Soldiers from the Sea: Imagining a Future for the British Army

"The British Army should be a projectile to be fired by the British Navy"

- Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary 1905-1916

The recent history of the British Army has been one of apparently relentless decline. At the height of the Cold War in 1960 the UK had 316,000 Soldiers, many of whom were still National Service conscripts. The service's core purpose was at that time brutally evident, the defence of Western Europe in the case of a Soviet incursion. Now the Cold War is over, and the number of troops stands at 82,000 (plus a planned 30,000 reserves by 2020). It is fair to say that the Army has shrunk very significantly. What matters though is asking seriously if we should be worried by this fact, and if we are then should the decline in troop numbers be reversed?

When looking at what the shape of tomorrow's British Army should be it's only logical to start with an examination of yesterday's Army. By asking: why were there 316,000 Soldiers in 1960, and what were they doing? The major commitment, as I've already mentioned, was to the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), and the defence of West Germany against the Soviet Third Shock Army. It is also often forgotten that the BAOR was also an army of occupation, a product of the outcome of the Second World War, with substantial civil duties and powers. In 1960 it's strength stood at 52,000 men of all ranks, fewer than the 55,000 requested by NATO. Although this seems an impressive force it is important to note that the War Office was under no illusions that it would not be an effective force if it were required to fight a major war against the Soviets. The intention was to reinforce this number with some 114,000 troops based in the UK if the Soviets were detected mobilising for war. In reality, even with these reinforcements the BAOR would still have been horribly overmatched by it's intended opponent. Estimates made in the early 1970s were that they could hold the Soviets for 48-72 hours through conventional means alone. It's true purpose was always to act as a demonstration of the UK's continuing commitment to NATO and, like the rest of NATOs forces in Germany, to act as a tripwire for the release of nuclear weapons.
The army of 1960 also retained a substantial role in policing the UK's remaining colonies as many made the, often difficult, transition to independent states. During the Malayan Emergency, which reached it's conclusion in 1960, the UK had some 35,000 troops deployed to that country alone.
Finally there were enough forces set aside for a modest sized "fire brigade", available at short notice and deployable in the event of a crisis.

In summary, the army of 1960 was:
1.Mostly committed to NATO and the defence of West Germany.
2.Responsible for Imperial defence and overseeing the ongoing process of decolonisation.
3.Able to deploy a moderately sized force, at short notice, in support of UK interests in the event of a crisis.

The first two commitments, by their very nature, required a large continental-style army; something that the UK had historically not maintained in peacetime until after the First World War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the handing over of Britain's last major imperial possession, Hong Kong, in the 1990s two of the major reasons for a large British army had disappeared. The 1990 "Options for Change" defence review saw an 18% cut in manpower across the board, with the army reduced to 120,000, mostly through cuts to the combat arms. It's successor, the 1994 "Front Line First" review, saw much smaller reductions, falling mainly on support and logistics structures. Reductions have continued since then, although no single review imposed reductions as great as those under Options for Change, the regular Army has decreased in size by 38,000 since the 120,000 level set in 1990. Many former soldiers and members of the press have lamented the drop in the Army's size, most claiming that the UK is slowly becoming unable to conduct substantial ground operations and high-end warfighting. In the author's opinion this gives the lie to the idea that Britain has ever really been able to do these things alone. With the exception of the World Wars, both of which we fought in coalition with continental allies, the British Army has never been especially good at fighting large continental wars. It usually winds up to be too small and institutionally amateurish at the higher levels of command to be really effective. Some parts of the Army tend to perform better than others and the performance of individual regiments tends to depend more on the quality of individual officers and NCOs, and the command teams they form, than on an effective universal doctrine. Even the comparatively large army of 1960 could not hope to contend with it's intended enemy, the Soviet Third Shock Army, without the use of nuclear weapons and the help of it's European and US allies.

1st Battalion the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment on parade in 1969, part of Britain's large Cold War army

The large Army of the Cold War is now a relic of the past and the future looks set to include a much smaller role for the land component of Britain's armed forces. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that the Army could not sustain an enduring commitment, of an operationally useful size, for the purpose of counterinsurgency warfare. Nor was the force especially well equipped to deal with such a commitment. It took a major effort on the part of all three services to eventually sustain 10,000 British Soldiers and Marines in Helmand province. It would eventually take a combined force of more than double that to begin the process of winning a measure of security for the local population. The force deployed to Afghanistan was neither large enough nor well enough equipped with transport helicopters and suitable vehicles, to do the job asked of them. The UK's involvement in these two wars came at significant expense, with disproportionate cuts falling on the RAF and Royal Navy in the 2003 defence review in order to sustain the Army's strength for operations in both countries. Now Britain's involvement in both wars has come to an end it's necessary to assess what the army was able to achieve in five years in Iraq and thirteen in Afghanistan. Aside from preserving a somewhat larger army for the ten years from 2001 to 2011 the conflicts have proved to be bloody (for modern wars), expensive and have achieved little in the way of furthering the UK's international interests. They have also done immense damage to the prestige and standing of the British Army in the eyes of the United States. I would argue that the army has no foreseeable future in enduring counterinsurgency operations. It's experience of efficient counterinsurgency methods in the context of "colonial policing" is now far less relevant than it was during the wars of decolonisation, when the UK usually had direct control over large native police, military forces and civil institutions as well as extensive expertise on the countries they were fighting in. This would almost certainly not be the case in any future counterinsurgency operation, with the possible exception of the unlikely chance that the IRA returns to armed struggle in Northern Ireland.

This all now begs the question: what is the modern British Army actually for? 

There is no doubt that the success of military operations will always hinge on the ability of the armed forces to effect events on land. While control of the air and sea can be helpful, even essential, to achieving this aim it is their effect on events on the ground which ultimately matters. How, then, do we go about getting the most out of a comparatively small regular army?

The force structure currently envisioned by the government, entitled "Future Force 2020", includes a number of promising changes to the overall force structure. By assigning specific units to regions of interest or concern to the UK there is substantial scope, if correctly exploited, for substantial improvements to the army's institutional understanding of the unique problems and challenges faced in those areas. It also puts a greater focus on preventative measures such as native capability building and defence engagement, rather than allowing states to fail before intervening in a significant (and usually costly) way. In order to make the most of this structural change the increasing investment in intelligence needs to be kept up and effectively co-ordinated with the activities of the regional brigades. Improved co-ordination with the Department For International Development (DFID) and Foreign Office will also be necessary to realise the aim of conducting early and effective preventative action. To achieve the close interdepartmental civil/military co-ordination needed regional command teams, which would provide overall direction and leadership, should to be developed. They need only be small civilian-led organisations, equipped with area experts and put in command of substantial civil and military resources, to achieve the government's strategic goals in their area of responsibility. Returning to the Army, improving our capability for regional defence engagement will mean enduring deployments of small numbers of troops, in and around potential trouble spots. It is encouraging to see that their presence in Africa, an area with a young population and vast economic potential, is likely to be increased. If the UK follows in the footsteps of their successful training missions in Sierra Leone and Kenya there is much that could be achieved at a low cost and with small numbers of troops.

The areas of responsibility for Future Force 2020's regional brigades

That said, the army will always have an important role for when things do not go to plan, when preventative measures occasionally fail the Army will need the ability to go to the crisis and effect events on the ground. Now we can return to the third role I outlined when looking at the 1960 structure:

Able to deploy a moderately sized force, at short notice, in support of UK interests in the event of a crisis.

This will be just as necessary for the Army of tomorrow as it has been in the past. The ability to surge and sustain a capable land force into a potentially hostile area requires a broad array of specialised equipment. There are a few predictions that we can make about the shape and core requirements of such a force, based on the Future Force 2020 structure. The Army's main surge strength seems to be invested in the "Reaction Force", made up of 16 Air Assault Brigade ready to move at very short notice and 3rd (UK) Mechanised Division made up of three armoured infantry brigades on rotation, with one at short notice and the other two available with longer notice. These slot into the broader Joint Rapid Reaction Force, the tri-service structure whose land component also includes 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines. It's undeniable that either the bulk or the entirety of any UK reaction force would need to be moved, supplied and possibly introduced into the area of operations by sea. With uncertainty about where the next military mission may come from, Britain no longer has the luxury of being able to pre-position it's heavy equipment and quickly fly troops out to crew it when needed, as was the case for the BAOR. Despite this fact, the UK's rundown of it's military sealift since 2011 has become worryingly apparent. One of the UK's two Albion class LPDs has now been mothballed, the helicopter assault ship HMS Ocean will be paid off without replacement in 2018, RFA Largs Bay was sold to the Royal Australian Navy in 2011 and two of the six Point Class RO-RO merchant ships leased by the MOD had their contracts terminated. In total this amounts to a loss of almost a quarter of the UK's sealift. In real terms the cut has likely been even deeper, because of the demands of maintenance for the remaining platforms. Having a smaller, more regionally engaged and better equipped army will do Britain no good if it isn't deployable enough to "go to the crisis" and remain there until the job is done.

Sealift will become an essential force multiplier for a smaller army in the future

Unless we wish to become wholly reliant on the goodwill of the United States to cover our logistical needs then a substantial investment in military and civilian sealift will be necessary. The ability to move significant numbers of well equipped troops nearly anywhere in the world at a few weeks notice is essential if the UK is to make the most of a small but powerful army in the future. The costs involved in expanding the sealift force needn't be prohibitive either, the RFA's Bay Class cost £130 million each (2006 prices) or about a third the cost of a Type 26 Frigate. HMS Ocean, the centerpiece of the amphibious fleet, cost about the same as a Type 23 Frigate. Also to be considered is that the manning costs of sealift vessels operated by the RFA is substantially lower than that of Royal Navy warships of a comparable size.

In summary, the British Army at it's peacetime numerical height in the 1940s-1960s was neither large nor well enough equipped to actually fight the war it was intended for against the USSR. In the years that followed successive governments reduced the size of the army until it constituted a large, but still conventionally impotent, nuclear tripwire as part of NATO. Since the disintegration of the communist bloc between 1989-91 the army has seen even further reductions, largely as a function of the draw down from it's Cold War posture in Europe. There is now little popular or political stomach for protracted counterinsurgency operations following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the focus in future will become prevention through native capability building and defence engagement, with a robust intervention force available in the event of a crisis. In the author's opinion, to really make the most out of a smaller army the UK needs to be looking seriously at expanding it's sealift capability so the smaller army can remain a highly deployable independent force.

The EU Refugee Crisis: All Quiet on the Libyan Front?

As part of a growing series on the root causes of the EU Refugee crisis, and how the West could move to restore stability to the Mediterranean basin, today's article will take a look at the current situation in Libya.

Since the 2011 NATO intervention the situation on the ground in Libya has deteriorated significantly. The internationally recognised government, based in Tripoli, struggled to exert its authority in the wake of the Gaddafi regime's collapse. Faced with a weak central authority the country slowly began devolving into regionalism, based on tribal loyalties. By 2014 the ruling General National Congress (GNC), elected in the wake of the first civil war, was becoming increasingly unpopular. Amongst other things it was criticised for being dominated by the minority Islamist faction, directly and indirectly supporting Islamist groups and attempting to impose policies in line with strict Islamic legal practice against the wishes of the Libyan people. The political crisis finally came to a head in the winter of 2013-14, with the GNC unilaterally voting to extend their mandate for a further year. Their refusal to stand down at the end of the mandated governing period was met by protests and demands for the establishment of a new elected governing body with popular legitimacy. On the 14th of February 2014 General Haftar, the overall commander of the Libyan Army at the time, appeared in a televised address and ordered the dissolution of the GNC. Elections would be held for a ruling council of deputies, and the running of the country would be conducted in the interim by a "caretaker government".

As expected the GNC refused to comply with General Haftar's ultimatum, accusing him of an attempted military coup. The first fighting, in what can be described as the Second Libyan Civil War, broke out in mid May when the forces of the Libyan Army under General Haftar attacked the bases of several Islamist groups in Benghazi. A day later more forces loyal to the General forcibly dissolved and suspended the GNC parliament in Tripoli. In the following weeks much of the Libyan armed forces sided with General Haftar and a number of large pro-security forces protests were held, denouncing the GNC's support for the militias, seen by many of the protesters as destabilising the country. Elections were held soon after the military's move against the GNC, resulting in a landslide for the anti-Islamists and the formation of a new ruling Parliament. Although the turnout was low, at only 18%, due to the ongoing violence the result has been internationally recognised. The defeated Islamist political factions, mostly grouped around the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, reorganised themselves as the New General National Congress (NGNC) and declared the election illegitimate.

July of 2014 saw major moves by Islamist militias to capture Benghazi and Tripoli and substantially intensified fighting between Government and Islamist forces. By September the situation in the capital had deteriorated to such an extent that the national parliament was moved to Tobruk, conducting it's activities from a requisitioned Greek car ferry, the Elyros. October saw Islamist militias in control of Derna swear allegiance to ISIS' Islamic Caliphate. During the following three months the skirmishes, air strikes and bombings continued, some targeting the country's oil infrastructure.

A diplomatic breakthrough was reached in January of 2015, with the UN support mission in Libya (UNSMIL) helping to bring about a negotiated ceasefire and talks between the NGNC and Government factions. Since the ceasefire fighting has continued between Government forces and ISIS, who have expanded their control over the area around the city of Sirte and carried out terror attacks in the capital. In early March General Haftar was re-appointed as head of the Libyan Army by the national Parliament and Government forces conducted an offensive against the ISIS-held town of Derna, in an attempt to drive the militants out. Later that month Ansar al-Sharia, one of the major Libyan Islamist militias, also declared allegiance to ISIS. General Haftar also announced that Benghazi would be retaken from the Islamist militias.

The process of de-escalation between the Government and NGNC has continued apace, with an increasing number of local peace agreements coming into force. Interestingly, in August the people of Sirte revolted against ISIS rule, the ensuing reprisals killed 38 and the group was forced to threaten the use of poison gas against the population if attacks on their forces did not cease.

The Second Libyan Civil War, Mid August 2015. Government Forces (Red),
NGNC (Green), ISIS (Grey), Local Forces (Blue), Tribal Militias (Yellow).

What is surprising is the degree to which the situation on the ground in Libya has markedly improved this year, and how this improvement has been largely overshadowed by the war in Syria and the escalating Refugee crisis. Until recently the majority of refugees were being moved to Europe by sea, with people traffickers based in Libya providing boats to make the crossing to Italy. Despite the relative reduction in importance of the Libyan route, as tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have begun moving through the Balkans, the Mediterranean crossing still remains the second most popular route into Europe. Many of the refugees using the Libyan route have been displaced by conflicts in Africa, such as the ongoing conflicts in Nigeria and Eritrea, rather than the Middle East.

As the country has slowly been moving towards a peaceful settlement, the long-term result of which will likely be a far more stable North Africa better able to deal with migration and the people traffickers who exploit refugees fleeing conflict, it is vital that the West now give greater support the UN peace process. In the near future we will need to make a substantial investment in the future of that country, in the form of development aid, technical expertise, equipment and training for their security forces. The Libyan government and people have avoided sliding into the kind of serious sectarian violence that would have seen their country join the ranks of a handful of other failed states in Africa. They have done much of the heavy lifting and compromising necessary to begin bringing their country back together but we, in Europe, need to give them the tools to finish the job. If sustaining and building upon the ceasefire agreements requires the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force then we should support such a proposal with finance, logistics and military means if necessary.

Where the West can certainly help is with defeating the ISIS affiliated militias in control of the area around Sirte. Both the NGNC and Government have agreed that ISIS constitutes a common enemy, and both have focused substantial portions of their military effort, since the ceasefire, on attacking areas held by ISIS. Libya's lack of strategic depth, almost all of the population live along the coast, means naval artillery could be brought to bear, along with air strikes and commando raids in support of local ground forces. Striking a decisive blow against the Libyan branch of ISIS would do much to break that organisation's aura of invincibility, such a victory would be a propaganda coup for the West and Anti-ISIS forces in a battle where image is vital. Removing the "third force" from the Libyan internal conflict could also be used as a means of helping unify the country again, turning all forces against a common foe as part of a long-term peace process managed by the UN. It also seems that, unlike in Iraq, ISIS' presence in Libya is resented to by the local populations they control which greatly simplifies the problem.

The UK RFTG on exercise with partner navies in 2015

It just so happens that the UK has a near-ideal force to conduct the operations I have suggested, in support of the Libyan people currently occupied by ISIS militias. The Royal Navy's Response Force Task Group (RFTG) contains all the naval, rotary-wing and amphibious commando forces necessary, while air bases in Southern Italy could be used to conduct air strikes, as they were in 2011. A small military commitment and a short sharp intervention, co-ordinated closely with local forces, would be all that would be necessary to wrest control of the Sirte area from the estimated 5,000 ISIS militia members that currently occupy it. Rather than try to attack ISIS directly where they are the strongest, in Syria and Iraq, by striking and rapidly eliminating their "emirate" in Libya the UK could help further the ongoing Libyan peace process and win an important propaganda victory against ISIS' image of invincibility. In doing so we would make their cause less attractive and possibly hasten them to take rash and uncalculated action on their central fronts in the Middle East, in order to shore up their image.

Of all the places where a Western intervention could succeed against ISIS, Libya is by far the place where such action would result in the greatest good at the lowest cost in lives. We would be honoring the commitment we made to the Libyan people in 2011 and investing in a plan that would result in a more stable, pro-Western and democratic North Africa in the long-term. The great strength of the UK's modern armed forces is our ability to strike at our enemies' weaknesses with great accuracy, delivering a quick rapier thrust rather than a series of crushing sledgehammer blows. Now is our opportunity to strike at ISIS' weakness in North Africa, to cut out the cancer before it has the chance to spread and do more damage to a state still shakily finding its feet again.

The EU Refugee Crisis: A Collective Abandonment of Responsibility

The astonishing thing about the Europe's response to the ongoing refugee crisis is that it has been almost wholly passive. The debates have centred on the number of people to be let into various countries and how the total should be distributed throughout the 28 member states of the EU. This passive response, and the reluctance to seriously discuss action to address the root of the crisis: the Syrian Civil War, is indicative of the malaise that has eaten deep into the influence of the Great Powers of Europe. By abandoning responsibility for what goes on in areas that could be described as Europe's "back yard", North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, the great powers have contributed in no small measure to the deterioration of the situation in Syria and Libya. Military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have sapped any will for the introduction of ground troops into either conflict, even the idea of muscular peacekeeping forces under a UN flag hasn't been seriously mooted.

All of this is a sign, in the author's opinion, of the abrogation of responsibility by European states for their own foreign policy. Increasingly the nations of Europe look to the EU to manage their foreign policy, a body neither equipped nor designed for the purpose. When an issue is too large for the EU to manage, or when military action has been required, all eyes turn to the United States to provide the leadership and resolve to "sort out" a problem. What we're seeing today is a situation where a self-interested and increasingly reluctant United States has refused to take the lead in solving a problem which effects them very little, and which is beginning to effect Europe a great deal. The American response has been almost entirely focused on defeating ISIS in Iraq by bombing. Hardly a solution to the Civil War in Syria.

The sad message of the story seems to be that when everyone believes they're protected by a collective organisations like the EU and NATO they take less responsibility for the defence of their own interests. This has happened to such a great extent in Europe the great continental powers have become strikingly passive international actors. It was not always so, throughout the 1990s the major European powers took an active role in containing and eventually bringing to an end the war in the Balkans. Few should forget that at its worst that conflict was fought by groups just as ruthless as the jihadists of Syria or the militias of Libya. And yet now, we don't even seriously discuss intervention. The cancer of "someone else will sort it out" and "it's not our problem" has spread far, reducing states with the ability and capacity to act to mere onlookers. The fact that Europe accepts refugees is not concerning, what is worrying is that this is our main contribution and the subject of the whole debate.

British troops committed to the UN mission in Bosnia

At least Britain is one of the more involved states, trying to make a difference where it will count. The capitals of Europe should be ashamed that the UK has contributed more in aid to the people of Syria than all of them combined. While supporting US bombing of ISIS targets in Syria, through refuelling and intelligence missions in the region, is a feeble military commitment it's far more than the other great powers will even contemplate. At least the UK is willing to do something rather than stand aside and do nothing at all. Regardless of whether we, as Europeans, want to be involved with these problems or not we don't have a choice in the matter. Either we are willing and able to go to the crisis, or sooner or later the crisis will come to us.

We can no longer pretend that the EU can provide all the solutions to the serious international problems we face today. Nor can we continue to depend to such an unhealthy degree upon the largesse of the United States to pay the price in blood and treasure for maintaining stability in our geographic backyard. If this means spending more on the tools of foreign policy: aid, diplomatic services and defence then so be it. There is increasingly little choice in the matter, lest we are left as passive spectators in our own retreat into irrelevance.

A man of great standing once vocalised a similar feeling to the one that currently exists amongst most of the peoples of Europe when he said: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing." The man was Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the "far away country" was Czechoslovakia. 2015 is not 1938, but when we turn our backs on the world and "only wish to be left alone" the world has a tendency of coming knocking. Like every generation that has come before us we must constantly learn and relearn the vital value of action and the bankruptcy of trying to be a passive bystander on the world stage.

The EU Refugee crisis and the Syrian Civil War: a solution wrapped in a problem

Firstly I'd like to apologise because obviously this article is not the planned piece on Afghanistan, but this week's events have really resonated with me and I think that something needs to be said about how we deal with the refugee crisis currently engulfing Europe. Don't worry though, the article on Afghanistan is in the pipeline. That said, let's take a look at the current state of Syria.

The country has been engulfed in a grinding civil war since July 2011, protests against the depredations and misrule of the Assad government earlier that year spilled over into an insurgency that has steadily grown into the full blown civil war. Over the course of the following four years four more or less distinct actors have emerged.
   The Assad government still commands formidable military resources, and controls most of the South and West of the country, as well as the entire Mediterranean coast, The ports of Latakia and Tartus remain its critical lifeline to their main supplier of arms and equipment: Russia.
   The other major faction is ISIS, in control of most of the North Western half of the country. Their fighters are often able to offset their disadvantage in heavy equipment with an innovative style of fighting which combines conventional maneuver warfare with guerrilla tactics such as the use of mines and IEDs. From what we know from Iraq they also seem to be led by highly experienced people, some ex-Iraqi Ba'athist officers from the Saddam era included.
   On the peripheries of the country sit the remnants of the Free Syrian Army, who hold enclaves in the West of the country the largest of which is in the far North West along the border with Turkey. The FSA is by now an eclectic mix of democrats, communists, anti-ISIS jihadist movements and more. They do have a good number of experienced military personnel, mostly defectors from Assad's Army, and some western backing and equipment. Unlike ISIS the FSA has to rely mainly on guerrilla tactics and raiding, as it lacks the equipment and training to take on ISIS or the Assad government in conventional fighting. They also share an important alliance with the government of"West Kurdistan".
   The Kurds occupy two enclaves in the far North East and North West of the country, along the Turkish border. While the Kurdish armed forces are likely some of the most coherent in the conflict, their unity is based on a strong ethno-nationalist identity that seems to have broadly transcended political differences during this conflict. The socialist YPG or "people's protection" militia command the Kurdish military effort in Syria. Their fighters tend to be less experienced and trained than their ISIS counterparts, although the leadership has considerable military experience from the on-off guerrilla conflict waged against the Turkish and Assad governments. Despite this their fighters have proven steadfast when placed in good defensive terrain and given adequate support by Western air forces, inflicting an important reverse on ISIS at the border town of Kobane in late 2014.

Areas occupied by: Assad's forces (Red), ISIS (Grey), the FSA (Green) and the Kurds (Yellow)

The military situation on the ground seems to have become a stalemate, with the two major factions unable to make real progress against one another and the smaller factions reduced to defensive and guerrilla operations. The war, if it continues as it has until this point, looks set to grind on for years and destroy much of the country's infrastructure in its course.
   According to the UN High Commission for Refugees the conflict has officially displaced just over 4,013,000 people as of July 2015 (although the real number is likely higher). To put this into perspective the Syrian population in 2011 was just under 22,000,000, between a fifth and a quarter of the total population are now refugees in other countries. This doesn't include the estimated 6,500,000 internally displaced people. The largest refugee populations are in the countries nearest Syria, with 3/4 (3 million) of the refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Of the remaining 1/4 many have made their way to Europe via North Africa. Deciding how to manage these people has thrown the EU into crisis and proven to be politically divisive across the continent. Germany's preferred solution, a migrant quota system managed by the EU, proved unacceptable in the latest Brussels Summit. Since then the response has been largely deadlocked at the EU level and national governments have started taking measures of their own, such as Hungary's construction of a border fence.

Throughout all of this Britain has played a reasonably quiet but important role, contributing the second largest aid package after the United States (worth some £900 million) to improving the refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon as well as mitigating the effects of the conflict in Syria itself. However, the UK has come under intense recent criticism from some quarters, especially in Germany, for its refusal to accept greater numbers of refugees. This is especially important to the Germans, considering that Chancellor Merkel is predicting that they could see an influx of up to 800,000 asylum seekers, mostly from Syria, by the year's end. Crisis appears to be piling upon crisis, producing movement of people on a scale not seen since the Second World War. What has been missed is that Britain has been saying the right thing about the refugee crisis from the start: treating the symptoms by taking in refugees is no solution compared with treating the cause by bringing peace and stability back to Syria. While this is far easier said than done it is the correct position. The war in Syria is out of control, and now the crisis is sat staring at the White cliffs of Dover. We can no longer afford to remain a passive observer.

This may be where you could expect me to launch into a polemic on the necessity for Western intervention, as I suggested would be the right course of action in Iraq. But Syria is not Iraq and the solution to this problem is sitting right in front of our collective noses: the refugees themselves. Within the Syrian diaspora is all the manpower, leadership potential and technical skills necessary to retake and rebuild that country. What they need is housing, organising and equipping. I'm not just talking about recruiting and training a new Syrian Army from the refugee population (although this will be essential), but also creating a government, judiciary, medical services, brigades of people responsible for reconstruction of key infrastructure and a light paramilitary force capable of basic law enforcement. We would need to generate all the institutions necessary for the administration of a medium sized state, some as a nucleus to be built upon and some as fully formed services, before re-introducing them to the country as the leading force in an international intervention.

We have 1/4 to 1/5 of the country's total population sat in camps outside of Syria or displaced to Europe. By some predictions at the end of this year there will be over a million Syrians in Europe. If we in the West can tap into the sheer human potential of this body of people, give them purpose and help them retake and rebuild their country there really are few limits to what we could achieve.
  Let me be clear, this would not be taking in refugees because it looks like a good humanitarian thing to do. We would be pursuing a hard-nosed political and military strategy designed to further our interests in the region: removal of Russian influence from Syria by overthrowing Assad (something we're already committed to), the installation of a popular and democratic pro-Western regime in Damascus, the defeat of ISIS in Syria and the restoration of stability to the Eastern Mediterranean which would allow refugees to begin returning to Syria.

A sea of untapped human potential

This wouldn't be cheap or easy, the construction of a competent new Syrian army, to be trained and equipped to Western standards, alone would take years and cost billions. That said, by the debates over equipping the FSA and the dispatch of training missions to aid Iraqi forces the West seems comfortable with training and equipping local forces to do its fighting. What I'm suggesting is that we do this on a vast scale, dividing the effort across Europe and the United States. This is hardly a new experience for the West either, the UK and US (and NATO nations in Afghanistan) have built essentially new armed forces from scratch in the past in far more difficult conditions. If we can muster the will and leadership we could do it again.

Earlier I stated that the crisis was "producing movement of people on a scale not seen since the Second World War". Well maybe we should look to the free forces of WW2 for inspiration, drawn from refugee populations and the shattered remnants of armies from all over Europe. Britain took them in, trained them to modern standards and armed them with US equipment before they symbolically led the liberation and rebuilding of their countries alongside the Allies. Maybe General David Richards was right when he said that the UK "must go onto a war footing" to defeat ISIS. The only real solution is for the Syrian people to liberate their own country from the tyrants and terrorists who have taken control of it. If we in the West enable them to do this, by turning the refugee population into the basis of a new Syrian state, then we may just achieve a truly great liberal intervention. So yes, we should accept more Syrian refugees into the UK, but as part of a concerted effort to put an end to the Syrian Civil War and ultimately rebuild that country.