The sun never sets: going back East of Suez

The phrase East of Suez is so inextricably linked with Britain's imperial past that even the mention of it evokes images of cruisers on far flung tropical stations, colonial officials in white linen suits, and all the mystery and adventure of 'the Orient'. Almost inevitably, like all of the other trappings of empire, East of Suez was abandoned and consigned to the history books in 1968. Britain had simply become too small, backwards and poor to continue pretending that it could project force half way around the world. All it took was a government willing to accept Britain's new place in the world, as a diminished regional power, before all the Imperial pretense fell by the wayside. This is how the story usually ends, with a nation in terminal decline, a defining moment in the steady fall of an empire.

Unfortunately for the neat and ordered history of the rise and fall of empires, there is another story of Britain's involvement East of Suez, and it's not nearly as clear cut. While it is true that British troops withdrew from a range of military bases from the Gulf to the Far East, following the 1967 Sterling crisis, the UK never fully disengaged from the region. Before the 1971 date for final withdrawal Britain had already helped establish the five powers defence arrangements, a series of bilateral defence treaties with the leading commonwealth countries in the region, that guarantee the sovereignty of Malaysia and Singapore. By working closely with the new and old commonwealth partners Britain laid the foundations for a 'quiet alliance' that has kept the peace in the region for over 40 years. The security and independence of Malaysia and Singapore remain vital interests for the UK. The strait of Malacca, which borders both countries, handles around one quarter of global traded goods and keeping the waterway open and free ensures that oil, commodities and manufactured goods can flow freely between Europe and the rising Asian economies. The British permanent commitment is small and very cheap: a dock complex in Sembawang, Singapore and 'Naval Party 1022'- the few staff required to man it. Recent developments seem to suggest that post Afghanistan the UK intends to become more, rather than less, involved with the FPDA. Suggestions that for the first time in quite a while British soldiers and airmen will be exercising with their five powers partners is a sign that this 'soft alliance' is stronger and more important than ever.

While the Royal Navy's presence in South East Asia has reduced significantly since the 1968-71 withdrawal from its bases in the region the UK has maintained an impressive ability to surge maritime forces to the region when necessary. The 1983-4 Orient Express deployment saw a UK Task Group conduct a tour of the Indian Ocean and Far East. Led by the light carrier Invincible and including three frigates, a destroyer, a diesel-electric submarine and two RFA support ships the group visited a number of ports in India before heading on to Singapore and exercising with the American and South Korean navies in the South China sea. Similar large group naval deployments to the Far East were conducted in 1992 and 1997. The increased pressure on the surface fleet, due to diminishing escort numbers since the end of the Cold War and the heavy burdens imposed by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have made these large flag-flying exercises a rare occurrence since 2001. The Task Group deployments have been replaced by single-ship tours of the region, such as Daring's 2013 visit to Australia. Despite a smaller surface fleet, the UK has continued to demonstrate an impressive ability to surge substantial naval forces into the region when necessary. This was demonstrated in the same year, when Typhoon Haiyan devastated the Philippines. Daring and the carrier Illustrious was sprinted out to South East Asia to provide disaster relief, stopping to take on supplies at Sembawang dock in Singapore. This just goes to show that the UK's ability to reach around the globe, and into East Asia, with naval forces remains substantial.

The other major military component of Britain's presence in Southeast Asia is the army's garrison in Brunei. Some 2000 troops remain permanently based in the small sultanate near the North coast of Borneo, centered on one of the Gurkha infantry battalions and its supporting forces. The forces are funded by the Sultan and base facilities have been provided to Britain on a five year rolling lease since 1962. Political and military ties between the two countries remain exceptionally strong and look set to remain so for the foreseeable future. The forces stationed in Brunei currently form the UK's Far East acclimatised reserve, in recent years they have taken part in the interventions in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. The British army's jungle warfare courses are also taught there, using the thick rain forests and tropical climate as the ideal location for practical training, particularly for special forces. In support of this mission the army also stations a number of Bell 212 Twin Huey helicopters in the country, as part of 7 flight Army Air Corps. These were deployed following the 2004 Tsunami which struck Indonesia, as part of the disaster relief operation in Northern Sumatra. Brunei became the sole permanent UK military base in the Far East after the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 but, unlike the former colony, its use as a jumping-off point for action in the region has been relatively uncontroversial.

The Armilla Patrol laid the foundations for current UK presence in the Gulf

Ostensibly the British withdrawal from the Middle East and Persian Gulf in 1971 was a clear sign of retreat from imperial responsibilities. The UK was no longer prepared to act as the guarantor of regional stability and consequently pulled out of its military bases in the Gulf States. Under the pressures of the Cold War the United States very rapidly stepped in to fill the vacuum left by Britain's exit, laying the foundations for the current regional order. However, in spite their apparent 'withdrawal' in 1971 Britain has maintained an almost continuous presence ever since. Between 1970 and 1976 the UK deployed some 500 soldiers, Royal Marines and special forces personnel to Oman, to combat communist guerrillas in the Dhofar rebellion. With the support of Iranian troops and forces trained, and in some cases led, by the British the campaign was brought to a successful conclusion and the Adoo insurgents defeated.

The first step towards a post-imperial role for the UK was taken in 1980, the Iran-Iraq war threatened to spill over into the Persian Gulf, an area vital for the movement of crude oil and petroleum products at this time. To safeguard shipping during the conflict the Armilla patrol was established. This has entailed a constant minimum presence of at least one frigate, destroyer and a nuclear powered attack submarine, supported by an RFA tanker, ever since. These forces have been scaled up and down in proportion to the needs of the government, as well as the threat to UK interests at the time. During the 1990-91 Gulf War eleven RN warships and six RFA supporting vessels were assigned to Operation Granby, with the destroyers Gloucester and Cardiff playing a leading role in the destruction of the Iraqi navy. An even larger force was assembled for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Seventeen warships, including the carrier Ark Royal and the assault ship Ocean, supported by thirteen RFAs, deployed to the Gulf. Although the two surge efforts during the wars with Iraq were atypical, constant naval presence with powerful surface and sub surface combatants, has formed the bedrock of the UK's Gulf presence since 1980. In view of this, the recent news that the UK is to establish a naval base in Bahrain shouldn't come as a great surprise. Substantial maritime forces have been deployed in the region for so long that significantly shortening their logistics train through forward basing makes sense. In terms of military value alone the move will free up a number of RFAs currently dedicated to supporting the RN's presence in the region. Forward maintenance facilities will be essential to get the most out of the current small pool of nineteen high-end surface escorts.

Due to the rise in piracy around East Africa between 2005 and 2013 the UK has contributed surface escorts and RFAs intermittently to the multinational combined task force, established in 2009, to safeguard merchant shipping in the area. Since 2010 there has been a marked decline in the seizure of vessels by pirates in the area, in part because of the efforts of international maritime forces.

The Gulf and surrounding region looks set to remain the area where the greatest military threats to Britain's economic prosperity could emerge in the future. The recent nuclear deal with the Iranian regime is a positive start, but there still remains a great divide between the Islamic republic and the West. In concert with partners in the region and around the world the UK presence will continue to act as a deterrent to any state or non-state actors that would threaten the freedom of merchant shipping in these important waterways.

Afghanistan: projecting UK power East of Suez

Finally we come to Afghanistan, the army's largest sustained deployment since Korea. To lay the success of sustaining a force of nearly ten thousand British service personnel in the country solely at the feet of the army would do a disservice to the marines, sailors and airmen, without whom a campaign on this scale would not have been possible. Although the UK did not provide a huge proportion of the total manpower, the US at the height of the war had just under 100,000 troops deployed. Despite this the British troops were likely some of the most militarily capable of the ISAF forces. Unlike some of the other European forces in Afghanistan, UK troops were generally prepared and trained for intensive combat and equipped with robust rules of engagement. They also brought an impressive array of equipment with them, which was steadily tailored and upgraded as the threat from Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents developed. The procurement of a specialised fleet of mine-resistant vehicles is only one example of how the system designed to provide equipment deemed an "urgent operational requirement" was refined throughout the conflict.

Few other countries can boast the ability to sustain such a large and capable force in high intensity combat for as long as the UK did. It must also be remembered that this force was projected into a land-locked country half way around the world, and that until 2008 the army also had significant forces deployed to southern Iraq. This ability alone demonstrates that Britain deserves to be counted amongst the world's serious military players. I'll reserve a finer analysis of the conflict and it's outcome until a later date. However, the essential take away is that the British armed forces have fought some of their hardest battles since the 1950s, in one of the longest wars fought in recent years, with large and capable forces projected East of Suez.

Royal Navy forces contribute to maritime security in the Persian Gulf

In view of the last forty years of history we can clearly see that Britain's 1968-71 withdrawal from its East of Suez commitments occurred in name only. While the way the UK continues to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf, East Africa, South East Asia and the Far East has certainly changed over time it is arguable that they are just as involved in these areas as before. Much of the instability of the 21st century looks set to play out far from the shores of the British Isles and the armed forces remain equipped and able to 'go to the crisis' in ways that few other countries can. As the draw down from Afghanistan is completed, and the defence effort is re-balanced in the wake of that conflict, equipment programmes such as the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, F35 Joint Strike Fighter and Type 26 frigate look set to ensure the armed forces remain able to deploy military force globally. Flexible and deployable forces will be necessary to face new challenges and threats from state and non-state actors.

The huge variety of defence activity that still takes place East of Suez is anything but an anachronism. The imagery of a long lost colonial past may still resonate strongly, but since 1968 Britain has transformed it's role in that area. No longer the declining colonial power but a dynamic and vibrant medium power with security needs and national interests that spread around the world, backed up by an enviable raft of defence agreements and alliances and in possession of highly capable armed forces. Just like the title of this post, Britain's 'withdrawal' from East of Suez is a misnomer. We never really left.

Killing people and breaking things: dealing with the Islamic State

In June of 2014 the previously obscure Islamist militia known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant stormed over the Syrian border, into Western Iraq and onto the TV screens of millions of people around the world. Their initial blitzkrieg offensive culminated on the 29th of that month, with the proclamation of a caliphate by their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the group renaming itself simply 'Islamic State'. A further offensive in August, directed against Kurdish territory to the West of Mosul, trapped thousands of Yazidi refugees atop Mount Sinjar and brought the first concerted Western intervention in the developing conflict. Since then the front lines have largely stabilised, with back and forth fighting mainly on the roads leading North and West out of Baghdad and in the area between Mosul and the Kurdish regional capital of Erbil. Neither Iraqi government or Islamic State forces have been able to break the deadlock thus far, both lacking the military capability to do so. The slightly better led and motivated Kurds seem unlikely to advance far outside their own territory.

Broadly speaking the Iraqi Army has been poorly led and motivated, suffering especially badly in the face of mass desertions during the initial offensives of 2014. Its real strength though is the constant supply of US arms and equipment it can count upon. In comparison IS has appeared thus far to be well led and motivated, with its command structure built around a core of experienced ex-Iraqi Baathist officers and highly motivated Jihadist fighters. Their lack of a steady supply of arms, and likely inability to maintain the heavy equipment captured in Mosul and Syria over anything more than the short-term, may however prove to be their Achilles heel. If the war remains a drawn out attritional affair then it seems unlikely that IS will survive in the long-term. The Iraqi government forces will slowly improve as the pressures of war weed out the incompetent leaders, and protracted combat experience hardens their previously green troops. For IS though, a prolonged conflict almost certainly spells eventual defeat. Casualties amongst their mid and low level officers will prove increasingly difficult to replace with leaders of the same quality and skill. Once the group loses its tactical advantage, afforded to them by competent battlefield leaders, it will start losing. The higher ups will be unable to impose greater central control to counteract the effects of this attrition, because of the limits placed on electronic communication by Coalition signals intelligence aircraft. If they decide to lead from the front they too will be exposing themselves to injury or death.

It seems then that the current US strategy of 'degrading' IS will eventually prove successful and result in the defeat of the group. However, while their logic is sound the consequences of a victory won by slow grinding pressure on IS in Iraq will likely prove catastrophic for the people of Western Iraq and the region. As IS is slowly ground down it will inevitably press ever more of the population it controls into military service. We have seen what this sort of victory looks like before, a country of old women and young children living amidst the rubble of towns and cities leveled by fighting. Even with the enormous Marshal aid programme it took Germany more than thirty years to rebuild much of its infrastructure and, make no mistake, there will be no such comprehensive programme for the reconstruction of Iraq. This doesn't even begin to address the even greater numbers of people that will be displaced as the Iraqi army drives IS back street by street, adding to the more than 4 million people already displaced by the wars against IS. A vast swathe of the Iraqi state will effectively be reduced to prolonged and extreme poverty and hardship. This could very well breed the next generation of jihadist fighters to throw Iraqi state into another prolonged conflict it can ill afford.
In human terms alone this is a victory that Iraq and the West cannot afford to win, especially if blame for the current conflict continues to be laid at the foot of the US and UK for initiating the 2003 invasion.

Iraq's future is Syria's present if the current strategy of slow attrition is maintained

The involvement of regional powers is not a real solution to the problems Iraq faces either. As we have seen with Turkey's recent involvement in the conflict, directing most of its bombing against the Kurds rather than IS, most of the region's powers have ulterior motives or too much at stake to risk involvement. The conflict is likely already another outlet for the Middle Eastern Cold War between the major Sunni and Shia powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Of all the regional powers Egypt and Jordan would seem best suited as allies in the fight against IS, but like all things in that area of the world once action is taken things tend to become very complicated indeed. Some commentators, Malcom Rifkind among them, have suggested alignment with President Assad's beleaguered regime under the idea that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'. Despite evidence that suggests that the Baathist regime has engaged in a truce with IS, so that both sides can focus on destroying what remains of the Free Syrian Army. Russia can play the game of supporting President Assad's 'lesser evil' but the West has come too far, by supporting the FSA and threatening to bomb the regime over the use of chemical weapons, to go down this path now.

So what is Britain currently doing to combat IS? Operation Shader is the UK's tri-service military effort in Iraq, led by the efforts of the RAF's 903rd Expeditionary Air Wing flying out of the Akrotiri air base on Cyprus. The ten MQ-9A Reaper drones, eight Tornado GR4s and Tomahawk-armed nuclear powered submarine form the sum total of the UK's striking forces currently in the region. The range of intelligence gathering assets deployed is certainly the key British contribution to the bombing campaign. The two Sentry AEW, and four assorted Shadow, Sentinel and Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft, as well as special forces teams on the ground provide a robust array of assets that enable the use of coalition air power. This is especially important for the smaller European and regional coalition members who tend to possess strike aircraft but lack the support and intelligence gathering assets necessary for effective targeting. Alongside these striking forces are two battalions from the Yorkshire and the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiments, stationed in Iraq to provide training to the Iraqi Army and Kurdish forces.

The current level of commitment and military engagement by the UK is commensurate with the requirements of the current US-led attrition strategy. Small numbers of combat aircraft, flying missions principally directed against the logistical and command structure of IS, will succeed in the slow degradation of the combat capabilities of IS. However, as previously discussed, the current attritional strategy is destined to produce disastrous results for the areas of Iraq occupied by IS. If the current coalition strategy of slow attrition and building up the Iraqi Army is destined to result in a Pyrrhic victory that will be catastrophic for Iraq, and likely continue to propagate instability within the country and in the wider region. What I would suggest is that Britain argues the case for a different strategy altogether. Intervention on the ground and a 'counter blitzkrieg'.

Warrior fighting vehicles of the Welsh Guards advance towards Basra in 2003

To call this option controversial is a gross understatement, for Britain and the United States the scars of the 2003 war are still uncomfortably fresh. Even the phrase 'boots on the ground' has become politically toxic and shifting public opinion on the issue will take time, concerted effort and critically honesty on the part of Western political leaders. There can be no 'dodgy dossiers' this time, no lying to the public. Yet, in spite of the very significant political problems, it is what must be done if we are to avoid incalculable damage to the Iraqi state and regional stability.

So how would a Western ground war against IS prove less damaging to the country than the current Iraqi-led ground war? Firstly, the speed that Western armed forces can move and fight at would almost certainly take IS by surprise. Their role would be to conduct the 'blitzkrieg', small powerful armored formations that drive deep into IS held territory, disrupt logistics, sow confusion and ferment panic amongst disoriented and isolated troops. The aim would be to keep the amount of fighting that takes place in built up areas to a minimum, engaging always with overwhelming force but only when absolutely necessary. Following this Western advanced guard would be the Iraqi Army, who would be tasked with reducing the significant pockets of IS forces that had been cut off by the armored spearheads and garrisoning liberated areas. Speed, logistical damage and the rapid capture of enemy territory would substitute for the current strategy of slow attrition. As for an exit strategy, we already have one - continue to build up the Iraqi Army as an inclusive national force with Sunni elements capable of securing their own communities in tandem with local actors, as per the Anbar Awakening of 2006. Some Western troops would have to remain to secure the Syrian border and block further IS incursions, but a large scale 2003 style occupation would be unnecessary. I make no suggestion that Western troops will not be killed if we choose to conduct this sort of operation, but the sacrifice of a few will save the lives of countless Iraqis, who would otherwise be pressed into military service by IS or have their homes destroyed by prolonged back and forth urban fighting. If we are truly humanitarians, concerned with the fate of the Iraqi people, then this is the only option available to us.

If we do this, and do it properly then maybe, just maybe, we can put the ghosts of the last war to bed. For good this time.

The Bear and the Lion: Russia and Britain, European outsiders?

If there is a single word which sums up the Anglo - Russian geo-strategic rivalry it is history. To be precise the 200 years of history after 1815 have, with few notable exceptions, featured foreign policy competition between these two states. Both sit on the periphery of the European continent, separated from the core not only by geography but also different political traditions from the central European states. For Britain constitutional monarchy, liberal values and the rule of law have formed the basis of political life for two hundred years. In contrast the Russian system has tended towards autocracy, illiberalism, and the rule of oligarchs, with each political 'dynasty' eventually collapsing and giving way to the next. The Russian Federation under President Putin is simply the latest expression of a political culture that dates back hundreds of years.

It is fair to say that both countries are located in Europe, but neither is truly European. Both look outside of the continent for important aspects of their national character. Britain's cultural, economic and military ties with the Anglosphere states (The United States, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) exert a powerful force that still draws the country away from the politics of the European core. Similarly, the vast and sparsely populated territory east of the Ural mountains lends Russia its distinct Eurasian character. In times past this distinct Eurasian Russian-ness was coupled with the Communist ideology and a command economy to form a variant for state organisation very different from the Western model. Over a quarter century since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia is still yet to demonstrate any significant moves towards becoming more European. Britain's Atlanticist traditions, especially its 'special relationship' with the United States has exerted a similar draw on Britain away from a purely European future.

So what to make of the conflict in the Ukraine? To really get an understanding of what is driving Russia's involvement in the country it is essential to consider natural defensive barriers as more than a way of keeping hostile armies out of a state's territory, but also a means of insulating that same state from unwanted foreign influences. Both Britain and Russia used their natural defenses to insulate themselves from the political ideas carried by the armies of revolutionary France in the 19th century and fascist Germany in the 20th. To understand why the Ukraine is so vital to Russia's perceived security interests it is necessary to understand the nature of Russia's particular natural defensive advantage. While the English Channel obviously constitutes a formidable British 'moat' the thousand or more miles between the nearest Western NATO state and the Russian Capital is what insulates the 'Russian system' from unwanted European influences. Until recently pro-Russian regimes in Belarus and the Ukraine, and the reluctance of NATO to station troops in the Baltic States, has maintained an ideological and military protective buffer zone between central Europe and Russia. It now seems inevitable that the collapse of the corrupt regime of President Yanukovych in 2014, and its replacement with a Westward looking provisional government, would have illicited a response from Russia in any case.

Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine, winter 2014.

The speed and ferocity of the response seems to have taken many Western capitals by surprise, war had returned to Europe seemingly out of the blue. 'Little Green Men' suddenly appeared in the Crimea and so much confusion and doubt was sown that before a coherent response could be formulated the Russian flag was flying in Sevastopol. By the time the smoke had cleared and it had become obvious that Russia was waging near open war against one of its neighbors their troops and Eastern Ukrainian separatists had occupied over a third of the country. The NATO response to date has included the imposition of damaging sanctions on Russia, which have reportedly shaved 9% off the GDP of an economy already struggling due to the recent collapse in oil and gas prices. The US plans to station equipment for an armored brigade in Poland, and the forces assigned to the Baltic air patrol mission (active since 2004) have had small additions made to them. While certain news outlets in the UK have hailed the crisis in Ukraine as the beginning of 'a new Cold War', for which Britain is woefully unprepared, the Western reaction has generally been rather subdued.

So, should more be done? Is this really the first move by a resurgent and militarist Russia bent on re-establishing its domination over Eastern Europe? To both questions I would issue a resounding no. Russia has fallen far since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the state has become increasingly reliant on the export of oil and gas for much of its revenue and the tumble in prices since the American 'fracking revolution' is hitting them hard. The Russian armed forces may appear formidably large on paper, but much of their equipment is old or obsolete. Of their 12,800(!) tanks only 2600 are assigned to 'active' units, and 1700 of those are aging Soviet-built T-72s. In total Russia possesses around 900 relatively modern tanks assigned to active military units. In comparison the US army has just under 1200 extremely modern M1A2 SEP Abrams tanks in its inventory, some of which have already been moved back into bases in Germany. In truth, while the Russian armed forces look large and impressive on parade in Red Square, in an offensive conventional war against NATO they would lose badly. Make no mistake, we won't be seeing the Third Shock Army rolling through the Fulda Gap anytime soon. Instead, I would argue that Russia is fighting in the Ukraine in an attempt to preserve a rump buffer zone between them and the pro-European government in the West of that country. Without this their leaders fear that a Westward looking 'Europeanised' Ukraine will eventually undermine the current system to such an extent that it could bring about civil unrest and the possibility of another revolution. Russia is fighting to remain an European outsider, because to be anything else would mean the collapse of the current system of corruption and patronage that underwrites the power of President Putin.

The Russian armed forces: formidably large but largely obsolete

So where does this leave Britain? If Russia feels threatened by European ideas to such an extent that it is willing to go to war with its neighbors, in spite of the serious economic damage that it has incurred for doing so, then it seems that we're dealing with that rarest of things, a 'vital national interest'. While it is nice for Britain to support freedom and democracy around the world, and we should politically oppose the illegal annexation of any and all Ukranian territory by Russia in forums like the UN and EU, a less corrupt Ukraine is not worth radically altering our defence and foreign policy posture towards Russia for. Their track record of intervening in neighboring states to prevent the spread of Western institutions like NATO, just look at the 2008 war in Georgia, seems pretty clear. If institutions like the EU and NATO want to expand into these areas then they should expect serious push back from a Russian regime that believes it is fighting to preserve its long term existence. In the opinion of the author it is simply not worth meddling in these areas. Talk of arming the regime in West Ukraine is dangerous. Russia has already made it clear that they are not going to be overly cautious or use half-measures, they're playing for keeps. We have to ask ourselves to what extent are we seriously invested in a Western future for Ukraine, and are we willing to go as far as Russia has to achieve that?

In the meantime Britain is fighting its own battle to remain the other 'European outsider'. In the capitals of Europe and in Brussels the future direction of the European Union, and Britain's place in it, is being shaped. Like Russia, Britain is struggling against the embrace of a purely European future, as powerful cultural and political forces ensure that we will continue to question and challenge many European institutions, from an outsider's standpoint.

Island beginnings

How does a state go about the business of achieving its foreign policy aims? Between means and ends lies the field of strategy, dealing with the "how?". Questions of "why?" "when?" and "where?", when discussing military strategy and the armed forces, can be said to be political in nature. As for the means themselves, the "what?" that a state uses to attempt to achieve its desired ends, it is (in the case of most Western states) an area where politics and the armed forces are jointly, although not equally, involved in crafting the military instrument.

The coherent use of armed force in pursuit of a political goal requires, as a fundamental prerequisite that all these questions are answered in a convincing and logical fashion. Failing to provide convincing answers to the political questions is just as dangerous as failing to answer the military ones. Imagine two scenarios at opposite ends of the spectrum. In the first a state possesses a superbly equipped, led and trained set of armed forces capable of conducting the full spectrum of activities required to achieve any mission asked of them. This state, however, lacks entirely the ability to direct this force or justify it's use. The result is a system as useless as a state entirely bereft of any means of achieving its aims, but with flawless justifications for the use and direction of all forms of state power.

The real world is never as straightforward as this, but numerous parallels with each scenario could be drawn. The first might be considered close to descriptive of the United States' involvement in Indochina between 1954 and 1975. A state with enormous means at its disposal failed to achieve its aims because it struggled to justify why Communism needed to be contained in Vietnam. Ultimately in spite of its possession of immensely capable armed forces and a workable, if far from perfect, strategy the war's political justifications collapsed under the weight of their own contradictions.

For an example of the second scenario described one must look to the experience of the Netherlands during the Second World War. They were able to correctly identify the threat posed by Hitler's militarist Germany, and the invasion of their territory would prove an immensely strong a justification for the use of force. The Dutch, however, failed in their aim of maintaining their neutrality in the event of another European conflict (as they had done during the 1914-18 war). They could not muster the military force to deter or defeat the German armies and were unable to secure their independence through other means.

So where does all this talk of strategy, politics, the armed forces, Americans and Dutchmen leave us? With this as a loose framework I'd like to finally come to the title of this post "Island Beginnings", because my intention is to use this blog to examine the current state of British military strategy. The primary focus will therefore be on the how and the what, although it is impossible to discuss these without occasionally addressing the political context.

As a preface to everything I go on to write I would like to clearly state that I am a firm proponent of the vital importance of the maritime sphere for Britain specifically and the "Anglosphere" states more generally. That is not to dismiss or diminish the importance of the land as the space that activities at sea, or in the air for that matter, must influence in order to achieve many state aims. I suppose I must also declare my bias as a British commentator, such that it is.