK surface ships could be equipped to carry out their duties.

Post-script:
This article has come under scrutiny from some who dismiss it as a "fantasy fleet" piece. I fully accept that this is indeed the case, and that I went into writing this with the intention of stimulating thought and discussion about some possibilities outside the "normal" conception of a UK surface combatant. The ideas here were never intended to be serious proposals for future UK warship designs. I am, however, happy to see that there is a lively discussion on the UK's next generation frigate going on at the UK Defence Forum. As ever I'd like to thank you, dear reader, for taking the time to read what I've written.